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What if consciousness has no function?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 November 2016

Susan Blackmore
Susan Blackmore*
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, University of Plymouth, Portland Square, Plymouth PL4 8AA, United Kingdom. susan.blackmore@plymouth.ac.uk www.susanblackmore.uk
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Abstract

An implicitly dualist or Cartesian materialist theory of consciousness is proposed without citing the many well-known problems with such theories. A function for consciousness is proposed with no reference to the possibility that “consciousness itself” has no function of its own. The theory builds on proposed “subset consensus” and “integration consensus” when in the literature there is no such consensus on these issues.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 39 , 2016 , e171
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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