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A game of raids: Expanding on a game theoretical approach utilising the prisoner's dilemma and ethnography in situ

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 January 2024

Emily M. L. Jeffries ,
Sarah E. Wright  and
Sheina Lew-Levy Open the ORCID record for Sheina Lew-Levy [Opens in a new window]
Emily M. L. Jeffries
Affiliation:
Durham Cultural Evolution Research Centre & Department of Psychology, Durham University, Durham, UK emily.m.jeffries@durham.ac.uk https://www.durham.ac.uk/staff/emily-m-jeffries/ sarah.wright2@durham.ac.uk https://www.durham.ac.uk/staff/sarah-wright2/ Sheina.lew-levy@durham.ac.uk https://www.durham.ac.uk/staff/sheina-lew-levy/
Sarah E. Wright
Affiliation:
Durham Cultural Evolution Research Centre & Department of Psychology, Durham University, Durham, UK emily.m.jeffries@durham.ac.uk https://www.durham.ac.uk/staff/emily-m-jeffries/ sarah.wright2@durham.ac.uk https://www.durham.ac.uk/staff/sarah-wright2/ Sheina.lew-levy@durham.ac.uk https://www.durham.ac.uk/staff/sheina-lew-levy/
Sheina Lew-Levy*
Affiliation:
Durham Cultural Evolution Research Centre & Department of Psychology, Durham University, Durham, UK emily.m.jeffries@durham.ac.uk https://www.durham.ac.uk/staff/emily-m-jeffries/ sarah.wright2@durham.ac.uk https://www.durham.ac.uk/staff/sarah-wright2/ Sheina.lew-levy@durham.ac.uk https://www.durham.ac.uk/staff/sheina-lew-levy/
*
*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

In this commentary, we set out the specifics of how Glowacki's game theoretical framework for the evolution of peace could be incorporated within broader cultural evolutionary approaches. We outline a formal proposal for prisoner's dilemma games investigating raid-based conflict. We also centre an ethnographic lens to understand the norms surrounding war and peace in intergroup interactions in small-scale communities.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 47 , 2024 , e14
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press

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