I propose a model analyzing patterns in local compliance in response to requests from intervening COIN allies. I argue four primary variables affect the likelihood of compliance with policies proposed by intervening forces: (1) the capacity of the local partner to implement the requested policy, (2) whether the respective interests of the local and intervening forces converge or diverge over the policy, (3) the dependency of the intervening ally on the local regime to implement the requested policy, and (4) acute external threats from insurgent forces. The theory contends that these are key to understanding the seemingly curious behavior of local COIN partners, who at times seem to undermine the strength of a joint COIN effort by remaining obstinate against key reforms promoted by intervening patrons. Instead of presuming local allies comply with such requests when it is in their interest to do, and refuse when their interests diverge, I argue there is a specific pattern of interaction between interests, and the reliance of foreign intervening forces on local actors to implement policy, that affects the likelihood of compliance by local partners with policy demands.

This chapter sets forth the conceptual scheme for the V–Dem project. We begin by discussing the concept of democracy. Next, we lay out seven principles by which this key concept may be understood – electoral, liberal, majoritarian, consensual, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian. Each defines a “variety“ of democracy, and together they offer a fairly comprehensive accounting of the concept as used in the world today. Next, we show how this seven-part framework fits into our overall thinking about democracy, including multiple levels of disaggregation – to components, subcomponents, and indicators. The final section of the chapter discusses several important caveats and clarifications pertaining to this ambitious taxonomic exercise.

This book explores the survival, performance and dynamics of radical right politics during peacetime, and Chapter 2 advances a theory of radical right mobilization grounded in the logic of electoral counter-mobilization, which originates in resentment about adverse shifts in the status quo that affect minority–majority relations. The core thesis is that radical right parties mobilize to keep minorities from advancing. The ire of radical right voters is not directed at all minorities, but specifically at minorities (and their allies) that aspire to change the status quo in their favor through the political process. Radical right mobilization does not originate in the demons of xenophobia or group hostility, as is often argued, but rather in policy shifts that reflect changes in the status quo and signal the social advancement of minorities. The state is the ultimate sovereign that is charged with regulating the relationship between the dominant group and minorities, and the appropriate assortment of accommodation, exclusion and repression. Radical right mobilization results from the sovereign’s resentment regarding its diminished status, and represents a revolt against a political system that has allowed minorities to gain political power and advance their causes.