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Valuation mechanisms in moral cognition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 September 2019

Julia Haas
Julia Haas*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Rhodes College, Memphis, TN 38112. Haasj2@rhodes.eduwww.juliashaas.com
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Abstract

May cites a body of evidence suggesting that participants take consequences, personal harm, and other factors into consideration when making moral judgments. This evidence is used to support the conclusion that moral cognition relies on rule-based inference. This commentary defends an alternative interpretation of this evidence, namely, that it can be explained in terms of domain general valuation mechanisms.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e155
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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