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Peeking ahead in space and time

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 June 2026

Thomas Suddendorf Open the ORCID record for Thomas Suddendorf [Opens in a new window]  and
Jonathan Redshaw Open the ORCID record for Jonathan Redshaw [Opens in a new window]
Thomas Suddendorf*
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia t.suddendorf@psy.uq.edu.au j.redshaw@uq.edu.au Australian Research Centre for Human Evolution, Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia
Jonathan Redshaw
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia t.suddendorf@psy.uq.edu.au j.redshaw@uq.edu.au
*
*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

Research suggests that reasoning about occluded objects, reality monitoring, and especially planning develop relatively late in children, and are capacities not universally shared with other land animals. F&M’s proposal needs to more clearly delineate their use of these concepts to avoid misunderstandings about what they see as essential for the evolution of conscious vision.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 49 , 2026 , e194
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press

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