Can monuments to victims of authoritarian regimes promote more tolerant societies? We look into the case of Stolpersteine, small memorials commemorating victims of the Nazi regime in Germany. Unlike other monuments, Stolpersteine are dedicated to specific individuals who were victims of Nazi violence. In a pre-registered survey experiment, we showed treated individuals pictures of the stones. Our results show that exposure to Stolpersteine strongly increased negative emotions and reduced positive ones. The results on attitudinal and quasi-behavioral outcomes are mixed, likely driven by ceiling effects. We find a positive effect on tolerance toward the only minority group that faces low tolerance in the control group. However, there is no statistically significant effect for other groups.

Who do we blame when bad things happen? Has division in American society made us less sympathetic to victims of tragedies? In previous trying times (e.g., 9/11 and Columbine), Americans rallied together to support victims and seek government solutions. In a highly polarized era, however, we have witnessed further division rather than unity. In this paper, I leverage original, pre-registered survey experiments to examine how much Americans blame and sympathize with someone who has tragically died from COVID-19. The studies find consistent evidence that partisans blame victims who hold an anti-vaccine perspective, regardless of partisanship. Less consistent evidence suggests that Democrats also blame victims who were Republican, but less than they do victims who held anti-vaccination views. Further, partisans are less sympathetic when the victim was anti-vaccine, but Democrats and Republicans are also less sympathetic when the person who died was an outpartisan. These results indicate that animosity towards outpartisans persists even through tragedy, but demonstrates limits to affective partisan polarization paired with evidence of rational blame and sympathy responses.

As digital platforms become a key channel for political advertising, there are continued calls for expanding regulation of digital political ads as a distinct content category. However, designing policies to meet these demands requires us first to decipher what the public perceives a “political” ad to be. In this article, we report two preregistered experiments to understand factors that drive public perceptions of what makes an ad political. We find that both advertiser-level cues and content-level cues play an independent role in shaping perceptions. To a lesser extent, participants also attribute political meaning to ads that clash with their own preferences. These patterns were replicated in a conjoint study using artificial ads and in an experiment using real-world ads drawn from the Facebook Ad Library. Our findings serve as an important benchmark for evaluating proposed definitions of political ads from policymakers and platforms.

Recent studies suggest that online abuse directed at politicians can have negative effects on their public engagement and continued participation in politics. This article considers the broader consequences of such online abuse by testing whether exposure to online abuse of politicians also decreases the prospective political participation of ordinary citizens. In a preregistered survey experiment with 2,000 participants from Denmark, we find that exposing citizens to cases of online abuse of politicians does not have any statistically significant, or substantively meaningful, negative effects on citizens’ prospective political participation. This result holds across multiple measures of political participation and when distinguishing citizens by their gender and level of conflict avoidance. If anything, exploratory analyses indicate that online abuse of politicians may in some cases mobilize citizens who have been bystanders to such abuse.

Mounting research finds that shared discrimination boosts solidarity between people of color (PoC), with downstream increases in support for pro-outgroup policies. However, these experiments measure the proposed mediator (solidarity), rather than manipulate it, which raises reasonable doubts about its causal impact. We report two pre-registered experiments (N = 2,692) that reassess solidarity’s causal influence by “blocking” its downstream effects. We conducted these studies with Black adults – the prototypical person of color who define this mega-group’s norms and values. Both studies focus on Black-Latino relations and reveal that manipulating shared discrimination between these groups heartily boosts Black solidarity with PoC (d∼.40). Critically, after solidarity’s activation, manipulating differences in the bases of discrimination against Black and Latino people (i.e., slavery versus immigration) modestly reduces its downstream effect on Black support for pro-Latino policies. A pre-registered internal meta-analysis finds this “blockage” effect is modest but statistically reliable (d∼.10), leading us to conclude that solidarity’s mediating influence is likely causal and resistant to this divisive threat. We discuss our results’ implications for inter-minority politics.

Scholarship has identified key determinants of people’s belief in misinformation predominantly from English-language contexts. However, multilingual citizens often consume news media in multiple languages. We study how the language of consumption affects belief in misinformation and true news articles in multilingual environments. We suggest that language may pass on specific cues affecting how bilinguals evaluate information. In a ten-week survey experiment with bilingual adults in Ukraine, we measured if subjects evaluating information in their less-preferred language were less likely to believe it. We find those who prefer Ukrainian are less likely to believe both false and true stories written in Russian by approximately 0.2 standard deviation units. Conversely, those who prefer Russian show increased belief in false stories in Ukrainian, though this effect is less robust. A secondary digital media literacy intervention does not increase discernment as it reduces belief in both true and false stories equally.

Why do some politicians face greater backlash for using insensitive language against identity groups while others do not? Existing explanations focus either on the content of speech or the context in which it occurs. In this article, we propose an integrated framework that considers both and test it using a preregistered conjoint survey on a national U.S. sample. Our findings provide partial support for our expectations. Subjects react most negatively to insensitive speech when the target belongs to their own identity group, when aggravating circumstances exist, and when politicians are of an opposing political party. Our article extends growing scholarship on speech scandals, which has largely explained the fates of politicians as a function of a small number of causative variables in isolation.

This Registered Report examines urban-rural tensions in Sweden – a historically egalitarian, multi-party welfare state with strong geographical equalization schemes, making it a least-likely case for place-based resentment theories. Using an online survey experiment (n = 2,051), we measured resentment through perceptions of in-group and out-group, and by experimentally varying whether political statements came from rural or urban politicians. Rural respondents showed stronger in-group identification, greater place-based resentment, and more negative stereotypes of their out-group than urban respondents. However, we find no evidence of place-based bias – that is, that rural respondents are less receptive to urban politicians’ statements, or vice versa. These findings reveal clear urban-rural tensions in a context often considered unlikely for such divides, underscoring the role of regional identities in political discourse and policy in multi-party welfare states beyond Anglo-Saxon settings, while indicating that these tensions do not translate into systematic bias in evaluating political statements.