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Encapsulation and subjectivity from the standpoint of viewpoint theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2022

Ezequiel Morsella
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, CA94132-4168, USA. Morsella@sfsu.eduhttps://faculty.sfsu.edu/~morsella/ Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco, San Francisco, CA94158, USA
Anthony G. Velasquez
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, CA94132-4168, USA. agvelasquez9@gmail.com; jyankulo@mail.sfsu.edu; a_li@ucsb.edu
Jessica K. Yankulova
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, CA94132-4168, USA. agvelasquez9@gmail.com; jyankulo@mail.sfsu.edu; a_li@ucsb.edu
Yanming Li
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, CA94132-4168, USA. agvelasquez9@gmail.com; jyankulo@mail.sfsu.edu; a_li@ucsb.edu
Adam Gazzaley
Affiliation:
Department of Neurology, Department of Psychiatry, and Department of Physiology, University of California, San Francisco, San Francisco, CA94158, USA. adam.gazzaley@ucsf.eduhttps://neuroscape.ucsf.edu/profile/adam-gazzaley/

Abstract

The groundbreaking, viewpoint theory of Merker et al. explains several properties of the conscious field, including why the observer cannot directly apprehend itself. We propose that viewpoint theory might also provide a progressive, constitutive marker of consciousness and shed light on why most of the contents of consciousness are encapsulated.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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