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Most people not only believe in free will but assume that if we didn't have it society would fall apart. Gregg Caruso challenges this assumption and argues that belief in free will, rather than being a good thing, actually has a dark side and we would be better off without it. His book develops an ethically defensible and practically workable account of how we can live well—indeed, live better—without belief in free will. The book discusses the moral psychology of blame and anger, the intricacies of our moral responsibility practices, and how we can preserve love, morality, creativity, friendship, and criminal and social justice without free will. He also develops an account of virtue ethics and argues not only that it is consistent with free will skepticism, but that adopting the skeptical perspective can better help us achieve the virtues most important to human flourishing and wellbeing.
Montesquieu is among the most important figures in the history of political thought, yet his published writings reveal next to nothing regarding his personal life. This volume provides the first English translations of letters revealing the character, lifestyle, and ambitions of this titled aristocrat, landowner, feudal lord, wine producer, and influential author. The letters chosen include intimate details regarding his marriage, family life, dalliances, and literary ambitions alongside frank assessments of French and European politics, warfare, and religion that would have aroused government censors if made public. We learn how eagerly Montesquieu sought entry into Parisian social circles after publishing his Persian Letters (1721), and we see how greatly he valued friendships with Parisian women whose influence at court could protect writers criticizing the existing order. In sum, the letters translated for this volume provide crucial context for his published work, illuminating how his life experiences shaped his worldview.
This is a comprehensive introduction to one of philosophy's deepest and most fascinating puzzles, the Liar Paradox. It introduces key theories of truth and paradox, and combines accessibility with depth, tracing the paradox from its simplest formulations to the most sophisticated contemporary theories. Chapters by leading philosophers and logicians present both classical and non-classical approaches - supervaluationist, paracomplete, paraconsistent, and substructural - and examine broader families of paradoxes alongside general theories of paradoxicality. The volume also explores the paradox's connections to meta-mathematics, modality, vagueness, quantifiers, context-dependence, and natural language semantics, demonstrating its far-reaching significance and its central role in logic, philosophy of language, and theoretical linguistics. Structured for clarity, each chapter introduces key ideas and develops advanced arguments, making the book an essential resource for students, researchers, and professionals seeking a comprehensive understanding of semantic paradoxes and theories of truth.
This Element launches a broadside against the visual-centric approach that has dominated philosophical and scientific discourse about the senses. Considering the variety and breadth of sensory experiences, from the deceptively familiar territories of smell and taste to the frequently overlooked experience of touch and interoceptive processes, it challenges us to rethink the philosophical bedrock of our theories of mind. It advocates a shift towards a more multi-modal and embodied approach that values biological realities and cross-cultural insights. It analyses traditional criteria for classifying sensory modalities and examines how sensory augmentation technologies provide insight for theories of perception by virtue of sensorimotor learning. The Element also highlights the disconnect between current scientific advancements and philosophical inquiry, suggesting that refocusing on the senses more broadly defined, especially on kinesthetic experiences, illuminates new paths through the thorny 'hard problem' of consciousness. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Representationalists view thought and language as mirrors of a mind-independent world. On this view, knowing is about accurately representing reality, and meaning lies in representational content. This book offers a pragmatist alternative: it argues that our practices are not just relevant but fundamental to both knowing and meaning—and that knowing-how should be seen as the primary form of knowledge. Building on neopragmatist tradition and engaging with classical pragmatism as well as recent work in epistemology, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of science, the book develops and defends methodologism. This novel framework reorients questions of knowledge and meaning around rule-guided rational practices. The book will appeal to students and scholars in these fields, as well as readers across the humanities and social sciences interested in language, rationality, and their role in communities.
This Element explores the conceptual complexity of time reversal in the philosophy of physics. It aims to show that time reversal, as a symmetry transformation, should not be regarded as a mere mathematical artifice applied to physical equations. It is rather a conceptually rich and multifaceted notion, one whose meaning and implementation are shaped by a combination of metaphysical commitments and heuristic-methodological strategies. Far from being a neutral tool, the way we define and apply time reversal encodes assumptions about the nature of time itself, its relation to motion, about the role of symmetries in physical theories, and about the relation between mathematical symmetries and the world they purport to describe. Such conceptual complexity also has implication for related debates, such as that of the direction of time.
Catholic Priests and the Matter of Sex confronts one of the most urgent crises facing the contemporary Catholic Church: the pervasive culture of clericalism. Through an interdisciplinary approach, this groundbreaking volume offers a penetrating analysis of how clericalism distorts priestly identity, undermines the Church's mission, and erodes lay participation. But this book does more than critique-it explores how clericalism intersects with sexuality, masculinity, and institutional power, revealing how these dynamics shape Catholic life today. With essays from diverse voices, this collection asks difficult but necessary questions: What is clericalism? How does it function? And how can it be overcome? The authors are driven by a deep love for the Church and a desire to support awareness, integrity, and renewal. Bridging theology, ecclesiology, and lived experience, Clericalism and Sexuality is both a prophetic challenge and a hopeful call to reform—a timely resource for anyone committed to revitalizing the Church's mission in the twenty-first century.
A sound philosophy of mathematical physics balances a philosophy of mathematics with a philosophy of physics, sharpening the general applicability problem of mathematics by also taking care of: (i) the early modern `mathematization of the world picture'; (ii) the theory-laden character of the targets of mathematical models of modern physics; and (iii): Wigner's `unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences'. Guided by a historical survey, I propose that theories of mathematical physics are meaning-constitutive a priori constructions, conventional but far from arbitrary and best described as hypothetical. Their models subsequently mediate between theory and nature, that is, between the a priori and the a posteriori. Models mediate by playing the role of Wittgensteinian ian yardsticks or objects of comparison to be held against nature as represented by data models, where the comparison is made via surrogative inference. This balancing act compromises realism.
Combining historical insight with contemporary theory, this book demonstrates that Kant's aesthetics can ground a robust theory of art criticism. It challenges the widespread view that Kant's rejection of aesthetic testimony – the idea that we cannot simply adopt someone else's judgment without first-hand experience - and his dismissal of general rules such as 'symmetry guarantees beauty' or 'a tragic ending ensures depth' leaves critics powerless. If testimony and rules are excluded, evaluations such as 'Blade Runner is a masterpiece' lose authority, while descriptions like 'most of the story takes place in perpetual rain and darkness' seems irrelevant to the critic's evaluation. This book locates the solution in Kant's overlooked judgments of perfection such as 'the film innovates within the neo-noir genre.' It reimagines what critical communication can be by positioning these judgments as mediators. They guide aesthetic evaluations and draw support from descriptions of a work's non-aesthetic features.
The mathematical method and the nature of mathematical knowledge were subjects of intense philosophical discussion in the 17th and 18th centuries. In particular, there was a debate over whether metaphysical truths admit of distinct proof as geometrical truths do, and whether they may be known with the same degree of certainty. This comparison between geometry and philosophy required a proper understanding of how Euclidean demonstration secured certainty. This element examines attempts by Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, Wolff, Lambert, Mendelssohn and Kant to address this question. The emphasis is on metaphysical and epistemological questions about geometrical demonstration in the 17th- and 18th-centuries.
This element describes an emerging and intriguing topic: computational indeterminacy. Indeterminacy occurs when a fixed physical system potentially computes several different functions, and there is no fact of the matter which of these is actually being computed by the system. The phenomenon of computational indeterminacy has potential significance for a number of fields, including neuroscience and cognitive science, artificial intelligence (AI), the theory of algorithms, and circuit design. Here we address foundational and philosophical issues. We also explain how the indeterminacy phenomenon impacts on current thinking about the nature of physical computation. Computational indeterminacy is the subject of a growing number of articles in specialist journals, and The Indeterminacy of Computation introduces the topic to a wider audience. The style is clear and informal, with many helpful diagrams. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
The rise of political extremism is often attributed to citizens' economic and cultural grievances. Less is known about how the state itself may facilitate extremism in contemporary democracies, despite frequent claims that elected leaders fail to contain it. How valid is this critique? Analyzing thousands of documents on the behavior of political parties, intelligence agencies, and the police in Germany across decades and states, the authors show that blind spots in combating extremism are widespread and deeply partisan. In parliamentary debates and election manifestos, right-wing parties devote less attention to right-wing extremist crimes than their prevalence warrants, while left-wing parties often downplay left-wing extremism. Similar divisions appear within ostensibly neutral intelligence agencies and the police. Across institutions, partisanship and ideology shape how state actors address extremist threats, raising concerns about the state's capacity to safeguard public safety and democracy. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Hegel referred to Geist as 'self-conscious life' as a being which exists within a 'web' of sense it spins for itself both collectively and individually. As Geist collectively develops itself in history and in theory, it ties 'knots' in various parts of its web which then form the settled basis for further progress. John Dewey spoke of the fundamental 'deposits' laid down in history in the same way Hegel spoke of 'knots.' Both Hegel and Dewey thought that the kinds of obligations necessary in modern political life could only be actualized in terms of a larger conception of the good life individually and collectively led. However, Dewey argued that given the fact of democracy as a 'way of life' and not merely a form of government was the necessary replacement for Hegel's concept of Sittlichkeit (ethical life) as the living good in which the watchword is freedom.
This Element is about Wittgenstein's engagement with skepticism. Two forms of skepticism will be at the center of this Element: skepticism concerning our knowledge of the 'external world,' and skepticism concerning our knowledge of 'other minds.' It will be shown that Wittgenstein is neither a skeptic nor an anti-skeptic. Rather, Wittgenstein thinks of the skeptic's doubt as a form of denial: a denial of knowledge that one cannot but have. The aim of this Element is to bring out what it means to think of the skeptic's doubt in a Wittgensteinian way, that is, as a doubt that manifests a denial of knowledge that one cannot but have, rather than a philosophical position about the possibility of knowledge that is either true or false and hence an object either of justification or refutation. Wittgenstein's relation to skepticism is therefore unique and highly original.
The nature and importance of the Nachlass from Kierkegaard's hand is not well known, especially to researchers outside Denmark. At his death, Kierkegaard left behind an enormous amount of unpublished material in various folders, journals, notebooks, and on loose pieces of paper. This Element includes observations and analyses on various topics, sketches and outlines for possible works, reading and lecture notes, as well as autobiographical reflections. Although there are numerous introductory books about Kierkegaard, none treats the Nachlass in any detail. This Element is an attempt to make this rich and interesting material better known to international Kierkegaard readers. It shows how Kierkegaard's posthumous writings are interesting and valuable on their own and serve to illuminate his well-known published works.
This Element traces the development of Wittgenstein's views on belief formation throughout the different phases of his philosophy. Section 1 concentrates on the Tractarian period, where the sparse references to belief consist primarily of reactions to Russell. The logical purism of the early Wittgenstein led him to reject psychological stances such as those found in Russell's epistemological works. Section 2 explores Wittgenstein's 'middle' period, focusing on his evolving views on belief formation, influenced by his shift to viewing language as a social practice. It addresses key texts, including The Big Typescript and 'Cause and Effect', and links the psychological mechanisms of belief to Wittgenstein's later grammatical investigations in an analysis that extends to his reflections on mathematics and religion. Section 3 reconstructs the intellectual trajectory that would culminate in On Certainty, tracing the influence of Moore and Newman on the range of belief-forming processes Wittgenstein examines in his final writings.
Philosophical problems fundamentally infuse the theory and practice of astronomy. Bringing together fifteen historians, eleven philosophers, and four pioneering scientists, this volume provides a rigorous yet largely accessible examination of the conceptual and methodological challenges that lie at the intersection of philosophy and astronomy – broadly construed to include astrophysics, cosmology, space science, and astrobiology. Drawing largely on interdisciplinary advances from the past two centuries, the book's chapters tackle metaphysical inquiries into the fundamental nature of reality, the limits of reasoning, the problematic nature of observation and inference, the role of technology, and the epistemology of concepts such as space, time, life, and intelligence. Discussions are anchored to fascinating theories and examples from the 'canals' of Mars to exoplanets, black holes, dark matter, and the multiverse. Written primarily for practicing scientists, this volume will also serve historians and philosophers of science, as well as the curious general reader.
Thomas Aquinas regularly claims that metaphysics is not merely scientific, but the highest and most certain of all the sciences, and his conception of metaphysics is one of the boldest and most epistemically ambitious in the history of philosophy. This book presents a new account of Aquinas's metaphysics, approached from the perspective of his theory of science and knowledge. It offers a novel interpretation of his understanding of the properties of being, the principles of being, the requirements for demonstrative knowledge, and shows how Aquinas's account of metaphysics was able to meet those requirements in a more coherent and compelling way than any thinker who had come before him. It will be of interest to scholars of medieval philosophy, the Aristotelian tradition, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophical methodology.
When faced with a difficult problem or limited information about a novel domain, how do scientists advance their research? As historians of science have widely noted, one strategy common to the natural and the social sciences is to make use of analogy. Formulating hypotheses about an unknown system construed by analogy with what is observed in a more familiar system has repeatedly proven to be a source of discoveries. But what makes analogy such a useful tool for scientific inquiry? Although early reflections trace back to Aristotle, the question of the exact role of analogy in science remains an outstanding one in contemporary philosophy of science. This Element aims to clarify the main epistemological questions at stake and why seemingly obvious answers to them do not survive scrutiny. We provide an overview of the current debate and summarize insights from relevant case studies in the natural and social sciences.