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Consciousness science as a marketplace of rationalizations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 June 2026

Matan Mazor Open the ORCID record for Matan Mazor [Opens in a new window]
Matan Mazor*
Affiliation:
All Souls College and Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK mtnmzor@gmail.com
*
*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

In consciousness science, theoretical predictions are often untestable, such as claims about phenomenal consciousness in other beings. This evidential underdetermination, in combination with the perceived moral significance of consciousness, puts consciousness science at risk of becoming a marketplace of rationalizations: a field that produces theories that reaffirm social practices and conventions.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 49 , 2026 , e184
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press

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