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Moral reasoning is the process of asking moral questions and answering them

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 September 2019

Mark Alfano Open the ORCID record for Mark Alfano [Opens in a new window]
Mark Alfano*
Affiliation:
Ethics and Philosophy of Technology, Delft University of Technology, 2628 BX Delft, The NetherlandsMark.Alfano@gmail.comwww.alfanophilosopy.com Institute for Religion and Critical Inquiry, Australian Catholic University, Fitzroy, VIC 3002, Australia.
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Abstract

Reasoning is the iterative, path-dependent process of asking questions and answering them. Moral reasoning is a species of such reasoning, so it is a matter of asking and answering moral questions, which requires both creativity and curiosity. As such, interventions and practices that help people ask more and better moral questions promise to improve moral reasoning.

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Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e147
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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