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Locating consciousness: We are conflicted by the role of conflict

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 November 2016

Dom Massaro  and
Bill Rowe
Dom Massaro
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA 95060. massaro@ucsc.edu wrowe@ucsc.edu http://mambo.ucsc.edu/dominic-massaro/
Bill Rowe
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA 95060. massaro@ucsc.edu wrowe@ucsc.edu http://mambo.ucsc.edu/dominic-massaro/
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Abstract

What is consciousness for? Consciousness allows us to handle conflict, a promising proposal by Morsella et al. However, they provide little evidence as to why consciousness is particularly valuable in resolving conflict, nor do they limit the role of consciousness to only conflicting experiences. We attempt to clarify their possible positions and offer several solutions for how these might be formulated and tested.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 39 , 2016 , e186
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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References

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