1234731 results in Books
3 - Social Welfare in a Muslim Society
- Christopher Candland, Wellesley College, Massachusetts
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- The Islamic Welfare State
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- 30 June 2024, pp 33-52
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What are the rights of your neighbor? Help him if he asks for your help. Give him relief if he seeks relief from you. Give him a loan if he needs one. Show him concern if he is distressed. Congratulate him if he meets with any good news. Sympathize with him if any calamity befalls him. Nurse him when he is ill. Attend his funeral if he dies.
—Prophet MuhammadOne hears versions of this purported hadith (a saying of the Prophet Muhammad) across Pakistan. No authenticated hadith matches it precisely. It is, nevertheless, very much in the spirit of the Prophet's thinking about the responsibilities of people to one another in a good society, which to many Muslims is synonymous with an Islamic society. Everyone should be given help, provided relief, offered assistance, and given concern, congratulations, sympathy, medical aid, and commemoration. Many of the injunctions of the Quran and Sunnah if followed privately create public goods. Public welfare is a central theme of the Quran and sirat (life of the Prophet).
The life of the Prophet contained many important lessons, such as care should be given to all, even those who are hostile to us. According to a widely told story, a woman detractor showered the Prophet daily with a bucket of refuse as he made his way past her home. But he neither got angry nor changed his route. As he passed the woman's house one day without incident, he became concerned for her welfare and visited her to inquire after her health. The Prophet's example shows that even one who is hostile is deserving of care in times of need.
By establishing the essentially humanitarian spirit of Islam, this chapter, paired with Chapter 5, determines the span of the chasm between Islamic ideals and public (that is, governmental) practices. Some of this is attributed in part to past government eagerness to prioritize military spending and territorial security and past government interest in assuming resource of and controlling activities in the traditional Muslim charitable sector.
4 - A Fait Accompli: The Complete Hinduisation of the Laldas Order
- Mukesh Kumar, Alexander von Humboldt Fellow, South Asia Institute, Heidelberg University
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- Between Muslim Pīr and Hindu Saint
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- 30 June 2024, pp 110-134
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The formulation of the persona of Laldas from a nirgu bhakti follower to a sagu saint and deity is central to the rise and success of the religious order. The complete conversion of Laldas into a ‘Hindu’ saint requires a profound restructuring of his identity. This undertaking involves assigning him a new role while simultaneously erasing or modifying his traditional religious image, which had been distinguished by a shared form of religiosity. The changes observed within the Laldas order also signify a deliberate undermining of the saint's religious teachings and principles. This subversion of Laldas's original teachings implies a shift towards a more homogeneous understanding of the order, where the liminal elements of his beliefs are now incorporated into the broader narrative of neo ‘Hinduism’.
This new imagery of Laldas has been achieved by first transforming the traditional shrines spatially and then constructing new temples in various parts of north India to practice anthropomorphic image worship. It is also an effort to achieve a new social construction of a religious space. In fact, spaces contested for ideological, economic and religious reasons generally reflect efforts to create new meanings for them in a changed context, leading to spatial transformations (Low 1996). Currently, the shrines of Laldas are examples of what Lefebvre (1991: 164–68) refers to as ‘dominated space’ and ‘appropriated space’. More importantly, the spatial changes at the religious shrines of Laldas signify ongoing efforts to transform the meanings of a traditional sacred space. This is being achieved by the process of what Low (1996, 2009) describes as ‘the social construction of space’. In this process, new symbolic meanings imbued with new religious significance of Laldas are created. Devotees’ social interactions, memories and daily use of the material setting effectively transform Laldas's traditional shrine spaces into new arenas of ritual scenes and actions, ultimately Hinduising what was once a shared/mixed sacred space.
Most of these changes are quite recent in origin and are undertaken by the financially rich Baniya community. Moreover, their socio-economic power and traditional devotional beliefs also contribute to these spatial and architectural transformations at the traditional shrines. In analysing the domination of Hindus at these traditional religious sites, the main attention is paid to the structure, control, and agency of followers, on one hand, and new religious discourses and practices surrounding these sacred spaces, on the other.
Camille Bulcke
- Ravi Dutt Bajpai, Swati Parashar
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- June 2024
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- 01 September 2025
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1 - Introduction
- Bart Klem, University of Gothenburg
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- Performing Sovereign Aspirations
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- 30 June 2024, pp 1-16
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One could start the story of an insurgent movement with a vignette of the frontline or a first encounter with some enigmatic rebel office. In fact, the deleted text that was once on this page did precisely that. While such an initial vantage point helpfully offers the reader a glimpse of the convoluted ground reality of an emerging state, it also risks depicting these territories as exotic and the author as an adventurous protagonist with privileged up-close knowledge of dangerous outposts. Indiana Jones turning to the camera to look his audience in the eyes one more time, before he enters a land of mystery and peril. To start on this footing would disguise that the depiction of these supposedly quaint and anomalous places derives in part from the peculiarities of international perceptions and from the compromised knowledge curve of people like me who seek to understand insurgencies. Let me therefore not start in Sampur or Omanthai or Jaffna but at the picturesque gardens on the northern outskirts of The Hague.
These parklands are home to the Clingendael Institute. As a junior researcher of the institute – perhaps best described as an academic outboard motor to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs – I had been put on a team of consultants that had been commissioned by a group of aid donors to write a ‘Strategic Conflict Analysis’ about Sri Lanka. It was 2005, and these donors had enthusiastically jumped aboard the bandwagon of the Norwegian-facilitated peace process between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which had started three years prior. However, the process appeared to be going off the rails, and donors were desperate to consider their options. Hence our assignment. Having completed several visits, interviews and consultations in previous months, I was sitting at my desk overlooking the ponds and greenery of the Clingendael estate to write up our report when the phone rang. In hindsight, my struggle with the interpretative problems around the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka that has become this book started with that phone call
2 - Sovereignty, Performativity and Tamil Nationalism in Sri Lanka
- Bart Klem, University of Gothenburg
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- Performing Sovereign Aspirations
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- 30 June 2024, pp 17-47
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This chapter establishes the theoretical underpinnings of this book and clarifies key concepts and ideas. More specifically, it reviews debates on the question of sovereignty and its murky status as the central referent of global political order, and it advances the perspective of performative politics to grapple with the contradictions and ambiguities that prevail in the context of sovereign contestation. The chapter then proceeds to apply this perspective to the Tamil nationalist movement in Sri Lanka. In doing so, it also provides the reader with essential contextual and historical background to the chapters that follow.
The notion of the sovereign state as the legitimate authority over people and territory is deeply inscribed in prevalent understandings of the world today – as the referent of law, authorised force, national citizenship, democratic rule and international order. It is embedded in a whole architecture of norms and claimed entitlements. However, this framework of legitimation is ultimately circular: sovereign states are sovereign because they are. This circularity becomes exposed when the fundamentals of a state are challenged (Pegg 1998, 2017). Such confrontations come in myriad forms – indigenous communities resisting settler states, such as in Australia (Schaap 2004), Canada and the United States (A. Simpson 2014); occupied territories with a government in exile, like Tibet (McConnell 2016) or Western Sahara (Alice Wilson 2016), or a constellation like the Syrian Interim Government (Gangwala 2015; Sosnowski, under review); governments with incomplete or faltering sovereign recognition, such as the Palestinian Authority (Feldman 2008; Kelly 2006), the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (Bryant and Hatay 2020; Navaro-Yashin 2003), Transnistria (Bobick 2017), Abkhazia (Preltz-Oltramonti 2017), Kosovo (Krasniqi 2019; Van der Borgh 2012), Taiwan (Corcuff 2012; Friedman 2021) or Hong Kong (Yep 2013); insurgent groups that demand reunification with a neighbouring state, as in Northern Ireland (Aretxaga 1997; Little 2014); or separatist movements as in Catalonia (Achniotis 2021; Bárcena 2020; Enguix Grau 2021), Kurdistan (Gunes 2012; Watts 2010), northeast India (Baruah 2007) and Myanmar (Brenner 2017) – and, as discussed in this book, in northeastern Sri Lanka.
By challenging the foundational premises of state sovereignty, these movements unsettle the self-referential cycle of analytical and normative claims that undergird the notion of legitimate state sovereignty.
List of Figures, Maps and Tables
- Mukesh Kumar, Alexander von Humboldt Fellow, South Asia Institute, Heidelberg University
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- Between Muslim Pīr and Hindu Saint
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- 30 June 2024, pp xi-xii
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Frontmatter
- Supriya Routh, University of British Columbia, Vancouver
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- Labour Justice
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- 30 June 2024, pp i-iv
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11 - Religious Provision of Public Goods
- Christopher Candland, Wellesley College, Massachusetts
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- The Islamic Welfare State
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- 30 June 2024, pp 233-248
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There are … socio-cultural barriers [that] do not allow government to deliver social services. The government therefore encourages NGOs to help them out.
—The Sada Welfare FoundationWe want a rights-based society, not a charity-based society.
—Zahida Hameed QureshiWe have seen, in the four preceding chapters, the breadth and diversity of the Islamic social welfare sector in Pakistan. Here we take our observations to the questions with which the study began. What are the political consequences—for human security, for government legitimacy, and even for inter-community harmony—of a dearth of public services provided by government and a wealth of public services provided instead by religious associations, including partisan and sectarian associations?
The comments of the Sada Welfare Foundation earlier suggest an explanation for why private religious welfare organizations can deliver welfare services better than government. Government officials themselves often lack the requisite moral sentiments. Zahida Hameed Qureshi's comment earlier suggests a reason that government should not rely on private religious welfare organizations to provide essential public goods. If charity is a gift, dependent upon voluntarism, welfare is not a right. If charity is not a right, private whims, political calculations, and discriminatory sentiments may determine to whom welfare is provided and to whom it is not provided.
What is the good of a government that does not provide essential public goods to its citizens? Religious organizations, including political parties that aim to establish an Islamic welfare state, provide the bulk of essential welfare services, including basic education, basic and emergency healthcare, such as eye and heart care, and natural emergency and disaster relief. Religious charities are often dedicated to a specific religious community. Is that not detrimental to principles of universal access to quality public services? Let us take, for example, the International Association for Relief, Care, and Development, the relief and development agency of the Muslim World League. One of its activities in Pakistan is to build masajid (mosques), to staff them with Ahl-i-Hadith teachers of the Salafi school of Islam, and to hand possession of these mosques over to local government. Mosques in Pakistan are not open to women or children and they (mosques) are rarely involved in social service work.
Acknowledgements
- Supriya Routh, University of British Columbia, Vancouver
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- Labour Justice
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- 30 June 2024, pp xxiii-xxvi
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Contents
- Md Azmeary Ferdoush, University of Eastern Finland
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- Sovereign Atonement
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- 30 June 2024, pp vii-viii
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7 - Poetic Response to Religious Puritanism
- Mukesh Kumar, Alexander von Humboldt Fellow, South Asia Institute, Heidelberg University
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- Between Muslim Pīr and Hindu Saint
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- 30 June 2024, pp 187-217
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Where there is power, there is resistance.
(Foucault 1978a: 95–96)At the Sherpur shrine of Laldas, I was introduced to Jogi and Mirasi bards during a religious performance. These bards were traditionally supported by the Meos under the jajmānī (patron–client) system, which gave the dominant Meos control over these socially and economically marginal Muslim communities. The landless and small landowner bards were hit most by the slow collapse of this patronage system. Additionally, the rise and popularity of the Tablighi Jamaat led most Meos to condemn their musical performances as perversion from Islam, which had once been greatly admired by them. Since the Tablighi doctrine frowns upon music, most Meos today see the bards’ performances as incompatible with Islam. Consequently, the Jogis and Mirasis felt pressured to abandon their performances, even though this was their livelihood, and they cherished their artistry.
As socially and economically marginalised communities, the Jogis and Mirasis had to negotiate the opinions and stances of their erstwhile patrons, whose hostility to their performance now threatens their everyday survival. The Jogi and Mirasi minstrels are employing the lyrics of their new poetic songs as a form of passive resistance in response to the Meo patrons’ interpretation of religious piety. More specifically, these minstrels are promoting a version of righteous behaviour that is universal and does not depend on organised religions.
Earlier, it was noted that when Muslim devotees of saints faced pressure, they resorted to tactics such as secrecy and concealment in order to deal with the Tablighi idea of religious discipline. The examples in Chapter 6 were not related to issues of livelihood but rather to the right to freely profess one's religious beliefs in saints. It was evident that the attempted imposition of the religious authority of the Tablighi Jamaat had severe consequences for many individuals beyond Sufi believers. This same theme is now being explored in relation to Muslim bards and their passive resistance against their former patrons, the Meos. The Meos frequently encouraged the bards to abandon their musical profession, join the Tablighi Jamaat and adopt its reformist principles. Considering the Indic theme of cultural interaction in the formation of all these communities, it is important to analyse the past and present forms of their interrelations and the nature of their religious subjectivity.
Epilogue
- Bart Klem, University of Gothenburg
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- Performing Sovereign Aspirations
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- 30 June 2024, pp 176-181
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I wrote the initial drafts of this book over the period November 2018 to April 2020. Every time I had finished a draft chapter, Sri Lanka's appetite for power-sharing seemed to have crumbled further. The scene at the Galadari Hotel and the dim prospects of devolution in the concluding chapter are reflective of this. With Gotabaya Rajapaksa's election to president in late 2019 a new era appeared to start, and I decided to draw a line under my analysis. Academic books cannot continue to keep up with events, and it would be foolhardy to try.
Or so I told myself. Until an economic maelstrom of debt and shortages precipitated a popular uprising that ousted the Rajapaksa government, leaving Sri Lanka's entire political landscape in disarray. With the resulting whirlwind of ideas, hopes, puzzles and disillusions – as present in many readers’ minds as in mine, I presume – an epilogue is warranted to grapple with the afterthoughts to this book. As my manuscript wormed its way through the academic machinery of reviews and revisions, radio stations called me to comment on a country that appeared to have changed beyond recognition. Everything that had seemed unchangeable – the very genetic coding of Sri Lanka's political system and culture – got in flux. Through the aragalaya (struggle), as the uprising came to be known, the edifice of the state and its foundation of a sovereign people made a volte-face in the first half of 2022 – only to land roughly where they had always been, though maybe not quite, in the second half of that year. Many of the characteristics of this revolt connect to the central concerns of this book.
In late 2021 and early 2022, Sri Lanka spiralled into a foreign debt trap. The seeds for this had been sown in the immediate aftermath of the civil war, when the Rajapaksa government initiated a lending spree to bankroll a trajectory of postwar development that combined sensible infrastructural upgrades with misguided megalomanic prestige projects, as well as soaring corruption (Ruwanpura 2016). The impressive growth figures of the immediate postwar years and visions of becoming a new Malaysia or Singapore muted concerns over the debt burden from multilateral, Chinese and other loans.
Acknowledgements
- Mukesh Kumar, Alexander von Humboldt Fellow, South Asia Institute, Heidelberg University
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- Between Muslim Pīr and Hindu Saint
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- 30 June 2024, pp xiii-xvi
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5 - Everyday Public Security and Insecurity
- Christopher Candland, Wellesley College, Massachusetts
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- The Islamic Welfare State
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- 30 June 2024, pp 85-108
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August the 15th [sic] is the birthday of the independent and sovereign state of Pakistan. It marks the fulfillment of the destiny of the Muslim nation. Our object should be peace within, and peace without.
—Mohammad Ali JinnahPakistan is an ideal place to study the impact on government legitimacy of provision of essential welfare services by private religious associations and religiously inspired individuals. Governments in Pakistan have a state religion and the public is highly engaged in voluntary faith-inspired welfare work. The political dynamics concerning private religious charity, government legitimacy, and public security are therefore more pronounced and readily observed. The objective of this chapter is to fathom the depth of the human needs to which Muslim charitable associations in Pakistan are responding.
Millions of Pakistanis daily suffer severe physical deprivations; more than 30 percent of the population survive with purchasing power levels below the average for homeless people in the United States. Thirty percent of the population of Pakistan lives on the equivalent purchasing power in the United States of about US$7.50 per day, below levels needed to acquire essential food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, education, and medical care. Many residents of the United States do live like this. On any given night, more than 500,000 people in the United States find that they must sleep in a shelter, in a park, in a car, or on the street. And over the span of a year, more than 3.5 million US residents will be homeless. Such a life can be desperate. One might have to sleep in the open and perform all other daily necessities there. In Pakistan, tens of millions of people live like this and must accept that any formal education and professional medical attention is unaffordable and unobtainable for themselves and their children.2 Most Pakistanis have no indoor kitchen (47.7 percent at last census), no bathroom (43.6 percent), and no latrine (60.0 percent).
Demographics
Pakistan is the fifth most populous country on earth—after China, India, the United States, and Indonesia—and has the world's fourth-largest population of poor people—as measured by the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI)—after India, China, and Bangladesh.
5 - Religious Reform and Shared Shrines
- Mukesh Kumar, Alexander von Humboldt Fellow, South Asia Institute, Heidelberg University
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- Between Muslim Pīr and Hindu Saint
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- 30 June 2024, pp 135-161
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During his regular Thursday visits to the Sufi tomb of the saint Shah Chokha, Ram Singh, a schoolteacher of the Baniya caste from the town of Punahana, never forgot to donate money to Tablighi Jamaat volunteers. He believed that visiting a Sufi dargāh and providing funds for Islamic education and mosque renovation were acts of service to God. Ram Singh lived close to the Laldas temple in Punahana (Figure 5.1). He or a member of his family visited the temple daily, either in the morning or evening. Ram Singh openly regarded Laldas as a Muslim, saying, hamāre bābā musalmān the par hamen unki pahcān se koi lenā denā nahī (our saint was Muslim, but we do not have any problem with his identity).
In 2015, the new temple of Laldas was built on the premises of an Arya Samaj school. The school building also served as a regional centre for the Arya Samaj. An open courtyard was located in front of the temple. Visitors arrived daily and waited in the courtyard while the Brahmin head priest, made the required arrangements for Laldas's morning and evening prayers. Most of the devotees were shopkeepers in the nearby central market in Punahana and came to the temple for quick prayers to the saint. This market was dominated by Hindus, particularly the Baniyas who owned shops for selling items of daily use. On the outer circle of this market, which separated Punahana from Nakanpur (a very old Meo village that is today part of the Punahana town municipality), there were shops for selling garments, mobiles, and vegetable and fruits, among other items. These shops were predominantly owned by Muslims.
The town was also home to considerable populations of Hindu ‘low castes’ such as Valmikis, Jatavs, Sainis (Malis), Nais and Punjabi immigrants from Pakistan. The everyday dynamics of social life in this town were significantly influenced by the presence of these communities. The demographic numbers of Hindus and Muslims were almost nearly the same, but the region had a Muslim majority. Hindus and Muslims interacted with one another, but there was a sense of insecurity among the Hindus, especially the Baniyas, due to the Muslim majority in the area. Hindu caste communities built strong networks with right-wing organisations such as the RSS, the Bajrang Dal and the Arya Samaj in response to their minority status, anticipating potential conflicts in the future.
7 - Conclusion
- Bart Klem, University of Gothenburg
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- Performing Sovereign Aspirations
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- 30 June 2024, pp 156-175
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Big questions sometimes present themselves in small form. The grand themes of Sri Lanka's contemporary history – its quagmire of nationalist politics, the hampered solution of provincial devolution and the incessant friction between constitutional, administrative and political realities – became manifest in the minutiae of a marginal bureaucratic problem when I was in Colombo in October 2019. For just a moment, all the central concerns of this book were folded into a discussion between a civil servant and a constitutional lawyer about a topic that would never have occurred to me as one of my research interests: the appointment of schoolteachers.
I was attending a seminar titled ‘Thirty Years of Devolution’ at the Galadari Hotel in the historical heart of the capital. Constitutional experts were launching a book (Amarasinghe et al. 2019) to an audience of civil servants: chief secretaries and legal officers from various provinces. The debate centred on the unresolved problems of the provincial council system three decades after its creation. Any talk of fixing devolution felt like a rear-guard battle, though. We all knew that the world outside our elegant conference room had moved on. Whatever had been left of the consultative process on constitutional reform, which had started with much excitement under the Sirisena–Wickremesinghe government in 2015, had been thrown off the rails by the constitutional crisis of 2018 (Welikala 2020). The governing coalition had become defunct. The country was now holding its breath for the presidential elections, which would be in two weeks. Until the race between Sajith Premadasa (United National Party, or UNP) and Gotabaya Rajapaksa (Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna, or SLPP1) was adjudicated, all other political matters were on hold. Quite literally so at the provincial level: by now, all councils had been dissolved. Their term had expired, but new elections had been postponed time and again due to a stalemate over electoral system reform. In effect, we had entered a new ‘interim period’ where the provinces were ruled by presidential appointees (the governors) rather than elected politicians (the provincial council and the board of ministers), not just in the north and east this time but in all nine provinces.
Acknowledgements
- Bart Klem, University of Gothenburg
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- Performing Sovereign Aspirations
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- 30 June 2024, pp xv-xviii
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List of Abbreviations
- Mukesh Kumar, Alexander von Humboldt Fellow, South Asia Institute, Heidelberg University
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- Between Muslim Pīr and Hindu Saint
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- 30 June 2024, pp xvii-xviii
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8 - Professional Islamic Charities
- Christopher Candland, Wellesley College, Massachusetts
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- The Islamic Welfare State
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- 30 June 2024, pp 142-180
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It is impossible for me to detail the sums which some people receive in consequence of representations having been made of their circumstances by such as stand near the throne; and it would take up too much time to describe the presents made daily to beggars, or the eating houses which have been established for the poor.
—Abul Fazl AllamiA person documenting Muslim charity in South Asia will have some sympathy for Abul Fazl Allami, the wazir of Mughal Emperor Akbar. He was able to give the names of each of the wrestlers in Akbar's court and details of how many elephants, horses, camels, and mules were in the Mughal Emperor's stables and what each animal ate. But he found it impossible to make an account of all the acts of charity of the Emperor. Likewise, it would be quite impossible to describe the work of all Muslim charities in Pakistan, even those that are registered with government, or even to identify them all, within a single lifetime.
We can say with confidence that most of Pakistan's many registered Muslim charities are independent from political parties and governments. They are neither affiliated or associated with a political party or political movement nor administered or supported by a government. There are tens of thousands of such charities in Pakistan, as many, or more depending on the measures, as one finds in European countries.
In this chapter, we consider more than forty nonpartisan, nongovernmental registered Muslim charities. We discuss twenty charities in detail. The group is intended as a representative sample. There is no universe of charities from which one could draw a random sample. Provincial governments do make lists of registered charities. But these are partial and badly out of date, even in Punjab, the province with the best records. A sample drawn from these lists would be highly biased, as many registered charities are not active, and many active charities are not registered. Additionally, government-maintained lists of welfare associations do not include information on the religious motivation of founders or funders.
Bibliography
- Mukesh Kumar, Alexander von Humboldt Fellow, South Asia Institute, Heidelberg University
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- Between Muslim Pīr and Hindu Saint
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- 30 June 2024, pp 334-358
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