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Escaping from the IIT Munchausen method: Re-establishing the scientific method in the study of consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2022

Paul Verschure Open the ORCID record for Paul Verschure [Opens in a new window]
Paul Verschure*
Affiliation:
Cognition and Behaviour - Centre for Neuroscience (DCN-FNWI), 6500 GL Nijmegen, The Netherlands. paul.verschure@specs-lab.com https://www.specs-lab.com
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Abstract

Integrated information theory (IIT) is an example of “ironic science” and obstructs the scientific study of consciousness. By confusing the ontological status of a method to quantify network complexity with that of a theory of consciousness, IIT has to square the circle and spirals toward its panpsychism conclusion. I analyze the consequences of this fallacy and suggest how the study of consciousness can be brought back into the realm of rational, empirical science.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e63
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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