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Why evolve consciousness? Neural credit and blame allocation as a core function of consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2022

W. Tecumseh Fitch Open the ORCID record for W. Tecumseh Fitch [Opens in a new window]
W. Tecumseh Fitch*
Affiliation:
Department of Behavioral and Cognitive Biology, Faculty of Life Sciences, University of Vienna, Vienna 1030, Austria. Tecumseh.fitch@uniie.ac.at
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Abstract

I concur with Merker and colleague's critiques, suggesting that hypotheses about the evolutionary function of consciousness can help address them. Brains are parallel systems that function to compute possible actions and predict outcomes. I hypothesize that a core function of consciousness per se is the global feedback of information about those actions actually executed, supporting local learning via neuronal updating.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e49
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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