This study examines the evolution of populism in South Korea by analyzing the rhetoric of its two mainstream political parties, the People Power Party (PPP) and the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK), from 2012 to 2022. Utilizing a longitudinal content analysis of party statements and employing advanced large language models (LLMs) for classification, the findings reveal three key trends. First, populist rhetoric has increased over time across both parties. Second, its usage intensifies during election periods and when parties are in opposition. Third, among different forms of populism, sectarian populism, marked by moral polarization and hostility toward political opponents, emerges as the most prominent. These findings contribute to the broader understanding of populism’s role in third-wave democracies, illustrating its implications for democratic stability and the entrenchment of political sectarianism.

In-person networks based on imperial legacies, immigrants, and general trading companies that share a common language and culture can help expand trade in differentiated goods. However, little is known regarding how such networks can facilitate deals for differentiated goods. To investigate the role played by general trading companies in this context, we study how major trading companies navigated a sensitive transaction—the procurement of distillation facilities for oil shale in Manchuria—in imperial Japan during the first age of globalization. Our archival research revealed that trading companies logistically supported Japanese buyer engineers when they met in person with engineers associated with Western suppliers, and visited plants in the West with the aim of acquiring tacit knowledge beyond the scope of written specifications. The role played by Japanese trading companies in this context involved promoting knowledge spillover from the West by providing logistic support for such in-person meetings.

The Anti-Extradition Bill Movement in 2019 sparked the most radical mass protests seen in Hong Kong since the transfer of sovereignty. Scholars have proposed various explanations for the radicalization of the protests, as well as for the mass support for this radicalization across various sectors of society. However, economic grievances have been relatively downplayed in attempts to understand the radical protests. Using data from a survey conducted during the suspension of the movement in 2020 (N = 1,574), this study examines the relationship between economic grievances and support for the protests. Through mediation analysis, the findings show that individuals who perceived themselves as belonging to a lower class tended to have a diminished sense of social mobility and equality. These negative perceptions contributed to concerns about the activities of Mainland Chinese individuals and the use of public resources. Thus, these particular economic grievances were found to be positively associated with support for the 2019 movement.

In 2015, China adopted “Made in China 2025” to upgrade its manufacturing sector and to engage firms in contributing to state priorities including economic growth and national security. Since 2015, the media and academics have noted that manufacturing firms of more strategic importance received more subsidies. However, firms manufacturing cutting-edge products do not necessarily mean that they are willing to meet the state’s political goals. This article argues that China grants more subsidies to manufacturing firms more connected to the party-state. Data on manufacturing firms listed in China supports the argument. Data also demonstrates that when manufacturing firms are more politically connected, the positive effects of subsidies on local manufacturing growth and on firm-level productivity tend to decrease. The symbiotic relationship between politically connected firms and the party-state may curb on the growth momentum, which contradicts one of the key goals of “Made in China 2025”: economic growth.

Indonesia’s population skews young, so political analysts are increasingly concerned with what the “youth vote” looks like, and what generational change will bring to Indonesia’s democracy. On the one hand, analysts have historically focused on the liberal political activism of more educated cohorts of young people, and especially those in urban areas. On the other, and most recently, young Indonesians overwhelmingly voted for Prabowo Subianto in the 2024 presidential elections, suggesting this cohort to be either unaware of, or unperturbed by, his authoritarian history. This paper examines how young Indonesians perceive their country’s democratic trajectory. We analyze two decades of nationally representative survey data, and examine the democratic preferences of Indonesian voters whose political socialization took place entirely in the post-authoritarian era (1998–). The results suggest both life-cycle and intriguing cohort effects: on average, Indonesians become more positive towards their democracy as they age; but we also find that Indonesia’s Gen Zs are more satisfied with democracy than other generational cohorts—despite a precipitous decline in the quality of Indonesian democracy over the past decade. We argue, therefore, that while all Indonesians show high levels of satisfaction with their weakening democracy, young Indonesians, more than other generations, can be understood as ‘complacent democrats.’

Propagandists discredit political ideas that rival their own. In China’s state-run media, one common technique is to place the phrase so-called, in English, or 所谓, in Chinese, before the idea to be discredited. In this research note we apply quantitative text analysis methods to over 45,000 Xinhua articles from 2003 to 2022 containing so-called or 所谓 to better understand the ideas the government wishes to discredit for different audiences. We find that perceived challenges to China’s sovereignty consistently draw usage of the term and that a theme of rising importance is political rivalry with the United States. When it comes to differences between internal and external propaganda, we find broad similarities, but differences in how the US is discredited and more emphasis on cooperation for foreign audiences. These findings inform scholarship on comparative authoritarian propaganda and Chinese propaganda specifically.