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The sensory horizons hypothesis fails to explain consciousness because it relies on an abstruse causal function

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 June 2026

Brian Key*
Affiliation:
School of Biomedical Sciences, and Centre for Innovation in Pain and Health Research, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia brian.key@uq.edu.au
*
*Corresponding author.

Abstract

The sensory horizons hypothesis as an explanation of consciousness depends on visual experience directly affecting neural activity underlying conscious model-based planning. Given that there is no known mechanism for subjective experience to generate action potentials, the sensory horizons hypothesis lacks explanatory insight into the function of consciousness. We contend that a better strategy is to investigate non-causal functions of consciousness.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press

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