This chapter discusses the role of widows in the family property distribution and formal–informal powers available to elite woman. Widows were discernably marginalised from family property in Ireland. Throughout the period, all women in the families in this study received jointure in place of dower, which in most cases was significantly less than the widow would have received as dower. Widows also had no rights to their husbands' personal property, which tended to be treated as an extension of estate property and bequeathed as such to the heir. Family practices, such as the use of trustees, further sidelined widows from family financial business. The stereotypical image of the greedy dowager bleeding dry an already encumbered estate was a common feature in the correspondence of this class.

According to its director, Terence Fisher, The Gorgon was not a horror film at all, but a romantic fairy tale and 'frustrated love story'. Although the film is set in Hammer's usual stylised middle Europe, the Gorgon herself derives not from Gothic literature, like Dracula and Frankenstein's monster, but from classical mythology, unfamiliar imaginative territory for the British studio. Relocating an ancient monster within the paraphernalia of Victorian Gothic, the film was Hammer's most striking experiment in free adaptation before the frankly bizarre transnational genre-fusion of The Legend of the 7 Golden Vampires. The Gorgon was Fisher's first Hammer film since The Phantom of the Opera and his only film about a woman. Significantly, it marked an attempt to invent a new monster at a time when, as the Dracula and Frankenstein films trailed off, Hammer sought to diversify its range for a wider international audience.

This chapter concentrates on the period from early 1936 to the outbreak of the Second World War. These years marked a turning point for the League of Nations Union (LNU) generally and for the League and the conduct of foreign policy more broadly. The link between League membership and collective security was only very imperfectly understood by the general public. The LNU's non-party rule had always been vulnerable to criticism, but in the later 1930s its inability to bear close scrutiny could no longer be denied. The radicalisation of the youth wing set the LNU's centrist dilemma in sharp relief. The souring of relations between absolutist pacifism and liberal pacificism did not eliminate all space for common action. The period between the close of the Peace Ballot and the outbreak of the Second World War were years of disappointment and frustration for the League movement.

This chapter analyzes the nature of an intriguing, if sometimes troubled, community of Port Jews, and its complex and multi-layered image inside and outside of Portsmouth. Ultimately it explores why particular memories of Portsmouth Jewry—as both a part of and apart from the town's dangerous ‘sailortown’ community—were so persistent in the nineteenth century and beyond. As was the case with the Jews of medieval Winchester, the representation of Portsmouth Jewry had, through the workings of place identity, a wider significance beyond the locality in question.

Trespass is a very old tort that can be used to address wrongs to the person of the plaintiff and also wrongs to the property of the plaintiff. This chapter deals only with trespass to the person, which arises in the case of forcible, direct and immediate injury to the person of the plaintiff.The tort of trespass reflected the interests of the law to maintain peace. Trespass to the person could be used where the plaintiff’s interest in their person – their bodily autonomy, freedom of movement and freedom from apprehension of unlawful touching – has been injured. Unlike the later tort of ‘trespass on the case’ (or ‘case’), which evolved into the tort of negligence, trespass to the person dealt with direct interference. The distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘consequential’ actions can be difficult to draw, as can been seen by the dissent of Blackstone J in Scott v Shepherd. As we will see, even though trespass and case/negligence are two discrete causes of action, the same facts may give rise to liability in both torts.

This chapter discusses the sometimes knotty methodological issues that the Bourdieusian heuristic model throws up. The parameters of Bourdieusian social scientific methodology are also explored. Pierre Bourdieu's interpretation of relationalism and rationalism is not without its critics. Bourdieusian generative structuralism concerns itself with every level of the operation of power. Bourdieu's genetic, microscopic conception of power is significantly insightful in uncovering the operation of coercive power relations in the seemingly quotidian and mundane. Codes and branches of codes could be easily moved around the overall tree, cutting where necessary for clarity, allowing for the development of a framework that is simultaneously systematic and intuitive to use. A similar line of reasoning applied to codings for speech style. Two extracts that show the coding and inference processes are reported.

This chapter discusses the links between the concepts of power, luck and freedom that are elucidated in the subsequent chapters of the book. It argues that comparative static definitions of power are correct for understanding the power structure of society and for comparing power across societies, but will always be inherently disappointing as power in action is dynamic. It discusses the nature of dynamic power and relates that to individual freedom, control and responsibility, demonstrating how luck underpins our understanding of freedom and responsibility.

The 1570 "Homelie against Disobedience" and court sermons responding to the Northern Rebellion and the threat posed by Mary Stuart employ biblical figures to develop a spiritual interpretation of current events. Public sermons in 1587, the year of Mary Stuart’s execution, and in 1589 likewise use biblical typology which shades into nationalism. Recent critics see the Mercilla episode, in its idealization of Elizabeth’s attitude and inaccurate presentation of Mary Stuart’s trial, as evidence of Spenser’s bad faith or a sophisticated critique of power. Rather, his allegory recalls preachers’ use of typology to spiritualize recent events and present them as reflecting well upon Elizabeth and God’s care of England.

This chapter looks at the events that led to the formation of the United Company and the creation of a theatrical monopoly of theatre in London which was to last for thirteen years. By pursuing a bottom-up approach to the power shifts in the company and considering afresh the position of the players and their response to changes in company practice, the actress can be seen to occupy a visible presence and emerging power in the economics of the playhouse.