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Language-of-thought hypothesis: Wrong, but sometimes useful?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2023

Adina L. Roskies
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA adina.roskies@dartmouth.edu, https://faculty-directory.dartmouth.edu/adina-l-roskies
Colin Allen
Affiliation:
Department of History & Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA colin.allen@pitt.edu https://www.hps.pitt.edu/people/colin-allen

Abstract

Quilty-Dunn et al. maintain that language-of-thought hypothesis (LoTH) is the best game in town. We counter that LoTH is merely one source of models – always wrong, sometimes useful. Their reasons for liking LoTH are compatible with the view that LoTH provides a sometimes pragmatically useful level of abstraction over processes and mechanisms that fail to fully live up to LoT requirements.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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