Kieslich and Hilbig (2014) employ a mouse-tracking technique to measure decision conflict in social dilemmas. They report that defectors exhibit more conflict than do cooperators. They infer that cooperation thus is the reflexive, default behavior. We argue, however, that their analysis fails to discriminate between reflexive versus cognitively controlled behavioral responses. This is because cognitive conflict can emanate from resisting impulse successfully—or unsuccessfully.

Following the airplane attacks of September 11th, 2001 it is claimed that many Americans, dreading a repeat of these events, drove instead of flying, and that, consequently, there were extra car accidents, increasing the number of fatalities directly caused by the attacks by 1, 500. After the Madrid train bombings of March 11th, 2004, Spaniards, like Americans, avoided the attacked mode of travel, but no increase in car travel or fatal accidents resulted. Here we analyze behavioral concomitants of the July 7th 2005 bomb attacks on public transport in London. We find reduced underground train travel and an increase in rates of bicycling and, over the 6 months following the attacks, 214 additional bicyclist road casualties — a 15.4% increase. Nevertheless we found no detectable increase in car accidents. We conclude that, while fear caused by terrorism may initiate potentially dangerous behaviors, understanding the secondary effects of terrorism requires consideration of the environmental variables that enable fear to manifest in dangerous behaviors.

According to the positive time-discounting assumption of intertemporal decision-making, people prefer to undergo negative events in the future rather than in the present. However, negative discounting has been identified in the intertemporal choice and loss domains, which refers to people’s preference to experience negative events earlier rather than later. Studies have validated and supported the "anticipated dread" as an explanation for negative discounting. This study again explored the effect of anticipated dread on intertemporal choice using content analysis; that is, having participants identify anticipated dread among reasons for negative discounting. This study also validated the effect of anticipated dread on negative discounting by manipulating anticipated dread. This study adds empirical and direct evidence for the role of anticipated dread in negative discounting.

Pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity is the tendency to perceive meaning in important-sounding, nonsense statements. To understand how bullshit receptivity differs across domains, we develop a scale to measure scientific bullshit receptivity — the tendency to perceive truthfulness in nonsensical scientific statements. Across three studies (total N = 1,948), scientific bullshit receptivity was positively correlated with pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity. Both types of bullshit receptivity were positively correlated with belief in science, conservative political beliefs, and faith in intuition. However, compared to pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity, scientific bullshit receptivity was more strongly correlated with belief in science, and less strongly correlated with conservative political beliefs and faith in intuition. Finally, scientific literacy moderated the relationship the two types of bullshit receptivity; the correlation between the two types of receptivity was weaker for individuals scoring high in scientific literacy.

This study measures the perceived costs, perceived benefits, choice outcome satisfaction, and choice process satisfaction from consumers making hypothetical choices amongst prescription drug plans. I juxtapose the number of options the consumer is choosing between and his/her perceived variety of the choice set to understand which contributes more to explaining these outcomes. I find that once perceived variety is included in the model, the number of options (i) has no effect on perceived benefits and choice outcome satisfaction, (ii) increases perceived costs, and (iii) decreases choice process satisfaction. Furthermore, the concave relationship that has been shown to occur when the number of options increases is a function of the subjective perception of variety. Overall, these results contribute to our understanding of how assortment structure and the number of options affect choice outcome and process satisfaction. Additionally, this study provides some evidence that can inform U.S. national heath insurance policy and the current debate on choice in health care in the United States and other countries.

During pregnancy, a variety of psychological and physical changes occur in women, which may have different impacts on risk decision-making involving different processes systems. Based on the dual-process theories of decision-making, using the Columbia Card Task (CCT) as the experimental paradigm, which can trigger deliberative versus affective decision-makings respectively, this study recruited 240 pregnant women and non-pregnant women aged 20-40 as the experimental group and control group respectively, investigated how pregnancy impacted on women’s risk decision-making, as well as the possible roles played by a series of psychological factors (impulsivity; sensation seeking; emotional state) and physiological factors (gestational age; human Chorionic Gonadotropin, hCG; progesterone) in the above process. The results were as follows: (a) Compared with non-pregnant women, pregnant women tended to choose fewer cards, indicating a higher risk aversion consistent with a more conservative strategy, both in cold and hot CCTs; in both cold and hot CCTs, compared with pregnant women in the second trimester of pregnancy, pregnant women in the first and the third trimesters of pregnancy had a higher risk aversion tendency. (b) Pregnant women had lower levels of all dimensions of sensation seeking than did non-pregnant women, pregnant women in the third trimester of pregnancy had lower levels of Disinhibition (DIS) and Boredom Susceptibility (BS) of sensation seeking than pregnant women in the first and the second trimesters of pregnancy, but there was no significant difference in levels of emotional state or impulsivity between pregnant woman and non-pregnant women. (c) DIS of sensation seeking played a fully mediating role in the impact of pregnancy on hot CCT performance. (d) Both hCG and progesterone levels were negatively correlated with pregnant women’s hot CCT performances. (e) Positive emotion played a partial mediating role in the effect of progesterone on hot CCT performance of pregnant women.

In an experimental gift-exchange game, we explore the transformative capacity of vulnerable trust, which we define as trusting untrustworthy players when their untrustworthiness is common knowledge between co-players. In our experiment, there are two treatments: the “Information” treatment and the “No-Information” treatment in which we respectively disclose or not information about trustees’ trustworthiness. Our laboratory evidence consistently supports the transformative capacity of trustors’ vulnerable trust, which generates higher transfers, more trustworthiness and increased reciprocity by untrustworthy trustees.

Using capture-recapture analysis we estimate the effective size of the active Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) population that a typical laboratory can access to be about 7,300 workers. We also estimate that the time taken for half of the workers to leave the MTurk pool and be replaced is about 7 months. Each laboratory has its own population pool which overlaps, often extensively, with the hundreds of other laboratories using MTurk. Our estimate is based on a sample of 114,460 completed sessions from 33,408 unique participants and 689 sessions across seven laboratories in the US, Europe, and Australia from January 2012 to March 2015.

Social networking sites (SNSs) provide users with an efficient interface for distributing information, such as photos or wall posts, to many others simultaneously. We demonstrated experimentally that this type of indiscriminate one-to-many (i.e., monologue) communication may induce self-focused attention and thereby impair perspective taking. The present study used multiple paradigms to explore the link between engaging in online one-to-many communication and a decrease in perspective taking. Experiment 1 revealed that Facebookers who published a personal photo to the public or their friends were less likely to adopt another person’s visual perspective than were those in the control group. Experiment 2 showed that Facebookers who engaged in indiscriminate one-to-many wall posting were more likely than those in the control group to rely heavily on their own perspectives. A state of self-focus, as measured by greater Stroop interference in naming the color of self-relevant versus neutral words, mediated the detrimental effect of indiscriminate one-to-many communication on cognitive perspective taking. These findings suggest that indiscriminate one-to-many communication on SNSs may promote public self-focus, leading to self-referential processing when making social judgments. Online monologue communication may be more harmful to perspective taking than previously understood.

The recognition heuristic exploits the basic psychological capacity for recognition in order to make inferences about unknown quantities in the world. In this article, we review and clarify issues that emerged from our initial work (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999, 2002), including the distinction between a recognition and an evaluation process. There is now considerable evidence that (i) the recognition heuristic predicts the inferences of a substantial proportion of individuals consistently, even in the presence of one or more contradicting cues, (ii) people are adaptive decision makers in that accordance increases with larger recognition validity and decreases in situations when the validity is low or wholly indeterminable, and (iii) in the presence of contradicting cues, some individuals appear to select different strategies. Little is known about these individual differences, or how to precisely model the alternative strategies. Although some researchers have attributed judgments inconsistent with the use of the recognition heuristic to compensatory processing, little research on such compensatory models has been reported. We discuss extensions of the recognition model, open questions, unanticipated results, and the surprising predictive power of recognition in forecasting.

To study the effect of cognitive reflection on behavioral anomalies, we used the cognitive reflection test to measure cognitive reflection. The study was conducted on 395 Iranian university students and shows that subjects with lower cognitive reflection are significantly more likely to exhibit the conjunction fallacy, illusion of control, overconfidence, base rate fallacy, and conservatism. In addition, test scores are correlated with risk preferences. The results do not show any relationship between cognitive reflection and self-serving bias or status quo bias. We also find that gender is significantly related to illusion of control and self-serving bias.

Decades of experimental research show that some people forgo personal gains to benefit others in unilateral anonymous interactions. To explain these results, behavioral economists typically assume that people have social preferences for minimizing inequality and/or maximizing efficiency (social welfare). Here we present data that cannot be explained by these standard social preference models. We use a “Trade-Off Game” (TOG), where players unilaterally choose between an equitable option and an efficient option. We show that simply changing the labelling of the options to describe the equitable versus efficient option as morally right completely reverses the correlation between behavior in the TOG and play in a separate Dictator Game (DG) or Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD): people who take the action framed as moral in the TOG, be it equitable or efficient, are much more prosocial in the DG and PD. Rather than preferences for equity and/or efficiency per se, our results suggest that prosociality in games such as the DG and PD are driven by a generalized morality preference that motivates people to do what they think is morally right.

When people are given quantified information (e.g., ‘there is a 60% chance of rain’), the format of quantifiers (i.e., numerical: ‘a 60% chance’ vs. verbal: ‘it is likely’) might affect their decisions. Previous studies with indirect cues of judgements and decisions (e.g., response times, decision outcomes) give inconsistent findings that could support either a more intuitive process for verbal than numerical quantifiers or a greater focus on the context (e.g., rain) for verbal than numerical quantifiers. We used two pre-registered eye-tracking experiments (n(1) = 148, n(2) = 133) to investigate decision-making processes with verbal and numerical quantifiers. Participants evaluated multiple verbally or numerically quantified nutrition labels (Experiment 1) and weather forecasts (Experiment 2) with different context valence (positive or negative), and quantities (‘low’, ‘medium’, or ‘high’ in Experiment 1 and ‘possible’, ‘likely’, or ‘very likely’ in Experiment 2) presented in a fully within-subjects design. Participants looked longer at verbal than numerical quantifiers, and longer at the contextual information with verbal quantifiers. Quantifier format also affected judgements and decisions: in Experiment 1, participants judged positive labels to be better in the verbal compared to the equivalent numerical condition (and to be worse for negative labels). In Experiment 2, participants decided on rain protection more for a verbal forecast of rain than the equivalent numerical forecast. The results fit the explanation that verbal quantifiers put more focus on the informational context than do numerical quantifiers, rather than prompting more intuitive decisions.

The aim of the study was to test convergent/discriminant validity of two measures of cognitive reflection, cognitive reflection test (CRT) and belief bias syllogisms (BBS) and to investigate whether their distinctive characteristic of luring participants into giving wrong intuitive responses explains their relationships with various abilities and disposition measures. Our results show that the same traits largely account for performance on both non-lure task, the Berlin Numeracy Test (BNT), and CRT and explain their correlations with other variables. These results also imply that the predictive validity of CRT for wide range of outcomes does not stem from lures. Regarding the BBS, we found that its correlations with other measures were substantially diminished once we accounted for the effects of BNT. This also implies that the lures are not the reason for the correlation between BBS and these measure. We conclude that the lures are not the reason why cognitive reflection tasks correlate with different outcomes. Our results call into question an original definition of CRT as a measure of ability or disposition to resist reporting first response that comes to mind, as well as the validity of results of studies showing “incremental validity” of CRT over numeracy.

Maximizers attempt to find the best solution in decision-making, while satisficers feel comfortable with a good enough solution. Recent results pointed out some critical aspects of this decision-making approach and some concerns about its measurement and dimensional structure. In addition to the analysis of these aspects, we tested the possible mediational role of regret in this psychological process. The Maximization Inventory (MI; satisficing, decision difficulty, and alternative search), regret, and Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS) were translated and adapted to Spanish in order to answer these issues with a Chilean sample. Validity and reliability analysis of the MI reports that only two dimensions of the MI have enough dimensional support (decision difficulty, alternative search). The tested structural model shows good fit of partial mediation effect of regret between decision difficulty and SWLS. At the same time, alternative search has a positive relation with SWLS. These results suggest that Regret becomes crucial for prescribing behavior to decision makers.

True and Error Theory (TET) is a modern latent variable modeling approach for analyzing sets of preferences held by people. Individual True and Error Theory (iTET) allows researchers to estimate the proportion of the time an individual truly holds a particular underlying set of preferences without assuming complete response independence in a repeated measures experimental design. iTET is thus suitable for investigating research questions such as whether an individual ever is truly intransitive in their preferences (i.e., they prefer a to b, b to c, and c to a). While current iTET analysis methods provide the means of investigating such questions they require a lot of data to achieve satisfactory power for hypothesis tests of interest. This paper overviews the performance and shortcomings of the current analysis methods in efficiently using data, while providing new analysis methods that offer substantial gains in power and efficiency.

We present evidence from a pre-registered experiment indicating that a philosophical argument – a type of rational appeal – can persuade people to make charitable donations. The rational appeal we used follows Singer’s “shallow pond” argument (1972), while incorporating an evolutionary debunking argument (Paxton, Ungar and Greene, 2012) against favoring nearby victims over distant ones. The effectiveness of this rational appeal did not differ significantly from that of a well-tested emotional appeal involving an image of a single child in need (Small, Loewenstein and Slovic, 2007). This is a surprising result, given evidence that emotions are the primary drivers of moral action, a view that has been very influential in the work of development organizations. We found no support for our hypothesis that combining our rational and emotional appeals would have a stronger effect than either appeal in isolation. However, our finding that both kinds of appeal can increase charitable donations is cause for optimism, especially concerning the potential efficacy of well-designed rational appeals. We consider the significance of these findings for moral psychology, ethics, and the work of organizations aiming to alleviate severe poverty.

A core principle in decision science is that people choose according to theirsubjective values. These values are often measured using unincentivized scaleswith arbitrary units (e.g., from 0 to 10) or using incentivizedwillingness-to-pay (WTP) with dollars and cents. What is unclear is whetherusing WTP actually improves choice predictions. In two experiments, we comparethe effects of three different subjective valuation procedures: anunincentivized rating scale, the same scale with incentives, and incentivizedWTP. We use these subjective values to predict behavior in a subsequent binaryfood-choice task. The unincentivized rating task performed better than theincentivized WTP task and no worse than the incentivized rating task. Thesefindings challenge the view that subjective valuation tasks need to beincentivized. At least for low-stakes decisions, commonly used measures such asWTP may reduce predictive power.

In the sacrificial moral dilemma task, participants have to morally judge an action that saves several lives at the cost of killing one person. According to the dual process corrective model of moral judgment suggested by Greene and collaborators (2001; 2004; 2008), cognitive control is necessary to override the intuitive, deontological force of the norm against killing and endorse the utilitarian perspective. However, a conflict model has been proposed more recently to account for part of the evidence in favor of dual process models in moral and social decision making. In this model, conflict, moral responses and reaction times arise from the interplay between individually variable motivational factors and objective parameters intrinsic to the choices offered. To further explore this model in the moral dilemma task, we confronted three different samples with a set of dilemmas representing an objective gradient of utilitarian pull, and collected data on moral judgment and on conflict in a 4-point scale. Collapsing all cases along the gradient, participants in each sample felt less conflicted on average when they gave extreme responses (1 or 4 in the UR scale). They felt less conflicted on average when responding to either the low- or the high-pull cases. The correlation between utilitarian responses and conflict was positive in the low-pull and negative in the high-pull cases. This pattern of data suggests that moral responses to sacrificial dilemmas are driven by decision conflict, which in turn depends on the interplay between an objective gradient of utilitarian pull and the moral motivations which regulate individual responsiveness to this gradient.