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Special, radical, failure of reduction in psychiatry

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Don Ross*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University College Cork, Cork, T12 AW89, Ireland. don.ross931@gmail.com School of Economics, University of Cape Town, Private bag, Rondebosch 7701, South Africa. http://uct.academia.edu/DonRoss Center for Economic Analysis of Risk, J. Mack Robinson College of Business, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303.

Abstract

Use of network models to identify causal structure typically blocks reduction across the sciences. Entanglement of mental processes with environmental and intentional relationships, as Borsboom et al. argue, makes reduction of psychology to neuroscience particularly implausible. However, in psychiatry, a mental disorder can involve no brain disorder at all, even when the former crucially depends on aspects of brain structure. Gambling addiction constitutes an example.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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