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Babies can be good at relationships and other things too: arguments for moral cognition in infancy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 May 2026

Francis Yuen*
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada francis.yuen@psych.ubc.ca zsoleimani@psych.ubc.ca noguz@psych.ubc.ca kiley.hamlin@psych.ubc.ca
Zohreh Soleimani
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada francis.yuen@psych.ubc.ca zsoleimani@psych.ubc.ca noguz@psych.ubc.ca kiley.hamlin@psych.ubc.ca
Neslihan Oğuz
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada francis.yuen@psych.ubc.ca zsoleimani@psych.ubc.ca noguz@psych.ubc.ca kiley.hamlin@psych.ubc.ca
Kiley Hamlin
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada francis.yuen@psych.ubc.ca zsoleimani@psych.ubc.ca noguz@psych.ubc.ca kiley.hamlin@psych.ubc.ca
*
*Corresponding author.

Abstract

Thomas suggests that evidence suggestive of an innate moral core can instead be explained by relationship inferences and evaluations. We argue that the analogy between other demonstrations of prosociality (e.g., helping) and imitation is insufficient, and additionally highlight key findings that appear inconsistent with a relationship-centric view of infants’ sociomoral capacities.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press

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