On 15 March 1999 the first reshuffle of the cabinet since its formation on 17 October 1997 took place. Four ministers resigned or were replaced. TheMinister of Justice and the Police, Aud Inger Aure, was forced to resign due to ill health, and was replaced by the Minister of Communications and Transport, Odd Einar Dørum. His position was taken over by the Minister of Defence, Dag Jostein Fjærvoll, who handed his ministry over to Eldbjørg Løwer, the first woman ever to hold this position in Norwegian politics. Laila Dåvøy replaced her as Minister of Planning and Coordination. Finally, the Minister of Local Government and Labor, Ragnhild Queseth Haarstad, had for some time signaled a wish to retire from politics. She was replaced by Odd Roger Enoksen, the new leader of the Center Party. The party’s former leader, Mrs. Anne Enger Lahnstein, had played a prominent role on the ‘No to EU side’ during the 1990–94 EU-debate, but at the party congress in December 1998 she had announced her decision to resign from her position as party leader. On 7 October 1999 Mrs. Lahnstein announced her resignation as Minister of Culture. She was replaced by Åslaug Marie Haga.

A growing body of literature shows that the preferences of poorer groups in society are less well represented than the preferences of the rich. This paper scrutinises one possible explanation of inequality in representation: that politicians hold biased perceptions of what citizens want. We conducted surveys with citizens and politicians in four countries: Belgium, Switzerland, Canada and Germany. Citizens provided their preferences regarding concrete policy proposals, and then politicians estimated these preferences. Comparing politicians’ estimates with the actual preferences of different social groups, the paper shows that politicians’ perceptions are closer to the preferences of the richer than to those of poorer people for issues that matter most for economic inequality: socio‐economic issues. Further, we find that especially right‐wing politicians tend to think about the preferences of richer societal groups when estimating the preferences of their partisan electorates on socio‐economic matters.

As breeding has become increasingly specialized over the last decades, modern dairy breeds have mainly been focusing on milk production, producing bull and surplus female calves with low economic value. To address this dilemma, the present study evaluates how crossbreeding with the specialized beef breed Belgian Blue and pure breeding with Holstein-Friesian bulls affect calving ease and subsequent fattening performance, and carcass quality in Holstein-Friesian herds. For the study, pedigree information, calving information, as well as fattening performance and carcass quality parameters of 5,162 fattening bulls sired by either Holstein-Friesian (n = 4,607) or Belgian Blue (n = 555) sires from Holstein-Friesian cows in northern Germany were considered. Crossbred calves had higher birth weights and better carcass conformation ratings but also higher age at slaughter, carcass weight and average daily weight gain than purebred dairy calves, reflecting beef breeds’ superior muscle development. However, crossbreeding with Belgian Blue sires also increased the frequency of difficult births (dystocia), which has previously been shown to negatively impact calf health. The effect of parity was not relevant for fattening and carcass quality parameters but highlighted the present breeding practice of using beef sires in multiparous rather than in primiparous cows. Seasonal variations were also observed, with spring and summer-born bulls exhibiting faster weight gain.

Although scholars of West European politics have long debated whether the region's highly institutionalised party systems were becoming de‐aligned and electorally unstable, the political fallout from the post‐2008 financial crisis has lent a new sense of urgency to the debate. The threats posed to party systems by economic crises are hardly unique to Europe, however. The Latin American experience with the debt crisis of the 1980s and 1990s suggests that party system upheaval was not simply a function of retrospective economic voting during the period of crisis. It was also attributable to programmatically de‐aligning policy responses to crises – namely the ‘bait‐and‐switch’ imposition of austerity and adjustment measures by labour‐based, left‐leaning parties that were traditional champions of statist and redistributive policies. Such patterns of reform made it difficult for party systems to channel societal resistance to market orthodoxy in the post‐adjustment era, setting the stage for convulsive ‘reactive sequences’ when such resistance arose outside and against mainstream parties through varied forms of social and electoral protest, typically on the left flank. This article explores the political fallout from the European and Latin American economic crises from a comparative perspective, arguing that it is essential to think beyond the short‐term political dynamics of crisis management to consider the longer‐term institutional legacies and fragilities of the different political alignments forged around crisis‐induced policy reforms.

This article investigates whether the smaller gender gaps in political engagement, found in more proportional electoral systems, translate into smaller gender differences in political participation. Using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, it presents the argument that more proportional systems may send signals that multiple interests are included in the policy‐making process, which may increase women's levels of political participation and thereby reduce gender gaps. Additionally, the article tests for the possibility that a greater number of political parties and the elected representatives they provide act as barriers to political participation that have a greater impact on women's levels of participation than men's. It is argued that women's lower levels of political resources and engagement might create more difficult barriers for them than for men. Results lend little support for the first hypothesis, but a greater confirmation for the second.

The question of whether and how federalism influences a country's welfare state has been a longstanding concern of political scientists. However, no agreement exists on exactly how, and under what conditions, federal structures impact the welfare state. This article examines this controversy. It concludes theoretically that the specific constellation of federal structures and distribution of powers need to be considered when theorising the effects of federalism on the welfare state. Using the case of Belgium and applying the synthetic control method, it is shown in the article that without the federalism reform of 1993, the country would have had further decreases in social spending rather than a consolidation of this spending in the years after 1993. In the case of Belgium, the combination of increased subnational spending autonomy in a still national financing system provided ideal conditions for a positive federalism effect on social spending to occur.

Voting advice applications (VAAs) have proliferated in recent years. However, most VAAs only match their users with parties, at least in part because creating a VAA matching voters to individual candidates tends to be more labour‐intensive. This could be an important missed opportunity. Candidates may deviate from the party line, but voters are often unaware of the policy platforms of individual candidates and therefore rarely hold them accountable for their issue positions in candidate‐based elections. VAAs providing information on issue congruence with individual candidates could help to rectify this. We evaluate the potential of candidate‐level VAAs by integrating a randomized experiment into a real‐world VAA whereby users were exposed either to candidate‐level VAA advice or to more standard party‐level VAA advice. Our results suggest that candidate‐level VAAs are worth the extra effort: they help voters distinguish candidates from parties and cast votes that are more in line with their policy preferences.

How and when do presidents influence the government formation process in semi‐presidential systems? Presidents have both a formal role and vested interest in the formation of the cabinet, yet their influence has been overlooked in studies of the duration of government formation. In this article, it is argued that the president's influence over government formation can be explained by his or her perceived legitimacy to act in the bargaining process and their partisanship. In this first case, it is argued that the legitimacy to act derives from a president's constitutional powers and more powerful presidents simplify cabinet bargaining, leading to shorter government formation periods. In the second case, it is proposed that presidents and their parties have overlapping preferences. Therefore, when the president's party holds greater bargaining power in government formation negotiations, the bargaining process is less uncertain and less complex. Thus, government formation processes will be shorter. Using survival models and data from 26 European democracies, both propositions are confirmed by the analysis. The results enhance our understanding of the dynamics of cabinet bargaining processes and contribute to the wider study of semi‐presidentialism and executive‐legislative relations. One broader implication of these results is that the president's party affiliation is an important motivation for them as political actors; this contrasts with some previous studies which conceive of presidents as non‐partisan actors.

Building on research on cultural threat‐induced polarization, we investigate the effect of the individual‐level salience of cultural threats on polarization between social liberals and conservatives. In a unique survey experiment conducted with 129,000 respondents nested in 208 regions in 27 European Union (EU) member states, we manipulate the presence of two cultural threats, women's rights, and refugee immigration, to test their polarizing effects on social liberals’ and social conservatives’ support for traditional values. We find that priming the threat of refugee immigration polarizes conservatives and liberals equally. Yet, introducing the salience of women's rights leads to lower preferences for traditional values, particularly among more liberal respondents. Our findings demonstrate: 1) the study of backlash should distinguish individuals by their predisposition to backlash, rather than studying the population as a whole; and 2) social conservatives’ backlash should be studied conjointly with social liberals’ counter‐reactions to backlash. Future research may investigate why different cultural threats provoke different reactions.

The year 1999 began with continuing turmoil and chaos in public secondary schools, promoted by both the KKE and ND, and provoked by the reforms and tactics of Minister of Education G. Arsenis. Ironically, when this frustrated aspirant to the PASOK leadership had been moved by Simitis, in 1996, from National Defense to Education, he was presumably expected to do less damage in his new post (see Yearbook 1997, p. 381). Nevertheless, in January Arsenis survived a personal motion of no confidence in Parliament (a procedure rarely invoked against individual ministers).

Investments in education and retraining, or research and development have become essential in today's knowledge‐intensive economies. While private actors often underprovided such knowledge‐based capital due to various market failures, there is also considerable variation in the extent to which governments invest in knowledge‐based capital due to cross‐sectional and intertemporal trade‐offs. I argue that in trying to account for this variation, corporatist institutions are a neglected but crucial factor. By necessitating and facilitating cooperation and compensation, corporatism creates a more collaborative style of policy making and a sense of common ownership of policy problems that helps overcome the trade‐offs associated with investments in knowledge‐based capital. Using within‐between mixed‐effects models on a novel time‐series‐cross‐sectional dataset, I find strong support for this argument. Corporatist countries invest a lot more in knowledge‐based capital, and corporatism also affects how countries react to deindustrialization. This is an important finding given the key role of long‐term policy making in areas like climate change politics, pandemic preparedness or responding to the digital transformation.

The Covid‐19 pandemic brought unprecedented governmental restrictions to personal and political freedoms. This article investigates individual‐level differences in mass support for the restriction of civil liberties during the first wave of the Covid‐19 pandemic. Employing theories of affect and decision making, it assesses the extent to which different emotional reactions toward the pandemic influenced attitudes toward mobile phone surveillance and the implementation of curfews. We test our hypotheses in five advanced European democracies using panel data which allow us to identify the role of emotions in support for restrictive policies controlling for individual heterogeneity. The results suggest that experiencing fear about Covid‐19 had a strong positive impact on supporting these measures, while hope and anger only played a minimal role. Importantly, the findings indicate that emotions moderate the impact of trust toward the government, a key variable for supporting the restriction of civil liberties during the pandemic. Specifically, experiencing fear was associated with higher acceptance of civil liberty restrictions. Further, experiencing fear substantially decreased the effect of trust in the government, rendering those who lack trust toward the government more supportive of civil liberty restrictions. These findings help us understand the psychological mechanisms that leads citizens to swiftly decide to sacrifice their civil liberties in the light of threat. Further, they offer empirical support for the causal role of affect in political decision‐making.

Men's numerical over-representation in politics leads to complacency regarding their substantive representation. Yet the men in politics are not descriptively representative of most men and are drawn disproportionately from the most socially privileged groups. Building on theories of representation, intersectionality and masculinities, I argue that men have gendered representational needs that are not adequately met. Power structures among men leave many men marginalized and/or subordinated, and disincentivize the privileged men in power from defending disadvantaged men's interests. Masculinist cultures within politics inhibit discussion of male vulnerability and further undermine the substantive representation of men. I make the case for why we should study men's substantive representation and then show how we could do so. I propose a groundbreaking research agenda for identifying and measuring men's diverse representational needs, recognizing how these are shaped by gender and its intersection with other identities. Combining insights from objectivist, constructivist and intersectional approaches, I develop a framework for measuring the substantive representation of men that explores who represents men, which ideology informs their claims, which men are included and excluded and whether the goals of representation are to transform or uphold the status quo. I offer several illuminations of policies where different men have distinct gendered needs, and offer an extended example using educational outcomes in the United Kingdom to illustrate how privileged men are not effective representatives of disadvantaged men. This article builds the normative case and offers the theoretical tools for addressing an important gap in the study of representation.

Law‐making is a core function of parliaments in democratic systems. Yet, we still know little about the extent to which parliaments influence legislation and the reasons why MPs modify some bills more than others. We analyse the degree of bill amendments operated by parliament, by comparing bills before and after parliamentary deliberations with a text reuse approach. We postulate that MPs attempt to overcome the problem of limited processing capacity by prioritising certain bills over others. To this end, they use considerations related to institutional rules, attention dynamics and partisan politics. Empirically, we apply zero‐inflated beta regressions on a dataset covering about 1,700 bills adopted from 1995 to 2015 in the Swiss Parliament. Moreover, we address the problem of observational equivalence affecting analyses of parliament's impact on law‐making, by taking into account the government's anticipation strategy. Results highlight a reasonably high amendment activity, but with strong variations across bills. MPs change bills more if they are subject to direct democracy, rank high on the parliamentary agenda or if they attract media attention. The influence of the electoral cycle and coalition politics is not confirmed.

The paper considers the powers, or more correctly the lack of powers, of the European Parliament. Attention is focused on the legislative powers of the Parliament; its financial powers following the revision of Article 203 of the Treaty of Rome; and its control, or oversight, powers. Comparisons are made between the powers of the European Parliament and those of the national parliaments of the European Community's nine Member States. The detailed examination of the powers of the European Parliament reveals that in no widely accepted comparative sense can it be considered a parliament as it fails to meet a series of basic political, constitutional, and decision-making requirements concerning the performance of legislative, financial, and control functions.