Empathic responses, such as sympathy towards others, are a key ingredient in the decision to provide help to those in need.The determinants of empathic responses are usually thought to be the vividness, similarity, and proximity of the victim. However, recent research highlights the role that attention plays in the generation of feelings. We expanded on this idea by investigating whether sympathy depends on cognitive mechanisms such as attention. In two studies we found that sympathy responses were lower and reaction times were longer when targets were presented with distractors. In addition, online sympathy judgments that allow attentional focusing on a target lead to greater affective responses than judgments made from memory. We conclude that attention is an ingredient in the generation of sympathy, and discuss implications for research on prosocial behaviour and the interaction between attention and emotions.

The attraction effect emerges when adding a seemingly irrelevant option (decoy) to a binary choice shifts preference towards a target option. This suggests that choice behaviour is dynamic, i.e., choice values are developed during deliberation, rather than manifesting some pre-existing preference set. Whereas several models of multialternative and multiattribute decision making consider dynamic choice processes as crucial to explain the attraction effect, empirically investigating the exact nature of such processes requires complementing choice output with other data. In this study, we focused on asymmetrically dominated decoys (i.e., decoys that are clearly dominated only by the target option) to examine the attentional and comparative processes responsible for the attraction effect. Through an eye-tracker paradigm, we showed that the decoy option can affect subjects’ preferences in two different and not mutually exclusive ways: by focusing the attention on the salient option and the dominance attribute, and by increasing comparisons with the choice dominant pattern. Although conceptually and procedurally distinct, both pathways for decoy effects produce an increase in preferences for the target option, in line with attentional and dynamic models of decision making. Eye-tracking data provide further details to the verification of such models, by highlighting the context-dependent nature of attention and the development of similarity-driven competitive decisional processes.

The anchoring effect, the assimilation of judgment toward a previously considered value, has been shown using various experimental paradigms. We used several variations of the sequential anchoring paradigm, in which a numeric estimate influences a subsequent numeric estimate on the same scale, to investigate how anchoring is influenced by multiple anchors, a comparison question, and by a newly introduced debiasing procedure. We replicated the anchoring effect using the sequential anchoring paradigm and showed that, when two anchors of opposite directions are presented, the second seems to influence a subsequent judgment somewhat more. A comparison of a target with another object before the numerical estimate was not sufficient to elicit anchoring, but it might have increased the sequential anchoring effect. The debiasing procedure, based on providing reference points on the numerical scale, prevented the sequential anchoring effect. The results are in accord with the scale distortion theory of anchoring, but other theories may also account for the observed findings with additional adjustments.

Prior research finds that liberals and conservatives process information differently. Predispositions toward intuitive versus reflective thinking may help explain this individual level variation. There have been few direct tests of this hypothesis and the results from the handful of studies that do exist are contradictory. Here we report the results of a series of studies using the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) to investigate inclinations to be reflective and political orientation. We find a relationship between thinking style and political orientation and that these effects are particularly concentrated on social attitudes. We also find it harder to manipulate intuitive and reflective thinking than a number of prominent studies suggest. Priming manipulations used to induce reflection and intuition in published articles repeatedly fail in our studies. We conclude that conservatives—more specifically, social conservatives—tend to be dispositionally less reflective, social liberals tend to be dispositionally more reflective, and that the relationship between reflection and intuition and political attitudes may be more resistant to easy manipulation than existing research would suggest.

This paper introduces a novel theoretical model and measure of strategic thinking in social decision making. The model distinguishes four strategic orientations: egocentric (thinking about how one’s actions shape one’s outcomes), impact (thinking about how one’s actions shapes others’ outcomes), dependency (thinking about how others’ actions shape one’s outcomes), and altercentric (thinking about how others’ actions shape their outcomes). Applying this model to explain social behavior in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, an exploratory study finds that the more people think about how their actions shape others’ outcomes, the more likely they are to: (a) comply with social distancing restrictions designed to curb the spread of the virus, and (b) donate money they received in the study to charitable organizations. These findings advance understanding of the multifaceted nature of strategic thinking and highlight the usefulness of the Strategic Thinking Scale for explaining social behavior.

Previous research on anchoring has shown this heuristic to be a very robust psychological phenomenon ubiquitous across many domains of human judgment and decision-making. Despite the prevalence of anchoring effects, researchers have only recently begun to investigate the underlying factors responsible for how and in what ways a person is susceptible to them. This paper examines how one such factor, the Big-Five personality trait of openness-to-experience, influences the effect of previously presented anchors on participants' judgments. Our findings indicate that participants high in openness-to-experience were significantly more influenced by anchoring cues relative to participants low in this trait. These findings were consistent across two different types of anchoring tasks providing convergent evidence for our hypothesis.

Introduction. People with mental health conditions (MHCs) are less likely to achieve long-term abstinence than people without MHCs. The Quit and Stay Quit Monday (QSQM) model offers a long-term approach to treating tobacco use by encouraging people to quit, requit, or recommit to quit smoking every Monday. Aim. To evaluate the efficacy, patient satisfaction, and patient engagement with an intervention that integrated the QSQM model into multicomponent smoking cessation services among people with an MHC. Methods. This was a randomized controlled pilot trial. Eligibility criteria were as follows: (1) ≥18 years old, (2) smoked a cigarette in the past 30 days, (3) diagnosis of an ICD-10 MHC, (4) interest in quitting smoking, (5) able to receive services in English, and (5) had an active email and a cell phone. The intervention group (n = 33) received QSQM-focused telephone coaching, a weekly QSQM email newsletter, a SmokefreeTXT anchored around a Monday quit date, and 4 weeks of nicotine replacement therapy (NRT). The control group (n = 36) received information about contacting their state Quitline for usual services. Primary outcomes were self-reported quit attempts, 7-day abstinence, and intervention satisfaction at 3 months. Results. Twenty-four participants (73%) in the intervention group began telephone coaching, 26 (79%) enrolled in the QSQM email newsletter, 19 (58%) enrolled in SmokefreeTXT, and 15 (46%) used NRT. Using a penalized intent-to-treat approach, quit attempts in the intervention and control groups were 63.6% and 38.9% (OR 2.75, 95% CI 1.03-7.30), respectively. Seven-day abstinence in the two groups was 12.1% and 5.6% (OR 2.35, 95% CI 0.40-13.74), respectively. Of the 15 intervention group participants who set a quit date during the intervention, 13 (86.7%) selected a Monday quit day. Qualitative interviews revealed positive participant experiences with picking a Monday quit day. On follow-up surveys, 89.5%, 69.3%, and 64.3% of intervention participants reported that the counseling, QSQM email, and text messaging, respectively, were very or somewhat helpful. Conclusions. The QSQM model was acceptable and potentially efficacious among people with MHCs, but intervention engagement and satisfaction were modest. Future research should adapt or develop new QSQM delivery approaches to improve patient engagement and potential efficacy of the model. This trial is registered with clinicaltrials.gov (NCT04512248).

Introduction. Some medical centers and surgeons require patients to stop smoking cigarettes prior to elective orthopaedic surgeries in an effort to decrease surgical complications. Given higher rates of smoking among rural individuals, rural patients may be disproportionately impacted by these requirements. We assessed the perceptions and experiences of rural-residing Veterans and clinicians related to this requirement. Methods. We conducted qualitative semistructured one-on-one interviews of 26 rural-residing veterans, 10 VA orthopaedic surgery staff (from two Veterans Integrated Services Networks), 24 PCPs who serve rural veterans (14 VA; 10 non-VA), and 4 VA pharmacists. Using the knowledge, attitudes, and behavior framework, we performed conventional content analysis. Results. We found three primary themes across respondents: (1) knowledge of and the evidence base for the requirement varied widely; (2) strong personal attitudes toward the requirement; and (3) implementation and possible implications of this requirement. All surgery staff reported knowledge of requirements at their institution. VA PCPs reported knowledge of requirements but typically could not recall specifics. Most patients were unaware. The majority of respondents felt this requirement could increase motivation to quit smoking. Some PCPs felt a more thorough explanation of smoking-related complications would result in increased quit attempts. About half of all patients reported belief that the requirement was reasonable regardless of initial awareness. Respondents expressed little concern that the requirement might increase rural-urban disparities. Most PCPs and patients felt that there should be exceptions for allowing surgery, while surgical staff disagreed. Discussion. Most respondents thought elective surgery was a good motivator to quit smoking; but patients, PCPs, and surgical staff differed on whether there should be exceptions to the requirement that patients quit preoperatively. Future efforts to augment perioperative smoking cessation may benefit from improving coordination across services and educating patients more about the benefits of quitting.

Imagine that you have just received a colon cancer diagnosis and need to choosebetween two different surgical treatments. One surgery, the "complicatedsurgery," has a lower mortality rate (16% vs. 20%) but compared to the othersurgery, the "uncomplicated surgery," also carries an additional 1% risk of eachof four serious complications: colostomy, chronic diarrhea, wound infection, oran intermittent bowel obstruction. The complicated surgery dominates theuncomplicated surgery as long as life with complications is preferred overdeath.

In our first survey, 51% of a sample (recruited from the cafeteria of auniversity medical center) selected the dominated alternative, the uncomplicatedsurgery, justifying this choice by saying that the death risks for the twosurgeries were essentially the same and that the uncomplicated surgery avoidedthe risk of complications. In follow-up surveys, preference for theuncomplicated surgery remained relatively consistent (39%-51%) despite (a)presenting the risks in frequencies rather than percents, (b) grouping the 4complications into a single category, or (c) giving the uncomplicated surgery asmall chance of complications as well. Even when a pre-decision "focusingexercise" required people to state directly their preferences between life witheach complication versus death, 49% still chose the uncomplicated surgery.

People’s fear of complications leads them to ignore important differencesbetween treatments. This tendency appears remarkably resistant to debiasingapproaches and likely leads patients to make healthcare decisions that areinconsistent with their own preferences.

Three experiments demonstrate how the processing of negations is contingent on the evaluation context in which the negative information is presented. In addition, the strategy used to process the negations induced different affective reactions toward the stimuli, leading to inconsistency of preference. Participants were presented with stimuli described by either stating the presence of positive features (explicitly positive alternative) or negating the presence of negative features (non-negative alternative). Alternatives were presented for either joint (JE) or separate evaluation (SE). Experiment 1 showed that the non-negative stimuli were judged less attractive than the positive ones in JE but not in SE. Experiment 2 revealed that the non-negative stimuli induced a less clear and less positive feeling when they were paired with explicitly positive stimuli rather than evaluated separately. Non-negative options were also found less easy to judge than the positive ones in JE but not in SE. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that people process negations using two different models depending on the evaluation mode. Through a memory task, we found that in JE people process the non-negative attributes as negations of negative features, whereas in SE they directly process the non-negative attributes as positive features.

Dynamic, connectionist models of decision making, such as decision field theory (Roe, Busemeyer, & Townsend, 2001), propose that the effect of context on choice arises from a series of pairwise comparisons between attributes of alternatives across time. As such, they predict that limiting the amount of time to make a decision should decrease rather than increase the size of contextual effects. This prediction was tested across four levels of time pressure on both the asymmetric dominance (Huber, Payne, & Puto, 1982) and compromise (Simonson, 1989) decoy effects in choice. Overall, results supported this prediction, with both types of decoy effects found to be larger as time pressure decreased.

We make hundreds of decisions every day, many of them extremely quickly and without much explicit deliberation. This motivates two important open questions: What is the minimum time required to make choices with above chance accuracy? What is the impact of additional decision-making time on choice accuracy? We investigated these questions in four experiments in which subjects made binary food choices using saccadic or manual responses, under either “speed” or “accuracy” instructions. Subjects were able to make above chance decisions in as little as 313 ms, and choose their preferred food item in over 70% of trials at average speeds of 404 ms. Further, slowing down their responses by either asking them explicitly to be confident about their choices, or to respond with hand movements, generated about a 10% increase in accuracy. Together, these results suggest that consumers can make accurate every-day choices, akin to those made in a grocery store, at significantly faster speeds than previously reported.

In classic research on judgment and decision making under risk, risk is described by providing participants with the respective outcomes and probabilities in a summary format. Recent research has introduced a different paradigm – decisions-by-experience – where participants learn about risk by sampling from the outcomes, rather than by summary descriptions. This latter research reports a description-experience gap, indicating that some of the classic patterns of risk attitude reverse when people experience the risk. Recent research has attempted to investigate risky choice framing in the decisions-by-experience paradigm. I discuss how this research runs into problems in properly manipulating framing in decisions by experience. Drawing from framing research with animals, I argue that framing effects also exist in experience tasks. The classic Asian Disease task, however, awaits proper translation into an experience paradigm.

Expertise is a reliable cue for accuracy – experts are often correct in their judgments and opinions. However, the opposite is not necessarily the case – ignorant judges are not guaranteed to err. Specifically, in a question with a dichotomous response option, an ignorant responder has a 50% chance of being correct. In five studies, we show that people fail to understand this, and that they overgeneralize a sound heuristic (expertise signals accuracy) to cases where it does not apply (lack of expertise does not imply error). These studies show that people 1) tend to think that the responses of an ignorant person to dichotomous-response questions are more likely to be incorrect than correct, and 2) they tend to respond the opposite of what the ignorant person responded. This research also shows that this bias is at least partially intuitive in nature, as it manifests more clearly in quick gut responses than in slow careful responses. Still, it is not completely corrected upon careful deliberation. Implications are discussed for rationality and epistemic vigilance.

Frederick, Levis, Malliaris & Meyer (2018) report a package of laboratory studies where participants underestimate the value of “hedges”: Risky bets which cancel out the risk of another presently-held bet. However, it might be questioned to what extent laboratory findings predict field behavior. People might better understand hedges when more money is at stake, or when they have more time to reflect. We discuss three gamblers who, instead of hedging, used a costly “cash-out” option to eliminate the risk of their bets on Leicester FC’s improbable victory in the 2015/2016 English Premier League soccer season. The decision to cash-out rather than to hedge led to individual losses of up to £8,000, and did not seem plausibly explained by rational economic factors. High-stakes hedges are misunderstood too.

Long-term thinking and voluntary resource sharing are two distinctive traits ofhuman nature. Across three experiments (N=1,082), I propose a causal connection:Sometimes people are generous because they think about thefuture. Participants were randomly assigned to either focus on the present orthe future and then made specific decisions in hypothetical scenarios. In Study1 (N=200), future-focused participants shared more money in a public dictatorgame than present-focused participants (+39%), and they were willing to donatemore money to charity (+61%). Study 2 (N=410) replicated the positive effect offuture-focus on dictator giving when the choice was framed as public (+36%), butfound no such effect when the choice was framed as private. That is, focusing onthe future made participants more generous only when others would know theiridentity. Study 3 was a high-powered and pre-registered replication of Study 1(N=472), including a few extensions. Once again, future-focused participantsgave more money to charity in a public donation scenario (+40%), and they weremore likely to volunteer for the same charity (+17%). As predicted, the effectwas mediated by reputational concern, indicating that future-orientation canmake people more generous because it also makes them more attuned to the socialconsequences of their choices. Taken together, the results suggest that focusingon the future promotes reputation-based generosity. Bystimulating voluntary resource sharing, a central function of human foresightmight be to support cooperation in groups and society.

Economic games involving allocation of resources have been a useful tool for the study of decision making for both psychologists and economists. In two experiments involving a repeated-trials game over twenty opportunities, undergraduates made choices to distribute resources between themselves and an unseen, passive other either optimally (for themselves) but non-competitively, equally but non-optimally, or least optimally but competitively. Surprisingly, whether participants were told that the anonymous other was another student or a computer did not matter. Using such terms as “game” and “player” in the course of the session was associated with an increased frequency of competitive behavior. Males were more optimal than females: a gender-by-incentive interaction was found in the first experiment. In agreement with prior research, participants whose resources were backed by monetary incentive acted the most optimally. Overall, equality was the modal strategy employed, although it is clear that motivational context affects the allocation of resources.

The gambler’s fallacy (Tune, 1964) refers to the belief that a streak is more likely to end than chance would dictate. In three studies, participants exhibited a retrospective gambler’s fallacy (RGF) in which an event that seems rare appears to come from a longer sequence than an event that seems more common. Study 1 demonstrates this bias for streaks, while Study 2 does so with single rare events and shows that the appearance of rarity is more important than actual rarity. Study 3 extends these findings from abstract gambling domains into real world domains to demonstrate the generalizability of the effects. The RGF follows from the law of small numbers (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971) and has many applications, from perceptions of the social world to philosophical debates about the existence of multiple universes.

Previous research has focused on studying the endowment effect for transactions that take place in the present. Many real-world transactions, however, are delayed into the future (i.e., people agree to buy or sell, but the actual transaction does not materialize until a later time). Here we investigate how transaction timing affects the endowment effect. In five studies, we show that the endowment effect systematically increases as transactions are delayed into the future. Specifically, buying prices significantly decrease as the transaction is delayed, while selling prices remain constant, resulting in an amplified endowment effect (Experiment 1). This pattern is not produced by a discounting of the money involved in the transaction (Experiment 2), and it holds across different types of items (Experiment 3). We also show that the phenomenon cannot be explained by sellers anticipating becoming increasingly attached to the items over time (Experiment 4). Finally, we demonstrate that this increased endowment effect in the future holds in the field, in the context of a real market and with real transactions (Experiment 5).

Experiments on economic games typically fail to find positive reputational effects of using peer punishment of selfish behavior in social dilemmas. Theorists had expected positive reputational effects because of the potentially beneficial consequences that punishment may have on norm violators’ behavior. Going beyond the game-theoretic paradigm, we used vignettes to study how various social factors influence approval ratings of a peer who reprimands a violator of a group-beneficial norm. We found that ratings declined when punishers showed anger, and this effect was mediated by perceived aggressiveness. Thus the same emotions that motivate peer punishers may make them come across as aggressive, to the detriment of their reputation. However, the negative effect of showing anger disappeared when the norm violation was sufficiently severe. Ratings of punishers were also influenced by social distance, such that it is less appropriate for a stranger than a friend to reprimand a violator. In sum, peer punisher ratings were very high for a friend reprimanding a severe norm violation, but particularly poor for a stranger showing anger at a mild norm violation. We found no effect on ratings of whether the reprimand had the beneficial consequence of changing the violator’s behavior. Our findings provide insight into how peer punishers can avoid negative reputational effects. They also point to the importance of going beyond economic games when studying peer punishment.