Hostname: page-component-77f85d65b8-pztms Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-03-27T16:46:33.574Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Advanced testing of the LoT hypothesis by social reasoning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2023

David J. Grüning Open the ORCID record for David J. Grüning [Opens in a new window]
David J. Grüning*
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany. david.gruening@psychologie.uni-heidelberg.de Department of Survey Design and Methodology, GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, Mannheim, Germany
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

I elaborate on Quilty-Dunn et al.'s integration of the language-of-thought hypothesis in social reasoning by outlining two discrepancies between the experimental paradigms referred to by the authors and the social world: Self-referential projection and deliberate thinking in experiments. Robust tests of the hypothesis in social reasoning should include observational, natural, and cross-cultural approaches.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e276
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Colman, A. M. (2003). Depth of strategic reasoning in games. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(1), 2–4. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(02)00006-2CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
De Neys, W. (2022). Advancing theorizing about fast-and-slow thinking. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1–68. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X2200142XGoogle ScholarPubMed
Evans, J. St. B. (2008). Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 255–278. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Gigerenzer, G. (1996). On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A reply to Kahneman and Tversky. Psychological Review, 103(3), 592–596. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.103.3.592CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grüning, D. J., & Krueger, J. I. (2021). Strategic thinking: A random walk into the rabbit hole. Collabra: Psychology, 7(1), 24921. https://doi.org/10.1525/collabra.24921CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grüning, D. J., & Krueger, J. I. (2022). Strategic thinking in the shadow of self-enhancement: Benefits and costs. PsyArXiv. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/gtc2mGoogle Scholar
Hedden, T., & Zhang, J. (2002). What do you think I think you think?: Strategic reasoning in matrix games. Cognition, 85(1), 1–36. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0010-0277(02)00054-9CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hertwig, R., Leuker, C., Pachur, T., Spiliopoulos, L., & Pleskac, T. J. (2022). Studies in ecological rationality. Topics in Cognitive Science, 14(3), 467–491. https://doi.org/10.1111/tops.12567CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.Google Scholar
Kahneman, D., Slovic, S. P., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (Eds.). (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krueger, J. I. (2008). From social projection to social behaviour. European Review of Social Psychology, 18(1), 1–35. https://doi.org/10.1080/10463280701284645CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krueger, J. I. (2013). Social projection as a source of cooperation. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 22(4), 289–294. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721413481352CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krueger, J. I., & Grüning, D. J. (2021). Psychological perversities and populism. In Forgas, J. P., Crano, W. D., & Fiedler, K. (Eds.), The psychology of populism (pp. 125–142). Routledge.10.4324/9781003057680-9CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krueger, J. I., Grüning, D. J., & Heck, P. R. (2023). Inductive reasoning model. PsyArXiv. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/3yasfGoogle Scholar
Kurdi, B., & Dunham, Y. (2021). Sensitivity of implicit evaluations to accurate and erroneous propositional inferences. Cognition, 214, 104792. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104792CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Orne, M. T. (1962). On the social psychology of the psychological experiment: With particular reference to demand characteristics and their implications. American Psychologist, 17(11), 776–783. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0043424CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schwarz, N. (1994). Judgment in a social context: Biases, shortcomings, and the logic of conversation. In Zanna, M. P. (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 26, pp. 123–162). Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60153-7Google Scholar
Schwarz, N. (1999). Self-reports: How the questions shape the answers. American Psychologist, 54(2), 93–105. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.54.2.93CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vranas, P. B. (2000). Gigerenzer's normative critique of Kahneman and Tversky. Cognition, 76(3), 179–193. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0010-0277(99)00084-0CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Zizzo, D. J. (2010). Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments. Experimental Economics, 13, 75–98. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-009-9230-zCrossRefGoogle Scholar