Popular culture reflects whatever piques our imagination. Think of the myriad movies and books that take viewers and readers on an imaginary journey to the past or the future (e.g., Gladiator, The Time Machine). Despite the ubiquity of time travel as a theme in cultural expression, the factors that underlie people’s preferences concerning the direction of time travel have gone unexplored. What determines whether a person would prefer to visit the (certain) past or explore the (uncertain) future? We identified three factors that markedly affect people’s preference for (hypothetical) travel to the past or the future, respectively. Those who think of themselves as courageous, those with a more conservative worldview, and—perhaps counterintuitively—those who are advanced in age prefer to travel into the future. We discuss implications of these initial results.

We conducted three studies to investigate how well pictographs communicate medical screening information to persons with higher and lower numeracy skills. In Study 1, we conducted a 2 (probability level: higher vs. lower) × 2 (reference information: yes vs. no) × 2 (subjective numeracy: higher vs. lower) between-subjects design. Persons with higher numeracy skills were influenced by probability level but not by reference information. Persons with lower numeracy tended to differentiate between a higher and a lower probability when there was no reference information. Study 2 consisted of interviews about the mental processing of pictographs. Higher numeracy was associated with counting the icons and relying on numbers depicted in the graph. Study 3 was an experiment with the same design as in Study 1, but, rather than using reference information, we varied the sequence of task type (counting first vs. non-counting first) to explore the role of the focus on numerical information. Persons with lower numeracy differentiated between higher and lower risk only when they were in the non-counting first condition. Task sequence did not influence the risk perceptions of persons with higher numeracy. In sum, our results suggest that pictographs may be useful for persons with higher and lower numeracy. However, these groups seem to process the graph differently. Persons with higher numeracy rely more on the numerical information depicted in the graph, whereas persons with lower numeracy seem to be confused when they are guided towards these numbers.

In Longoni et al. (2019), we examine how algorithm aversion influences utilization of healthcare delivered by human and artificial intelligence providers. Pezzo and Beckstead’s (2020) commentary asks whether resistance to medical AI takes the form of a noncompensatory decision strategy, in which a single attribute determines provider choice, or whether resistance to medical AI is one of several attributes considered in a compensatory decision strategy. We clarify that our paper both claims and finds that, all else equal, resistance to medical AI is one of several attributes (e.g., cost and performance) influencing healthcare utilization decisions. In other words, resistance to medical AI is a consequential input to compensatory decisions regarding healthcare utilization and provider choice decisions, not a noncompensatory decision strategy. People do not always reject healthcare provided by AI, and our article makes no claim that they do.

Policy makers should understand people’s attitudes towards opt-out nudges to smoothly promote and implement the policies. Our research compares people’s perceptions of opt-in and three improved versions of opt-out (transparency, emphasis on the low-cost opt-out option, education) in pro-social and pro-self policy domains, e.g., organ donation (N=610), carbon emission offset (N=613), and retirement saving (N=602). We found that people acknowledged more practical and societal benefits of opt-out than opt-in in organ donation and retirement saving but less so in carbon emission offset. Improved opt-out policies failed to address ethical concerns and most emotional discomfort concerns in organ donation whereas opt-out transparency and emphasis on low-cost opt-out were more successful than education at addressing concerns in retirement saving and carbon emission offset. Nonetheless, transparency and education may raise consciousness of policies’ aims. The results suggest that 1) acceptability of opt-out approaches may be more difficult to enhance in some domains than others; 2) policy makers should ensure the public understands that opt-out is a convenient choice and may consider combining all forms of improvement to increase people’s acceptance of opt-out nudges.

People overestimate their affective reactions to future events and decisions — a phenomenon that has been termed “impact bias.” Evidence suggests that completing a diary detailing events contemporaneous with the focal one de-biases judgments of affect. It is generally assumed that this is because diary completion helps people to realize that they will be distracted from the focal event. However, there is another possibility: de-biasing may occur because diary completion interferes with the processing responsible for the bias. In a first experiment, we showed that diary completion also lowers affect associated with past decisions. In a second experiment, we showed that solving anagrams has the same effect. A third experiment demonstrates that this is not because affect judgments are influenced by mood changes brought about by solving anagrams. Indeed, monitoring moods lowered affect in the same way as diary completion. It appears that cognitive tasks of any sort interfere with the processing required by judgments of affect.

The Allais Paradox, or common consequence effect, has been a standard challenge to normative theories of risky choice since its proposal over 60 years ago. However, neither its causes nor the conditions necessary to create the effect are well understood. Two experiments test the effects of losses and event splitting on the Allais Paradox. Experiment 1 found that the Allais Paradox occurs for both gain and mixed gambles and is reflected for loss gambles produced by reflection across the origin. Experiment 2 found that the Allais Paradox is eliminated by splitting the outcomes even when the probabilities used do not increase the salience of the common consequence. The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with Cumulative Prospect Theory, the current leading theory of risky choice. However, the results of Experiment 2 are problematic for Cumulative Prospect Theory and suggest that alternate explanations for the Allais Paradox must be sought.

Many popular books and articles that purport to explain how people, companies, or ideas succeed highlight a few successes chosen to fit a particular narrative. We investigate what effect these highly selected “success narratives” have on readers’ beliefs and decisions. We conducted a large, randomized, pre-registered experiment, showing participants successful firms with founders that all either dropped out of or graduated college, and asked them to make incentive-compatible bets on a new firm. Despite acknowledging biases in the examples, participants’ decisions were very strongly influenced by them. People shown dropout founders were 55 percentage points more likely to bet on a dropout-founded company than people who were shown graduate founders. Most reported medium to high confidence in their bets, and many wrote causal explanations justifying their decision. In light of recent concerns about false information, our findings demonstrate how true but biased information can strongly alter beliefs and decisions.

The transitivity axiom is common to nearly all descriptive and normative utility theories of choice under risk. Contrary to both intuition and common assumption, the little-known ’Steinhaus-Trybula paradox’ shows the relation ’stochastically greater than’ will not always be transitive, in contradiction of Weak Stochastic Transitivity. We bespoke-design pairs of lotteries inspired by the paradox, over which individual preferences might cycle. We run an experiment to look for evidence of cycles, and violations of expansion/contraction consistency between choice sets. Even after considering possible stochastic but transitive explanations, we show that cycles can be the modal preference pattern over these simple lotteries, and we find systematic violations of expansion/contraction consistency.

In this reply, we reiterate the main point of our 2012 paper, which was that the measure of inequality used by Norton and Ariely (2011) was too difficult for it to yield meaningful results. We describe additional evidence for this conclusion, and we also challenge the conclusion that political differences in perceived and desired inequality are small.

The assumption that people possess a repertoire of strategies to solve the inference problems they face has been made repeatedly. The experimental findings of two previous studies on strategy selection are reexamined from a learning perspective, which argues that people learn to select strategies for making probabilistic inferences. This learning process is modeled with the strategy selection learning (SSL) theory, which assumes that people develop subjective expectancies for the strategies they have. They select strategies proportional to their expectancies, which are updated on the basis of experience. For the study by Newell, Weston, and Shanks (2003) it can be shown that people did not anticipate the success of a strategy from the beginning of the experiment. Instead, the behavior observed at the end of the experiment was the result of a learning process that can be described by the SSL theory. For the second study, by Bröder and Schiffer (2006), the SSL theory is able to provide an explanation for why participants only slowly adapted to new environments in a dynamic inference situation. The reanalysis of the previous studies illustrates the importance of learning for probabilistic inferences.

This paper illustrates how to apply the RECIPE design to evaluate multiattributejudgment, reporting an experiment in which participants judged intentions toreceive a new vaccine against COVID-19. The attributes varied were Price of thevaccine, Risks of side effects as reported in trials, and Effectiveness of thevaccine in preventing COVID. The RECIPE design is a union of factorial designsin which each of three attributes is presented alone, in pairs with each of theother attributes, and in a complete factorial with all other information.Consistent with previous research with analogous judgment tasks, the additiveand relative weight averaging models with constant weights could be rejected infavor of a configural weight averaging model in which the lowest-valuedattribute receives additional weight. That is, people are unlikely to acceptvaccination if Price is too high, Risk is too high, or Effectiveness is too low.The attribute with the greatest weight was Effectiveness, followed by Risk ofside-effects, and Price carried the least weight.

Previous research has reported that the gambler’s fallacy could be detected in goalkeepers’ behavior during penalty shootouts. Following repeated kicks in the same direction, goalkeepers were more likely to dive in the opposite direction on the next kick. We employ here a unique data collection approach and accurately measure the exact location of each ball when crossing the goal plane. This allows us to analyze how different definitions of the goal center width affect the results, and we show that this width indeed affects whether a gambler’s fallacy in goalkeepers’ diving behavior exists. We further augment the data with additional kicks from top international competitions and analyze the extended dataset. We also question whether previous treatments of kicking sequences adequately represent what goalkeepers consider as a run of consecutive kicks to the same side. A different representation of kicking sequences is provided and applied to the data. Overall, we find some evidence for the gambler’s fallacy after sequences of two or three kicks to the same side.

People report themselves to be above average on simple tasks and below average on difficult tasks.This paper proposes an explanation for this effect that is simpler than prior explanations. The new explanation is that people conflate relative with absolute evaluation, especially on subjective measures.The paper then presents a series of four studies that test this conflation explanation.These tests distinguish conflation from other explanations, such as differential weighting and selecting the wrong referent.The results suggest that conflation occurs at the response stage during which people attempt to disambiguate subjective response scales in order to choose an answer.This is because conflation has little effect on objective measures, which would be equally affected if the conflation occurred at encoding.

Sunk costs have been known to elicit violations of expected utility theory, in particular, the independence or cancellation axiom. Separately, violations of the stochastic dominance principle have been demonstrated in various settings despite the fact that descriptive models of choice favored in economics deem such violations irrational. However, it is currently unknown whether sunk costs also yield stochastic dominance violations. In two studies using a tri-colored roulette wheel choice task with non-equiprobable events yet equal payoffs, we observed that those who had sunk costs selected a stochastically dominated option significantly more than did those who had no costs. Moreover, a second study revealed that people chose a stochastically dominated option significantly more when the expected value was low compared to high. A model comparison of psychological explanations demonstrated that theories that incorporate a reference shift of the status quo could predict these sunk cost-based violations of stochastic dominance whereas other models could not.

Why is misleading partisan content believed and shared? An influential account posits that political partisanship pervasively biases reasoning, such that engaging in analytic thinking exacerbates motivated reasoning and, in turn, the acceptance of hyperpartisan content. Alternatively, it may be that susceptibility to hyperpartisan content is explained by a lack of reasoning. Across two studies using different participant pools (total N = 1,973 Americans), we had participants assess true, false, and hyperpartisan news headlines taken from social media. We found no evidence that analytic thinking was associated with judging politically consistent hyperpartisan or false headlines to be accurate and unbiased. Instead, analytic thinking was, in most cases, associated with an increased tendency to distinguish true headlines from both false and hyperpartisan headlines (and was never associated with decreased discernment). These results suggest that reasoning typically helps people differentiate between low and high quality political news, rather than facilitate belief in misleading content. Because social media play an important role in the dissemination of misinformation, we also investigated willingness to share headlines on social media. We found a similar pattern whereby analytic thinking was not generally associated with increased willingness to share hyperpartisan or false headlines. Together, these results suggest a positive role for reasoning in resisting misinformation.

In sport betting, bettors exhibit home bias when they tend to bet on their home team more often. The paper offers a straightforward method of empirical identification of the home bias in the real-world betting market. Using Czech betting data on the league and the national ice-hockey matches, the paper provides support for the existence of the home bias in the Czech betting market.

Predictions of magnitudes (costs, durations, environmental events) are often given as uncertainty intervals (ranges). When are such forecasts judged to be correct? We report results of four experiments showing that forecasted ranges of expected natural events (floods and volcanic eruptions) are perceived as accurate when an observed magnitude falls inside or at the boundary of the range, with little regard to its position relative to the “most likely” (central) estimate. All outcomes that fell inside a wide interval were perceived as equally well captured by the forecast, whereas identical outcomes falling outside a narrow range were deemed to be incorrectly predicted, in proportion to the magnitude of deviation. In these studies, ranges function as categories, with boundaries distinguishing between right or wrong predictions, even for outcome distributions that are acknowledged as continuous, and for boundaries that are arbitrarily defined (for instance, when the narrow prediction interval is defined as capturing 50 percent and the wide 90 percent of all potential outcomes). However, the boundary effect is affected by label. When the upper limit of a range is described as a value that “can” occur (Experiment 5), outcomes both below and beyond this value were regarded as consistent with the forecast.

The current field study uses data collected after the 2009 war between Israel and the Hamas militias in the Gaza Strip ended. The study compares recalled emotions and perceived risks among two groups of students, all of whom were exposed to rocket attacks. Individuals in the “left the war zone” group left the region under attack as a precautionary action, while the “stayed in the war zone” group remained in the region during war. The results indicate no significant differences in the levels of recalled fear and anger between the two groups, while the perceived self-risk from terror was higher among the “stayed in the war zone” group. Yet, a higher level of recalled fear was found among those who left the war zone and whose parents resided in the war zone, compared to those who left the war zone and whose parents resided outside the war zone. In addition, fearful people became more pessimistic about their level of personal risk from terror, but not about the routine risks. We conclude that civilians need attention even if they leave the war zone since leaving the attacked region as a precautionary action may mitigate perceived self-risk from terror but does not seem to eliminate the high level of negative emotions evoked by the terror attacks.