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The reemergence of the language-of-thought hypothesis: Consequences for the development of the logic of thought

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2023

Nicolò Cesana-Arlotti Open the ORCID record for Nicolò Cesana-Arlotti [Opens in a new window]
Nicolò Cesana-Arlotti*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA. nicolo.cesana-arlotti@yale.edu; www.nicolocesanaarlotti.com
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Abstract

Quilty-Dunn et al. defended the reemergence of language-of-thought hypothesis (LoTH). My commentary builds up implications for the study of the development of our logical capacities. Empirical support for logically augmented LoT systems calls for the investigation of their logical primitives and developmental origin. Furthermore, Quilty-Dunn et al.'s characterization of LoT helps the quest for the foundation of logic by dissociating logical cognition from natural language.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e268
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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