The ‘Problem of Unconceived Alternatives’ – essentially the idea that we can never know when a radically different but better explanation is available – goes to the heart of what is involved in trying to understand the cosmos given our limited capacities for observation, and the challenges of interpreting the data. This article rethinks large-scale cosmological interpretation (in effect, ‘metaphysics’) as a process of modelling ‘protectorates’ of past experience in terms of ‘typicalities’ found in our own local range of empirical data, and then of making it available as a tool for understanding and prediction. Based on the role of examples and analogies (dṛṣṭānta) to build ontologies explaining the cosmos in the history of Indian metaphysics, it argues for a broadly structural realist account. When we ask whether something is a physical object, a material, a force, a field, or some other as-yet-unconceived kind of thing, we use best-fit models that are schematic of the structure of evidence, rather than descriptive of the thing in itself. Given this, Indian metaphysical history suggests strategies for finding unconceived alternative better explanatory models, by stretching the imagination towards novel schemas. In this light, the ‘problem’ becomes a ‘promise’ that unconceived alternatives with ever-better explanatory power await us, subject to more innovative, imaginative interpretations.

In recent decades, it has become clear that if our universe had been born with slightly different physics, e.g. if the masses of fundamental particles were altered by a tiny fraction, it would be sterile and uninhabitable. We explore the current state of the evidence for this cosmological fine-tuning. We then explore three possible explanations of fine-tuning: traditional theism, the multiverse hypothesis, and a pantheistic God of limited power.

The disciples of St Thomas Aquinas have organized their enquiries in diverse ways throughout the history of Thomism. The surge of reinvigorated interest in Thomas Aquinas following Leo XIII’s Aeterni Patris inspired a wide variety of purported types of Thomism in the twentieth century. What should Thomists of the twenty-first century learn from their inheritance of past centuries of Thomism? How can they take up Leo XIII’s call vetera novis augere et perficere. I aim to address two issues in this essay. First, to identify a more principled demarcation of approaches to Thomistic enquiry, which eschews the commonplace but problematic and merely sociological classifications of the last century’s ‘schools’ of Thomism. I argue that a more principled and agenda-setting criteria distinguishes “defensive-constructive commentary Thomism” and “tradition-constituted-enquiry Thomism”. The first stresses fidelity to the conclusions found in careful readings of Aquinas’s texts. The second emphasizes fidelity to Aquinas’s systematic forms of enquiry directed to the truth. Second, I then probe the resources these two forms of Thomism have for addressing the epistemological crises facing Thomism, focusing on those concerning how to engage the nova of the sciences and rival philosophical traditions.

Recent years have seen increased interest in Aquinas’s account of perception, its connection to other aspects of his thought and its relation to other theories, such as Kantian and empiricist ones. The present essay begins by discussing contributions to the understanding of Thomas’s position advanced by David Hamlyn and Anthony Lisska and later engages with Aquinas’s writings directly. It poses the question, ‘What sort of a theory does Aquinas offer?’ and suggests it is akin in type if not in substance to Quine’s ‘naturalised epistemology’. Aquinas holds that all human knowledge derives from experience, but I argue that this does not imply (as it would with a strict empiricism) that it is reducible, directly or indirectly, to the contents of immediate sense experience. This is because of the role of two capacities: the cogitative power and the active intellect in constructing contents that transcend immediate experience but which are expressed in perception. Also, some concepts are non-empirical. This leads to a consideration of the sense in which Aquinas is or is not a metaphysical and epistemological realist.

This paper critiques the use of the term ‘evil’ in philosophical discussions of the problem of evil. We argue that what is commonly identified as ‘evil’ in this debate is better as ‘misfortune.’ The division between moral and natural evil equivocates between agentic and non-agentic ‘evil,’ undermining its coherence as a unifying concept. Evil events are necessarily caused by evildoers, which are non-existent in events of natural evil. By contrast, ‘misfortune’ places the focus on the victim regardless of the source, better capturing what philosophers intend with the prior term ‘evil.’ Our more precise definition of ‘evil’ satisfies Jean Nabert’s notion of evil as the unjustifiable while also being sufficiently distinct from badness. What distinguishes ‘evil’ from mere badness is moral erasure, which is the perception of other human beings as objects unworthy of moral consideration. While a bad person causes misfortunes as a trade-off in pursuit of a perceived good, an evil person is either completely indifferent to their victim’s misfortunes, or malicious by deliberately causing misfortunes for pleasure’s sake. Our distinction between ‘misfortune’ and ‘evil’ clarified as (im)moral, indifferent, or malicious challenges the assumption that evil, as traditionally framed, poses a direct contradiction to God’s existence.