The rise of the five Deccan sultanates from the chaos of the Bahmanī empire, through the assertion of autonomy by the provincial governors, has been mentioned in the previous chapter. Their subsequent political history is largely a record of continuous strife between them, with occasional and variously aligned alliances but only on one significant occasion a community of interest. Internally, however, in spite of their border troubles, they developed major literary, religious and cultural centres.

To some extent all the sultanates inherited the factionalism of local and foreign elements which had led to the disruption of the Bahmani empire; although the religious tensions implicit in this faction were less prominent, as the influential Shī‘a tended to be concentrated in the Shī‘ī sultanates, Bījāpur and Golkondā. The Barīd Shāhis in Bīdar and the ‘Imād Shāhīs in Barār were Sunnī, as were the Nizam Shāhīs of Ahmad-nagar until Burhān I adopted Shi‘ism in 944/1537. The sultanate of the Barīd Shāhīs was gradually encroached upon in the north and west by Bījāpur, against which Bīdar made occasional alliances with the other sultanates; Bījāpur was subject to continual pressure on the south from the Vijayanagara kingdom, and the only occasion on which all the sultanates, except the northern Barār, acted jointly was when their confederation defeated Vijayanagara at the battle of Tālīkota in 972/15 64-5. Bīdar was finally annexed by the ‘Ādil Shāhis of Bijāpur in 1028/1619.

Algeria (1830–1962)

The occupation of Algiers (1830) led at first to the conquest of Algeria and then to that of the whole of the Maghrib by the French; the conquest was limited until 1834 to a few points on the coast but progressively extended towards the interior in spite of some spectacular reverses. The treaties which were concluded in 1834 and 1837 with the most representative chief of western and central Algeria, the Amīr ‘Abd al-Qādir, seem to have left the French freedom of action in the east. Thus they occupied Constantine in October 1837. The expedition of the Duc d'Orléans which linked Constantine to Algiers without any armed opposition, far from indicating the pacification of Algeria, as the French government maintained, was the beginning of a period of ruthless conflict. On the one side there was General Bugeaud, governor-general from the end of 1840, who obtained from the government men, supplies, credit, and above all complete freedom of movement; on the other, ’Abd al-Qādir, whose authority was based on his personality, his readiness to use force to reduce opposition, his desire to create, in imitation of Muhammad ‘Alī, if not an Algerian nation at least an Algerian state, and finally his good relations with Mawlāy ’Abd al-Rahmān of Morocco. The latter gave him substantial help until his defeat at Isly (1844). Bugeaud hounded ‘Abd al-Qādir and his partisans. Everywhere where the amīr could offer resistance, the general used the methods of total war; devastating the country, and massacring or carrying off women and children.

The coming of Islam

On the whole, accounts of conversion to Islam in Malay and Indonesian literature and tradition are not very reliable, however numerous they may be. There is a kind of uniformity about them which does not ring true. Often the ruler, destined to be the first among his people to pronounce the ‘Two Words’ (the profession of faith), the mere utterance of which will make him a member of the Muslim community, has already received notification of this in a dream or vision, even before the apostle of Islam drops anchor off his shores. Generally his conversion is immediate, with his subjects following soon after. There is no lack of wonders and miracles: opponents are easily persuaded or overawed by magic.

Yet the historian cannot afford to ignore such accounts. They shed a great deal of light on the nature of these societies and their organization, as well as providing clues as to the way Islam was in fact introduced amongst them.

An analysis of these stories suggests that Islam was propagated in South-East Asia by three methods; that is by Muslim traders in the course of peaceful trade, by preachers and holy men who set out from India and Arabia specifically to convert unbelievers and increase the knowledge of the faithful, and lastly by force and the waging of war against heathen states.

Despite recent research, the origins of the Safavid family are still obscure. Such evidence as we have seems to suggest that the family hailed from Kurdistān. What does seem certain is that the Safavids were of native Iranian stock, and spoke Āzarī, the form of Turkish used in Āzarbāyjān. Our lack of reliable information derives from the fact that the Safavids, after the establishment of the Safavid state, deliberately falsified the evidence of their own origins. Their fundamental object in claiming a Shi‘ī origin was to differentiate themselves from the Ottomans and to enable them to enlist the sympathies of all heterodox elements. To this end they systematically destroyed any evidence which indicated that Shaykh Safī al-Dīn Ishāq, the founder of the Safavid tarīqa was not a Shī‘ī (he was probably a Sunnī of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab), and they fabricated evidence to prove that the Safavids were sayyids, that is, direct descendants of the Prophet. They constructed a dubious genealogy tracing the descent of the Safavid family from the seventh of the Twelver Imāms, Mūsā al-Kāzim—a genealogy which is seduously followed by the later Safavid sources—and introduced into the text of a hagiological work on the life of Shaykh Safī al-Dīn, a number of anecdotes designed to validate the Safavid claim to be sayyids. Viewed dispassionately, the majority of these anecdotes appear ingenuous, not to say naïve.

The period of the Buyids, Samanids and Ghaznavids

The many disorders in the government, the deposition of caliphs and wazīrs, the arbitrary attitudes of the Turks, the quarrels between the different sects and theological schools, all prepared the way for new political changes in the eastern Fertile Crescent. Once again the foreign conquerors came from the east, as they did at the time of the ‘Abbasid revolution, They were from the Daylam area to the south-west of the Caspian Sea, and were led by a ruling family called, from their eponym, the Buyids (also Buwayhids, from the Arabic form of the name). Within a few years from 320/932 they had risen to greater importance than their Daylamite predecessors with their few petty dominions in what is now Āzarbāyjān and in Māzandarān. In 334/945 they occupied Baghdād, installed a new caliph, al-Mutī‘, and took over the secular government of the country. Thereby the Commander of the Faithful was subordinated to a family that did not in fact recognize the religious basis of his dignity, but refrained from attacking it in order to prevent the caliphs from settling elsewhere outside their sphere of influence, and thus becoming more dangerous. However, the caliphs found themselves in a very awkward situation. It was indeed alleviated to some extent by the fact that the members of the Buyid house were often at enmity with one another, so that the individual provinces of western Persia under their dominion were usually in the hands of various members of the dynasty; a real Buyid central authority existed only under ‘Adud al-Dawla from 366/976 to 372/983.

In the second half of the seventh/thirteenth century, as the Seljuk state fell apart, a number of principalities (beyliks) of a new kind came into being in the western marches of Anatolia. They were in territory conquered as a result of holy wars (sing., ghazā) waged against Byzantium, and hence are known ghāzī states. The Ottoman principality was one of these. It was destined within a century to unite Anatolia and the Balkans under its sovereignty, and to develop into an Islamic empire. Let us now examine as a whole the formation of these ghāzī principalities. The emergence of the Ottoman state can be understood only in the context of the general history of the marches.

The emergence of Turcoman border principalities in western Anatolia

When the state of the Anatolian Seljuks developed into a fully formed Islamic sultanate, three areas came to be designated as marches par excellence, and attracted settlements of Muslim ghāzīs. In the south, facing Cilicia (Chukurova) the ‘realm of the Lord of the Coasts’ was centred round ‘Alā'iyya and Antalya and directed against Lesser Armenia and the kingdom of Cyprus. In the north, on the borders of the Byzantine empire of Trebizond and along the shores of the Black Sea, the Muslim marches consisted of two parts, the eastern, centred round Simere, Samsun and Bafra, and the western centred round Kastamonu and Sinop. Finally, the western marches, whose principal cities were Kastamonu, Karahisār-i Devle (Afyonkarahisar), Kütahya and Denizli lay along the Byzantine frontier from the area of Kastamonu to the gulf of Makri in the south.

According to the tradition of the chroniclers, it was in 26/647 that the Muslims first came into contact with North Africa. The Caliph ‘Umar had in fact forbidden his conquering generals to proceed westwards beyond Tripoli, but his successor ’Uthmān authorized the military commander ‘Abd Allāh b. Sa'd to lead an expedition into Ifrīqiya to obtain plunder. This ended in victory for the Muslims over the Byzantine troops of the Patrician Gregory on the plain of Sbeitla.

The new conquerors found a complex country. It is true that they found a Byzantine power that they were beginning to know well, since they had already conquered the Byzantine provinces of Syria and Egypt. But Byzantine authority did not by any means extend throughout the whole of North Africa: it stopped at the meridian of the Chott el-Hodna (Shatt al-Hadna) in the west and did not begin again until Ceuta, (Sabta) where a Byzantine governor held on for better or worse until 92/711. The rest of the country was controlled by the Berbers. Some of them had come under Carthaginian, and later under Roman influence: this was the case with the Berbers of the present-day Tunisia and of the region of Constantine. Others had come under Roman influence only— those of the present-day Algeria and of northern Morocco; but many of them had no direct contact with either Carthaginians or Romans: this was the case with the majority of the Berbers of Morocco and those of the high western plains of Algeria.

The coming of the Arabs

The central axis of the eastern Bilād al-Sūdān is constituted by the River Nile. In the north, this is a single stream from the confluence of the Blue and White Niles by the modern town of Khartoum (al-Khartūm) to the First Cataract above Aswān. Except in certain districts, where rocky cliffs close in on the river, the main Nile is fringed by a narrow strip of irrigable land, which supports numerous villages and a few small towns. The riverain settled area, as far south as the Sabalūqa Cataract, a few miles below the confluence of the Niles, is the historic Nubia (Bilād al-Nūba), the seat of the most ancient civilization in what is now Sudanese territory. To its south, around the confluence, on the banks of the Blue and White Niles, andin the peninsula (al-Jazira, the Gezira) lying between them, is another area of settlement, where the greater annual rainfall makes more extensive cultivation possible. In this region, known to the medieval Arabic writers as ‘Alwa, the only ancient urban site lay at Sūba, on the Blue Nile, not far from Khartoum. East and west of the main Nile, the sandy deserts of the north merge imperceptibly into seasonal grasslands further south. This is herdsman's country, and a Hamitic-speaking group of nomad tribes, the Beja (al-Buja) have occupied the eastern desert from time immemorial. Their territory (Bilãd al-Buja) covers the rolling plains, which rise to the arid escarpment of the Red Sea Hills. Below, in the sultry and uninviting coastal plain, are scattered harbours, around four of which in succession, Bādi’, ‘Aydhāb, Suakin (Sawākin) and Port Sudan, substantial towns have grown up.

The seeds of the decline of the Safavid empire are already to be seen after the death of Shāh 'Abbās I, and when the Afghan invasion finally brought about its fall 1135/1722 period of disorder followed. Trade was interrupted and a general decline in civic and cultural life took place. This was not a new experience for Persia: earlier empires had disintegrated before the inroads of nomadic or semi-nomadic invaders. On this occasion, however, the invader did not succeed in establishing an empire as had, for example, the Seljuks, the Mongols and the Timurids.

Tahmāsp, the son of Shāh Sultān Husayn, the last Safavid ruler, who was besieged by the Afghans in Isfahān, sought the assistance severally of Peter the Great and the Ottoman sultan. The former captured Darband and Baku and concluded in 1723 a treaty with Tahmāsp, who ceded to Russia all the Persian possessions on the Caspian Sea on condition Peter expelled the Afghans and put him (Tahmāsp) on the Persian throne. In 1724, however, anticipating the disintegration of the Persian kingdom, the Russians and the Ottomans made an abortive treaty for the partition of Persia. In 1140/1727 the Ottomans forced Ashraf, who in 1137/1725 had succeeded Mahmūd, the first Afghan ruler of Persia, to cede to them those provinces which they had occupied in return for an agreement to acknowledge him as shah.

By the beginning of the eighteenth century, Muslim society in India was composed of descendants of Turkic, Afghan, Persian and Arab immigrants, and of Indian Muslims who had embraced Islam in different regions and circumstances, and under varied pressures. The immigrants, who themselves belonged to distinct culture groups, brought with them the characteristic features of their ethnic and non-Islamic religious backgrounds. In the course of time, the interaction of their various ideas and values contributed to the rise of cultural traditions which were radically different from those of their birthplaces; Muslims, while retaining the broad basic framework of their religion, evolved healthy traditions of toleration, and of peaceful coexistence with the indigenous population. A great deal of similarity developed in the dress and ornaments of Hindus and Muslims. Though the eating habits of the members of the two religious groups differed in important respects, especially in the eating of meat, these difficulties did not undermine their social relations. They appreciated each other's religions and social taboos and adjusted their lives in an atmosphere of social amity and mutual understanding. Hindu and Muslim peasants, artisans, craftsmen and merchants worked in close co-operation with each other. Hindu bankers, merchants and money-lenders controlled trade and commerce and exercised considerable influence over the finances of the government. They were the backbone of society.

The use of Persian served as a strong unifying bond between the Hindu and Muslim upper classes. Translations of some Hindu religious works into Persian widened the outlook of those Hindus who were linked with the Mughal administrative machinery; and an atmosphere of sympathetic understanding of the spiritual problems of the two major religions of India was thus created.

The nineteenth century had witnessed repeated and powerful commotion among the major Muslim communities in island South East Asia, especially in the Netherlands possessions. At considerable human and financial cost, the Dutch succeeded in defeating Muslim rebelliousness in the field. Pacification was followed by the implementation, at the end of the century, of a circumspect Islamic policy. Though Wahhābī-inspired Muslim ‘puritanism’ was to leave lasting marks in many parts of Indonesia—most notably, perhaps, in the gradual gains of orthodoxy at the expense of the mystical tarīqas—Islamic militancy in Indonesia had to all intents and purposes given way to relative stability and tranquillity in the opening years of the new century. But this tranquillity was short-lived and soon gave way to a virtual religious, social and political renaissance embracing many parts of the area. The impetus for this Islamic renaissance came, as so often before, from abroad; what lent it viability and a measure of cohesion were social changes resulting from accelerated modernization under colonial rule.

The sources as well as the development of South-East Asia's Islamic renaissance were varied. For one thing, the Pilgrimage continued to attract increasing numbers of South-East Asians. Thus in 1911, Dutch statistics recorded over 24,000 Indonesians, comprising almost thirty per cent of all overseas pilgrims in the Holy City. Ibn Su‘ūd's conquest of Mecca in 1924 and the subsequent Pax Wahhabica—coinciding with temporary prosperity in the Indies—led to a dramatic augmentation in the number of pilgrims, culminating in over 52,000 Indonesians (over forty per cent of the overseas total) in 1926–7.

Bābur

A Timurid prince, ‘Umar Shaykh Mīrzā, ruler of Farghānā, died in 899/1494, leaving little more than a title to his principality for his son Bābur, then eleven years old. Bābur had to fight not only to defend Farghānā but also to fulfil his ambition of possessing Samarqand because of its prestige as the main city of Central Asia. His adventures described in his excellent memoirs read like a romance. He did succeed in occupying Samarqand, only to lose it again. His lasting possession proved to be Kābul which he occupied in 910/1504, and which became his headquarters. All else, including Farghānā, he lost in the struggle.

The rise of the Özbegs and the Safavids affected Bābur's career deeply. The Özbegs were able to extinguish the power of the Timurids because they proved incapable of serious and joint effort. The Safavids came into conflict with the Özbegs and defeated them. Bäbur was restored to the kingdom of Samarqand as a vassal of Shāh Ismā‘īl I after the defeat and death of Muhammad Shaybānī Khān Özbeg (917/1511). The Safavids were defeated in the battle of Ghujduwān, and Bābur lost all hope of ruling Samarqand, and returned to Kābul (918/1512). When Bābur felt secure, his mind turned towards India. Ibrāhīm Lodī, the sultan of Delhi, had alienated his nobles. Dawlat Khān, the governor of Lahore, sent messengers to Kābul offering allegiance in return for help. Ibrāhām's uncle, ‘Ālam Khān, also went to Kābul seeking assistance to capture the throne of Delhi.