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Consciousness of emotions and action selection

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 November 2016

Guido Gainotti
Guido Gainotti*
Affiliation:
Center for Neuropsychological Research, Institute of Neurology of the Policlinico Gemelli/Catholic University of Rome, 00168 Rome, Italygainotti@rm.unicatt.it Department of Clinical and Behavioral Neurology, IRCCS Fondazione Santa Lucia, 00142 Rome, Italy.
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Abstract

The domain of emotions corresponds to the consciousness model proposed by Morsella et al. The action schemata unconsciously activated by spontaneous emotions are indeed automatically selected from a small number of innate operative patterns, whereas behavioral responses selected at the cognitive level of emotional processing consist of strategic plans, leading to a conscious integration of goal-directed actions.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 39 , 2016 , e177
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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References

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