There are many reasons why we should study and teach about Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander histories and cultures. An underlying factor is that Australia is our home, and we should have a thorough knowledge of the country’s history. As Joe Sambono says in Chapter 9, ‘If you don’t know about us, how can you have a respectful conversation with us?’ Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies is about educating all Australians in relation to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, histories, societies and cultures. That we are educating Australia in a climate of increasing racism is another important point.

Power is fundamental to co–management in numerous ways. In this chapter, key theoretical approaches to the concept of power are reviewed, drawing on conceptions of ‘power over’, ‘power to’ and similar. The chapter then investigates the concept of power in three ways: what power sharing means and how it is experienced, what dominant power relations are observed in co-management and what empowerment means in the context of co–management. In relation to power sharing, it is found that power is often unequally shared, with government having greater power than resource users, evidenced in control of resources and decision-making. Dominant power relations include elite capture, patron–client relations and gender relations. Constraints on the potential for co–management to be empowering for resource users are found to be related to power dynamics and unequal power sharing, encouraging a more technical approach to empowerment being taken rather than a more critical, political approach.

In this chapter we examine the duty to perform and what the Contract Act says about how that duty is to be discharged. Although the Contract Act contains an unusually large number of provisions which relate to performance, they can be addressed under four broad headings: (a) the duty to perform, (b) statutory default terms relating to performance, (c) defences to claims of non-performance and (d) implications of performance and non-performance.

THE GENERAL DUTY TO PERFORM

Section 37 of the Contract Act imposes a general duty on parties to perform ‘their promises’. Strictly speaking, in terms of the statutory provision, there ought to be no leeway provided – performance must match exactly what was promised. The promise itself may contain a degree of tolerance but that does not undermine the general principle that the promise, however flexible it is, must be performed exactly. So, if a contract says that interest must be paid at the rate of 5 per cent, it will not suffice if interest is paid at the rate of 4.9 per cent. However, if a contract provides for delivery of coal with a calorific value of 6,000 kilocalories per kilogram (kcal/kg) but provides for a tolerance of plus or minus 10 per cent, then it suffices to deliver coal with a calorific value of 5,500 kcal/kg (only because that is within the promised tolerance of 5,400–6,600 kcal/kg).

STATUTORY DEFAULT TERMS RELATING TO PERFORMANCE

Although the question of what performance is required from each party will usually be determined by ordinary interpretation of a contract, the Contract Act nevertheless provides for various statutory default terms regarding performance. These default terms apply absent specific provision in any given contract. The Contract Act also sets out certain provisions which specify the enquiry that the court must carry out to determine what performance is actually due.

The breach of contractual obligations can, in certain circumstances, entitle the innocent party to terminate the contract. Not every breach, however, entitles the innocent party to terminate. Only some breaches have that effect. The task of identifying what separates such breaches from other (lesser) breaches is not straightforward, and the Indian Contract Act does not provide clear guidance on what constitutes the additional element that entitles a party to terminate.

In our view, the categories of breach which generate a right to terminate are not, or at any rate should not be, dissimilar from those that currently exist in English law, namely: (a) renunciation (or ‘anticipatory breach’), (b) breach of a condition, (c) (more controversially) a sufficiently serious breach of a term other than a condition or warranty (or ‘fundamental breach’) and (d) any breach giving rise to a right to terminate under an express termination clause in the contract. While termination for breach under an express termination clause stands on a separate footing, ‘repudiatory breach’ is the term we will use to describe the other three categories taken together.

ENTITLEMENT TO TERMINATE

To repeat, the entitlement to terminate arises on the occurrence of the three kinds of ‘repudiatory breach’ identified above or if the parties have contractually stipulated that a certain breach would trigger the right to terminate. There is, however, a further situation where the innocent party is able to terminate: this occurs when the innocent party is prevented from performing by the other party. Strictly speaking, the other party's conduct of preventing performance by the innocent party need not be in breach of the contract but, as it gives rise to identical remedies, this situation is also discussed in this chapter.

The main contention of Chapter 6 is that the legal predominance of the internal market objective in this field of regulation has not been to the detriment of the protection of health. While the broad reach of the TFEU free movement provisions does mean that most Member State measures can be scrutinised by the Court of Justice for their restrictive effect on cross-border trade, the case law does not reveal a consistent hostility towards national control measures. The picture is rather one of unpredictability. In addition, the harmonisation practice of the EU legislature shows that the market functions mostly as an auxiliary to health, or, at times, fades away behind the objective of health protection. This invites a re-evaluation of the concept of the internal market in EU law.

This introduction outlines the focus and scope of the study, explaining its motivation, remit, and overall aim. It offers brief thoughts on relevant interpretive issues, explains the structure of the book, and provides brief summaries of each of the subsequent chapters.

Section 10 of the Contract Act provides that an agreement can only be a binding contract if it is made between persons who are legally competent to contract.

Section 11 of the Contract Act provides three categories of persons who lack the competence to enter into contractual relations:

• • minors, that is, those who have not attained majority according to the law to which they are subject;

• • those of unsound mind, that is, those incapable of understanding the contract and forming a rational judgment as to its effect upon their interests;

• • those disqualified from contracting by any law to which they are subject.

Where incapacity is on account of any of the three categories mentioned above, it is referred to as inherent incapacity.

Cases of inherent capacity are concerned with the competence of a party to enter into a contract and, where such competence is missing, the contract is treated as a nullity, that is, it is void ab initio. However, parties may already have performed under the (void) contract and courts have had to grapple with the question of whether any remedy is available in this situation (either under the Contract Act or otherwise).

This chapter examines each of the three categories of inherent incapacity set out above and then deals with the consequences of incapacity.

Disability is an unspoken aspect that is overshadowed by larger issues in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander education. Young Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander people with a disability often fall through the cracks in the education system, with their disability not recognised or not supported. The presentation of their disability in the classroom is routinely mis-characterised as behavioural issues rather than a learning disability requiring specific support, an assumption that leads to excessively high rates of suspension and expulsion when disability is a factor in the education of Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander children and young people.

Poetic Lines can be used to capture the strength, resilience, and aspirations of Indigenous students, ensuring their perspectives are represented in research and education policy. For Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, knowledge is not just written: it is sung, danced, spoken and felt. Indigenous poetic inquiry recognises this by using poetry as a way to share knowledge that is rich in meaning and emotion. Unlike conventional educational writing, which often privileges Western structures of knowledge, this approach allows for more fluid and relational ways of understanding. Poetry, with its rhythm, metaphor and storytelling, provides space for Indigenous voices to be heard on their own terms, resisting colonial narratives and centring Indigenous perspectives.