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Cautiously optimistic rationalism may not be cautious enough

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 September 2019

Justin F. Landy Open the ORCID record for Justin F. Landy [Opens in a new window]
Justin F. Landy*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster, PA 17604. jlandy@fandm.edujustinflandy.com
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Abstract

May expresses optimism about the source, content, and consequences of moral judgments. However, even if we are optimistic about their source (i.e., reasoning), some pessimism is warranted about their content, and therefore their consequences. Good reasoners can attain moral knowledge, but evidence suggests that most people are not good reasoners, which implies that most people do not attain moral knowledge.

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Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e159
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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