Some new information has recently come to light with regard to philosophy in Russia. It appears that it is next to impossible for anyone living there to study the subject or indeed to form an adequate conception of it. There is not a single teacher of philosophy or logic in any of the Universities ; a course of the history of philosophy is only read in theethnological department of the Moscow University. It is proposed, however, to introduce the teaching of logic and of the history of philosophy in certain towns “ when a sufficient number of teachers are available,” and with this purpose a department of philosophy at the ‘ Institute of red professorship ’ has been opened. But the qualifications required of the future professors of philosophy make one more than doubtful of their capacity to teach the subject. All that is required of them is that they should have read the first volume of Lange's History of Materialism, Hoffding's History of Modern Philosophy, Gomperz's Greek Thinkers up to Socrates (only the early part of Gomperz's work has been translated into Russian, and the knowledge of foreign languages is not required from the candidates), Wundt's Introduction to Philosophy, and the writings of various philosophizing Marxists. In addition to these academic qualifications they must have a recommendation from the communist party or some similar organization. The kind of ideas that are being instilled into these prospective teachers may be gathered from the writings of the accredited ‘ red ’ philosophers in the only philosophical periodical which is being published in Russia, Under the Banner of Marxism, and in other magazines.

The object of this article is not to criticize Professor Watson's psychology, still less his physiology; neither do I wish to attempt a fundamental metaphysical criticism, such as that contained in Professor Lloyd Morgan's article in the April number of the Journal, but it appears to me that a purely logical criticism, admitting Professor Watson's facts and observations, and assuming his mechanistic point of view, may be a useful preliminary to such wider and more fundamental inquiry.

Summary: In Germany several important books have recently been published, and several interesting conferences have been held. Among the publications which are here surveyed are Personal Presentations of Contemporary Philosophy, by a group of prominent philosophers; Contemporary German Philosophy of Value, by AugustMesser; On the Battlefield of Logic, by JosephGeyser; together with numbers of two periodicals—Annals of Philosophy and International Philosophical News.

English Philosophy owes much that is most characteristic of it to the assiduous toil of men whose vocation has not been that of academic teaching and research. Many of them have been engulfed in the routine of business life, and such hours as they could devote to philosophic reflexion have been snatched from intervals of leisure which the majority of business men relinquish to recreation and rest. The friend to whose memory I wish to pay my humble tribute would not have claimed for himself, nor have permitted his associates to claim for him, the distinction of having initiated a new line of speculative reflexion. But, if he did not propound any original metaphysical theory, he possessed, in quite unusual measure, the

Few current problems have become so confused as that of Value. Its increasing importance in all departments of modern thought has made it the focal point of so many diverse aspects that the result seems a mass of formidable contradictions. But these can never be overcome by attempting to simplify the situation, which must on the contrary be recognized from the outset as presenting an extreme complexity that will inevitably advance pan passu with the advancing complexities of human experience. If, then, simplification is impossible, the only alternative is to attempt to grasp the salient features and present these in their true relation, in the same way that an invading army seizes the principal bases of hostile territory.

Probably no psychologist is really satisfied at heart with the present position as regards the psychology of Meaning. A similar situation existed not so very long ago—and in a measure still exists—with respect to the psychology of the emotions. But the difficulties with regard to Meaning are even more formidable than those with regard to Emotion. In both cases the difficulties are of the most fundamental character, and may be said to involve the very foundations of the science itself. In both cases also the difficulties are to some extent of the same kind, and have their origin in analogous conditions.