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In an act of reconciliation following the tumultuous student protests of 1968, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia gifted the students a building in the center of Belgrade – a student-managed “safe space” where they could freely express their views and creativity. The space, which officially opened in 1971, became the iconic Student Cultural Center (Studentski kulturni centar, SKC). It was the birthplace of the New Art Practice in Yugoslavia headed by groundbreaking artists Marina Abramović and the “Belgrade Six,” and a young group of rebellious composers and performers – Opus 4 and the Ensemble for Different New Music – who defined a new era of avant-garde art with performance and conceptual art, minimalism, Cage-style experimentalism, Fluxus, and the use of multimedia. Informed by archival documents, Chapter 7 charts the compelling history of the SKC and how artistic and music programming by young, daring artists contributed to its meteoric rise and international popularity.
Technology has become the ‘fourth party’ in dispute resolution through the growing field of online dispute resolution (ODR), which includes using a broad spectrum of technologies in negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and everything in between. Furthermore, AI has become a particularly powerful fourth party, and may even become the third party in some situations where AI makes the decision. Accordingly, it is imperative that professionals and policymakers tread cautiously and remain responsible in their use of AI in dispute prevention and resolution. This chapter will discuss foundational considerations around the benefits and risks of AI in dispute resolution, and the regulations as well as ethical guidelines that should remain a top priority when using AI in civil dispute resolution.
This chapter traces the demobilisation process of the Ulrichsberg Celebration campaign in Austria. Veterans of Third Reich military forces had mobilised the campaign with the intention of commemorating Wehrmacht as well as Waffen-SS soldiery, asserting that comradeship is sacred, regardless of whether it was in the service of Nazi aggression and criminality. The qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) finds it covered by the closing opportunity pattern of demobilisation. Process tracing shows that the case was causally overdetermined with two potentially sufficient demobilisation causes present. However, there are good circumstantial grounds to conclude that the causation implied by the QCA pattern was decisive, in that a mechanism of resource deprivation was at work once the state withdrew essential material support for the campaign, causing demobilisation through closing opportunity.
In an era in which recycling is becoming almost an obligation that allows us to ensure the preservation of our planet, it is relevant to analyze the interferences between IPRs in the recycling activity. In this sense, it has been considered appropriate to study in this chapter the impact of the protection of artisanal and industrial geographical indications, especially now, when the European Union has adopted a new regulation. In Europe, artisanal and industrial geographical indications will protect porcelain, clothing, jewellery, and a wide variety of products resulting from the cultural heritage of European countries. It will be interesting in this regard to assess the limits that apply to geographical indications as IPRs. In particular, it will be interesting to analyze cases where parts of these protected products are used to create other recycled composite products, as well as the possibility of using recycled products for the creation of the protected products.
While recent years have seen a rapidly growing multidisciplinary interest in political emotions, the question of what makes an emotion political in the first place has received relatively scant attention. To remedy this, Thomas Szanto and Jan Slaby advance a novel account of political emotions according to which political emotions are unique kinds of collective attitudes that disclose a shared concern of political import, make a claim to public recognition and normatively regulate our political lives. Here, I argue that their account is inadequate, owing to its counterintuitive verdict that politically targeted emotions shaped by affective polarisation or out-party animus do not qualify as political. I then advance an alternative according to which emotions qualify as political by virtue of defeasibly motivating characteristic political actions and argue that my theory yields a promising analysis of political emotions that also has the resources to explain how affective polarisation shapes politically targeted emotions and why that makes them defective.
This chapter analyses the political economy of Rwanda’s financial sector. It presents the evolution of Rwanda’s national banking sector and the ways the Rwandan Patriotic Front has sought to mobilise domestic resources to invest in strategic sectors. It provides an overview of how African financial sectors have been transformed in varied ways through adapting to three kinds of financial sector reforms: policies influenced by the market-led consensus, developmentalist strategies and the influence of offshore sectors. Rwanda, in its attempt to transform Kigali into a financial sector while mobilising state-driven investments for strategic investments and adopting ‘best practice’ financial sector reforms, encapsulates the contradictions associated with being influenced by these three sets of policies concurrently. Next, the chapter describes how the Rwandan government has innovatively mobilised domestic resources to fund strategic investments. Innovations include its pension fund, the Rwanda Social Security Board. The chapter concludes by discussing how elite vulnerability has constrained the capacity of the Rwandan government to concentrate resources and financial expertise in one specific financial institution, thereby inhibiting the effectiveness of strategic investments.
This chapter explores how victimhood identities threaten liberal democracies from within. It identifies three atypical forms: (1) dominant group self-victimisation, (2) enduring intergenerational victimhood narratives and (3) victimhood culture within the progressive left. Existing research often overlooks these phenomena, focusing instead on genuine victims of oppression. Using the lens of ressentiment, we distinguish ressentimentful victimhood – driven by moral superiority, resentment and peer validation – from paradigmatic victimhood, grounded in empathy and solidarity. We argue that neoliberal socio-economic and ideological conditions nurture ressentiment, making victimhood identities attractive. Ressentimentful victimhood manifests as disruption of empathy, moral elitism, rumination, competition, collective narcissism and the inability to forgive, reinforcing self-pity and moral hypermnesia. In contrast, paradigmatic victimhood fosters inclusive identities, empathy towards others and democratic reintegration through restorative justice. By distinguishing these types, we present ressentimentful victimhood as a destabilising moral stance that erodes democratic solidarity while distinguishing it from paradigmatic forms that sustain social cohesion.
This chapter analyses the relationship between loneliness and antagonistic political emotions. Loneliness is commonly defined as a painful experience resulting from a discrepancy between desired and actual relationships. Philosophical literature highlights its impact on self-perception, agency and possibilities for connection, yet its political dimensions remain largely overlooked. To address this gap, I examine the case of a lone-actor terrorist whose loneliness motivates a search for meaning within a radicalised community. In this context, loneliness combines with emotions such as vengeful anger and envy. This raises key philosophical questions: How should loneliness be understood? Can it count as a political emotion on its own or only when coupled with other affective states? How does loneliness interact with antagonistic emotions? I call hostile loneliness the affective state in which loneliness conditions the emergence of aggressive and oppositional emotions. These emotions enable lonely individuals to reclaim agency and pursue radical social and political change. They become fully political when taken up collectively and expressed by a community.
The whole thrust ⦠is to the central point: the left is irrelevant, it has to be bypassed; the left parties are as exploitative as other parties; the NPPF [non-party political formation] represents a more radical alternative to the communists.⦠One has to cut through the pseudo-radical, academic jargon of the NPPF advocates to expose the core of their pernicious anti-Marxist ideology.
—Prakash Karat (1984, 9)
It cannot be denied that the major reason that these groups [NPPFs] and individuals are not working within political parties is because they find the empirical practice of the parties stifling, if not downright false. It is in a sense of rigidity, the bureaucratic and hierarchical nature, the constant side-tracking of issues of direct concern to the people ⦠which drive people outside the fold of parties.
—Harsh Sethi (1985, 379)
The excerpts mentioned above are part of a debate, which took place in 1984–1985, on the arguable failure of political parties and the emergence of groups referred to as non-party political formations. Defending the emergence of these groups, Sethi argues that the formation of such groups was necessitated because political parties had been ‘side-tracking the issues of direct concern to the people’. In contrast, Karat, on behalf of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI[M]), argued that non-party groups played into an ‘imperialist strategy’ and were anti-left.