Hostname: page-component-77f85d65b8-g4pgd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-04-17T16:44:45.340Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Explaining historical change in terms of LHT: A pluralistic causal framework is needed

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2019

Aurélien Allard Open the ORCID record for Aurélien Allard [Opens in a new window]  and
Antoine Marie
Aurélien Allard
Affiliation:
Laboratory of Political Theory, University of Paris 8, 93526 Saint Denis, Franceaurelien.ab.allard@gmail.comhttps://aurelienallard.netlify.com/
Antoine Marie
Affiliation:
Center for Research and Interdisciplinarity; Paris Descartes University, 75004 Paris, Franceantoine.marie.sci@gmail.comhttps://antoinemariesci.wixsite.com/antoinemarie Institut Jean Nicod, ENS, EHESS, CNRS, PSL Research University, 75005 Paris, France.
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Baumard suggests that the advent, through phenotypic plasticity mechanisms, of future-oriented preferences and creative mindsets in eighteenth-century Great Britain explains the wave of innovations that drove the British Industrial Revolution. We argue that, although this approach is promising, Baumard's model would benefit from being supplemented by demographic, economic, and sociological explanations independent of Life History Theory (LHT).

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e190
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Broadberry, S., Campbell, B. M. S., Klein, A., Overton, M. & van Leeuwen, B. (2015) British economic growth, 1270–1870. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Henrich, J. (2004) Demography and cultural evolution: How adaptive cultural processes can produce maladaptive losses: The Tasmanian case. American Antiquity 69(2):197–214. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2307/4128416.Google Scholar
Kremer, M. (1993) Population growth and technological change: One million B.C. to 1990. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(3):681–716. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2307/2118405.Google Scholar
Livi Bacci, M. (2000) The population of Europe. Wiley-Blackwell.Google Scholar
Norenzayan, A., Shariff, A. F., Gervais, W. M., Willard, A. K., McNamara, R. A., Slingerland, E. & Henrich, J. (2016) The cultural evolution of prosocial religions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39:e1. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X14001356.Google Scholar
Sperber, D. (1996) Explaining culture: A naturalistic approach, first ed., vol. 323. Blackwell.Google Scholar
Sperber, D. & Hirschfeld, L. A. (2004) The cognitive foundations of cultural stability and diversity. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8(1):40–46. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2003.11.002.Google Scholar
Squicciarini, M. P. & Voigtländer, N. (2015) Human capital and industrialization: Evidence from the age of enlightenment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 130(4):1825–83. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv025.Google Scholar
Weber, M. (2002) The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism: And other writings. Penguin Classics.Google Scholar