Is there progress in philosophy? A glass-half-full view is that there is some progress in philosophy. A glass-half-empty view is that there is not as much as we would like. I articulate a version of the glass-half-empty view, argue for it, and then address the crucial question of what explains it.

Divine command theories of metaethics are commonly rejected on the basis of the Euthyphro problem. In this paper, I argue that the Euthyphro can be raised for all forms of moral realism. I go on to argue that this does not matter as the Euthyphro is not really a problem after all. I then briefly outline some of the attractions of a divine command theory of metaethics. I suggest that given one of the major reasons for rejecting such an analysis has been found to be unsound divine command theories deserve to be taken more seriously in contemporary metaethics.

A discussion of how and whether judgment regarding the happiness, flourishing or well-being of a life is appropriately influenced by false belief or ignorance on matters central to that life. That is, is it so that what we don't know does not, or cannot hurt us? How much does it matter if the false belief was owing to betrayal or deception by others who mattered deeply to the now dead person? Further, is truthfulness about such betrayal something a friend of a dying person may eschew or is it itself a kind of betrayal?

My goal in this paper is to elucidate a problematic feature of Newton's metaphysics of absolute space. Specifically, I argue that Newton's theory has the untenable consequence that God depends on space for His existence and is therefore not an independent entity. I argue for this conclusion in stages. First, I show that Newton believed that space was an entity and that God and space were ontologically distinct entities. Part of this involves arguing that Newton denies that space is a divine attribute. I then show that Newton endorsed a principle according to which the existence of space is a necessary condition for the existence of any other entity. Following this, I discuss the ways in which this makes God depend on space for His existence and the reasons why this is unacceptable for traditional conceptions of God. Specifically, I show that it is incompatible with the orthodox position that God be entirely independent and self-determining. Finally, I offer two considerations which, I hope, make the problem seem less serious than it first appears. The first consideration has to do with Newton's polemical context and the second has to do with the nature of his theological thought.

Indifference is often described as a vice. Yet who is indifferent; to what; and in what way is poorly understood, and frequently subject to controversy and confusion. This paper proposes a framework for the interpretation and analysis of ethically problematic forms of indifference in terms of how different states of indifference can be either more or less dynamic, or more or less sensitive to the nature and state of their object.

It has often been claimed that Locke's agnostic remarks in the Essay represent his suspension of philosophical judgment on crucial ontological issues or his hesitation over which metaphysical stance to adopt. Against this often-raised criticism, I argue that Locke actually held a clear position – a type of functionalism about thingness in general, whether macro or micro, or whether mental or physical. What Locke refers to as a ‘nominal essence’, I further argue, represents a set of functional roles that a thing plays in order to be classified as of a kind to which it belongs. Our empirical knowledge about things – confined to their nominal essences – can only tell us about their functional roles but not their intrinsic properties that realize those roles. One remains therefore incurably ignorant about the intrinsic property of things in themselves. I explore the historical and philosophical significance of Locke's functional approach.