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On Mind and the Duty of Improving It

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Summary

Associated together in Man by the strongest ties, still no two things are more distinct from each other than Mind and Matter. We cannot in any way assimilate them, or make them identical; nor can we confound their relations, or trace them to one common origin. Every effect, or motion, or change dependant on the one part, or the other, carries with it that mark of its source which it is impossible for an indifferent mind to mistake; and even Materialists are spited by their very reasonings proving in each step of their progress the opposite of the conclusion which is to come.

It may be assumed that the material part of man is merely a convenient vehicle or machine in which the mind may exist and by which it may demonstrate its powers. This assumption may be made without any reference to a future state, and simply as it concerns present existence: It is of very ancient date, and as I think, by much the noblest way in which man can be considered; And, yet, perhaps, it will not be allowed me; for whilst such a vast portion of the practice of the world is in opposition to it, I have no right to suppose that that portion will condemn itself by admitting the above assumption.

Though on being asked the question of what is the relative situation of Mind and Matter in Man, every one who understood it, and there are few that would not in its simplest terms, would be ready with an answer; yet it may be justly doubted, whether the answer would accord with the opinion induced by a short succeeding consideration of the subject. The question is put to every man every moment of his life, and he acts in consequence; indeed, actual life is nothing more than a continual answer to it. The nature of Man consists in the union of mind and matter; and he would think the question of his moving, thinking, and living, according to his nature, ridiculous, because he can have no other object: Yet the terms of this ridiculous question include those of the one asked before, and if it is absurd to ask him whether he lives according to his nature, it is as absurd to ask him what that nature is.

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Michael Faraday’s Mental Exercises
An Artisan Essay-Circle in Regency London
, pp. 107 - 118
Publisher: Liverpool University Press
Print publication year: 2008

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