It seems futile to look for order in the tangle of norms that abound in the global extractive sector, even more so to look for the teleological principle that would give it meaning. In this tangle, normative regimes interact with each other—in a largely contingent manner—as elements of an ecosystem. We argue that inasmuch as order emerges in the global extractive normative ecosystem, it is a function of the success of norm entrepreneurs such as Export and Development Canada (EDC), Canada’s export credit agency, a financial institution adhering to the Equator Principles. Norms entrepreneurs like EDC perform various normative bricolages claiming to deliver different goods such as free, prior and informed consent (FPIC). We analyse how EDC tinkers with different normative instruments, including the International Finance Corporation’s Standard 7 regarding Indigenous Peoples, to deliver ‘FPIC compliance’ in jurisdictions that are deemed ‘deficient’. We argue that the political ontologies promoted by EDC’s notion of FPIC are better understood within the logic of leverage that underlies EDC’s Environmental and Social Risk Management Policy. These ontologies directly contradict notions of FPIC as expressions of Indigenous self-determination. In our view, offering such normative solutions as a palliative for ‘weak’ jurisdictions—a kind of ‘do-it-yourself (DIY) FPIC regime’ implemented by extractive companies—is thus deeply problematic. We conclude that the appraisal of such normative solutions as put forward by these norm entrepreneurs should look beyond the vocabulary these bricolages mobilise to also consider the political grammar that they induce in territories subject to extraction.

With the Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence, the European Union strives to address the negative externalities of companies that arise in the global economy. The new Directive follows the example of national lawmakers by requiring large companies operating in their own jurisdiction to manage adverse impacts on human rights and the environment. These due diligence laws affect companies beyond European borders by cascading due diligence standards down transnational ownership ties and value chains. They are shifting gears in the complex engine of the global economy and have considerable impacts on stakeholders in third countries. These extraterritorial implications raise the question of what limits international law places on relevant unilateral legislation. This article assesses the Directive against the law of jurisdiction and international comity arguing that unilateral due diligence laws are an appropriate way to address transnational sustainability challenges, provided lawmakers take adequate precautions.

Online platforms have adopted business models enabling the proliferation of hate speech. In some extreme cases, platforms are being investigated for employing algorithms that amplify criminal hate speech such as incitement to genocide. Legislators have developed binding legal frameworks clarifying the human rights due diligence and liability regimes of these platforms to identify and prevent hate speech. Some of the key legal instruments at the European Union level include the Digital Services Act, the proposed Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive and the Artificial Intelligence Act. However, these legal frameworks fail to clarify the remedial responsibilities of online platforms to redress people harmed by criminal hate speech caused or contributed to by the platforms. This article addresses this legal vacuum by proposing a comprehensive remedial responsibilities framework for online platforms which caused or contributed to criminal hate speech based on the general corporate human rights responsibilities framework.

This article argues that the global Business and Human Rights movement demonstrates a push towards a human-rights type of sustainable corporation, reconciling economic development and human rights. It explains the necessity for and significance of a definition of a sustainable corporation at the intersection of traditional international human rights and sustainable development instruments. It argues, inter alia, that an internationally recognised definition of a sustainable corporation can settle fundamental questions and create a minimal framework for meaningful discourse on corporate accountability for human rights, climate change and the environment. It identifies difficulties of defining a sustainable corporation such as the integration problem. It suggests ‘direct human rights obligation’ as a minimally sufficient normative criterion for the definitional correctness of a sustainable corporation. The suggested definition of sustainable corporation requires taking a normative position which makes the term ‘essentially contested’ resulting in discursive and behavioural norm contestation in the search for definitional determinacy and consensus within the divide between international and domestic law.

War is a lucrative business for the military industry, particularly in contexts of mass and structural violence, extensive violations of international law and genocide. For economically advanced states, the profits generated by military businesses are often seen as beneficial under the dynamics of the military-industrial complex. Israel’s genocide in Gaza, which has caused untold suffering that has ‘scarred the consciousness of humanity’, aptly illustrates this dynamic.

In such a context, states and corporations arguably have a duty under international law not to contribute to or benefit from the war economy of the state committing such violations. In practice, however, adhering to these obligations conflicts with the lucrative economic and geopolitical opportunities that this war economy provides. This essay reflects on the argumentative techniques used by states and corporations to justify continued military support for Israel, despite its clear contradiction with their international legal obligations.

The defence industry plays a critical role in maintaining international peace and security, yet its activities inherently have human rights implications. This article examines the industry’s responsibility to respect human rights in conformity with the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. It explores challenges, practices, and opportunities of human rights due diligence within the arms sector—including the end-use monitoring component. It seeks to inform policymakers, industry, scholars and activists working towards a rights-respecting arms trade regime. The article will explore human rights due diligence’s foundations in international human rights law and corporate social responsibility frameworks, as well as emerging shifts and standards in the legal landscape at the national, regional, and international levels. Drawing on the American Bar Association Center for Human Rights evidence-based research, this piece will also explore the industry’s response to its due diligence obligations and how these narratives cannot shield the industry from legal, financial and reputational risks.

There is increased public attention directed to the topic of weapons trade and this is a positive development because enhanced scrutiny holds a promise of bringing more accountability to the field that has long been obscure. This article reviews the possibility of criminal prosecutions of corporate officials for supplying weapons to Gaza, Yemen and Ukraine at the International Criminal Court (ICC) or a similar forum. The Nuremberg Trials planted seeds for such an endeavour by holding several industrialists criminally liable. Yet, modern international criminal law has so far largely stayed away from defining the scope of individual criminal responsibility for corporate officials. The case studies in this paper reveal that the moment is not ripe for commencing actual investigations at the ICC. Nonetheless, a future consensus is slowly building through (often failed) attempts to use legal or policy avenues to define the standards of conduct in the weapons trade.

Large European arms companies increasingly own and control subsidiaries in other parts of the world. These subsidiaries operate hundreds of production sites used to manufacture and export weapons for the benefit of the parent company. Yet, they are bound by the legal framework in host countries. An important case study of this phenomenon is South Africa, which is now the site for numerous subsidiaries of large European arms manufacturers, including Rheinmetall and Hensoldt. Between 2018 and 2021, a Rheinmetall subsidiary in South Africa continued to export weapons to Saudi Arabia despite a German prohibition. This article uses South Africa as a case study to examine the potential consequences of the practice of offshoring in the context of weaknesses in South Africa’s arms export control framework and provides recommendations on how to improve scrutiny and reporting in South Africa’s system to better guard against this type of conduct.

This article examines recent measures undertaken by major commercial banks to mitigate and address human rights risks associated with their financial dealings in the arms industry. By reviewing the corporate policies of 20 leading banks that provide financing to top arms manufacturing and exporting companies, the article provides insights into three significant aspects of banks’ efforts: the development of defence sector policies, the implementation of risk assessments for adverse human rights impacts, and the application of exclusion clauses. These measures highlight the increasing recognition by banks of the need to address the ethical, social and human rights implications of financing arms deals, contributing to the broader regulatory and normative framework governing the arms industry.

In 2018, human rights organizations filed a criminal complaint in Italy against the directors of the Italian armaments export licensing authority (UAMA) and the CEO of the arms manufacturer RWM Italia, following the discovery of bomb remnants on the site of an airstrike in Yemen that killed six civilians. The criminal complaint was dismissed in March 2023, despite the judge ruling that UAMA’s directors had violated the Arms Trade Treaty. In July 2023, the victims filed an application to the European Court of Human Rights against Italy, alleging a violation of the right to life. Drawing on an analysis of the criminal investigation files, this piece assesses the failures of the Italian state and RWM Italia to comply with their international human rights obligations regarding arms transfers. It considers the potential for improving accountability within the arms trade via domestic and European courts.

2024 marked ten years since the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) took effect. Firmly rooted in international human rights and humanitarian law, the ATT is the first legally binding instrument to regulate international arms transfers. It is a framework for national action to (i) contribute to peace and security, (ii) reduce human suffering caused by irresponsible arms transfers and (iii) promote transparency in the international arms trade. This piece exploresrecent developments in the ATT process that represent a pivot from building treaty infrastructure toward more expansive stakeholder engagement, increased information exchange centred on state practice and a sharper focus on the ATT’s human impact. Key new features are discussions on actual arms transfer decisions and the examination of the independent human rights responsibilities of industry that operate alongside government risk assessment obligations. Finally, this piece assesses the potential impact of these efforts on the achievement of the ATT’s humanitarian purpose.

This piece outlines the engagement of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights with the United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles on business and human rights in light of the Advisory Opinion requested by Mexico on the obligations of the firearms industry. It outlines how the Court has relied on the distinction between positive and negative human rights duties, which has led it to constantly find states responsible for omissions (failing to ensure rights) instead of actions (carried out by private actors, including corporations). For the Court, such a distinction translates into the possibility that corporations can violate human rights directly.

In the Lafarge decision of 7 September 2021, the French Cour de cassation resolved a long-standing unclarity about the interpretation of French criminal law on complicity in the context of multinational corporations’ involvement in international crimes. The court found that complicity in crimes against humanity can be characterized as soon as a business actor is aware that its actions can facilitate the criminal activities of the main perpetrator, without sharing their specific intent to commit the crime. With this ruling, France’s highest criminal court asserted that the transfer of money from multinational cement company Lafarge to the Islamic State (ISIS) to maintain its industrial activity in northern Syria could trigger its liability for complicity in crimes against humanity. This article summarizes this case from a French and international criminal law perspective, focusing on the charge of complicity in crimes against humanity, and assessing the potential implications of this jurisprudence to the arms industry.