In Patterns of Discovery, [1], and Concept of the Positron, [2], the late N. R. Hanson put forward an intersting and, I believe, essentially sound argument to the effect that, necessarily, micro-entities are “unpicturable.” Hanson's claim is centrally a claim about microreduction, but his use of the term ‘unpicturable’ may be misleading, generating critiques which overplay its implications and its importance. A. M. Paul, in a recent article, [4], has taken Hanson to task in this regard, claiming that the notion of picturability is so cloudy as to render Hanson's whole enterprise unconvincing. In what follows I shall critically discuss Hanson's argument and Paul's analysis and attempt to state a version of it capable of meeting Paul's objections. I will claim that Hanson's use of the term ‘unpicturable’ may be, at worst, infelicitous, and that his thesis concerning micro- or property-reduction remains unaffected by questions concerning what we can or cannot picture.

A philosophical interpretation of quantum mechanics presupposes a clear understanding of what is asserted by this theory. The aim of this paper is to help clarify one specific theorem of quantum mechanics, namely the so-called uncertainty relations. The surprisingly wide spread belief that these relations generally imply a reciprocal or inversely proportional relationship between the respective uncertainties is shown to be mistaken. Several reasons why this mistaken belief has been embraced are suggested. The conditions under which one could say that the uncertainty relations imply an inversely proportional relationship between uncertainties are specified.

Subjunctive conditionals have their uses, but constituting the meaning of dispositional predicates is not one of them. More germane is the analysis of dispositions in terms of “bases”—except that past efforts to maintain an ontic gap between dispositions and their bases, while not wholly misguided, have failed to appreciate the semantic birthright of dispositional concepts as a species of theoretical construct in primitive science.

In this essay it is argued that (1) if the process of scientific inquiry were to continue forever, then science would ultimately terminate in the acceptance of a single theoretical framework better than all conceivable others, and (2) there is some evidence in favor of the view that science will continue unto eternity but no evidence in favor of the contrary view.

In arguing for claim (1) it is claimed that if we are to understand the sense in which science is progressive we must mean either that science progresses by approximating a final goal which, given an infinite process, will be attained, or that science progresses simply in the sense of expanding a body of funded knowledge such that, given an infinite process, the body of funded knowledge expands ad infinitum. That the second member of this disjunct is false and that the first cannot be shown to be false follows largely from a discussion and rejection of all available arguments (five) against the hypothesis proposed in (1). Further, an argument provided by Peirce (and suitably supplemented) provides additional positive evidence for the truth of the first member. No such argument exists for the truth of the second member.

In arguing for claim (2) it is held that evidence in favor of a belief can be purchased by the positive moral value likely to occur as a result of accepting the beliefs, and that there is at least one moral value which accrues to the belief that inquiry will continue forever but which does not accrue to the belief that inquiry will not continue forever. In short, while there is no systematic evidence for or against the view that inquiry will continue forever, we have the right (and duty) to believe that inquiry will continue forever but we do not have the right (and duty) to believe the contrary.

To overcome sociopsychologism and historical relativism, the growth of science is deduced from the combined effect of postulated invariant controls, in the form of enduring ideals of science, in their interaction with nature. The thus constituted “cybernetics-of-science” concept permits extrapolation from present to future states of science. The ideal scientific theory is the goal or target toward which the scientific process is oriented, by virtue of its invariant controls. The form of the ideal theory can thus be extrapolated, and some speculative hypotheses advanced as to its contents, taking those of the recently emerged constructs of science as basis which best accord with the predicted form of the theory.

The purpose of this paper is to show that there are as many formulations of the process of falsification as there are archetypal, philosophical systems of inquiry. This paper explores several systems of inquiry which are based on Churchman's reading of the history of Western epistemology. It is argued that (1) the falsification of scientific theories can never be a purely formal process although it is perpetually open to formal exploration ; (2) that contrary to current belief, falsification can never be more certain than confirmation because falsification involves judgments which are no more certain than those involved in confirmation. The supposed asymmetry between confirmation and falsification is severely challenged. Finally, a Feyerabendian and a Hegelian notion of falsification are explicitly developed and contrasted.