Democratic innovations aim to strengthen citizen participation in democratic decision-making processes. Building on theories of deliberative democracy, participatory democracy and direct democracy, different types of democratic innovations have been developed, ranging from mini-publics, to participatory processes and referendums and citizens’ initiatives. Over the last four decades, an expanding number of scholars have investigated the effects of these democratic innovations on citizens. However, even though a considerable amount of research has been done, there currently exists no overview of the effects of different types of democratic innovations on citizens’ attitudes, behaviour and capabilities. In addition, it is unclear which effects prove robust across studies, and which effects require more investigation.

The aim of this paper is to systematically evaluate what we know and what we do not know yet about the effects of democratic innovations on citizens who participate in them. In order to do so, we conduct a meta-analysis of 100 quantitative empirical studies published between 1980 and 2020. We find, perhaps unsurprisingly, that mini-publics are widely researched for their effects on citizens, whereas studies into the effects of participatory processes and referendums and citizens’ initiatives on participating citizens are much less frequent. We also find that participation in mini-publics changes citizens’ policy attitudes and positively affects citizens’ political attitudes, knowledge, internal efficacy and reasoning skills. For participatory processes, our analyses indicate that they appear to have a positive effect on participants’ political attitudes and knowledge and no effect on participants’ internal efficacy, but there are too few studies to draw robust conclusions. Participation in referendums and citizens’ initiatives appears to have a positive effect on participants’ knowledge and internal efficacy, even though these findings should also be considered preliminary due to the limited number of studies.

This article links the consequences of the Great Recession on protest and electoral politics. It innovates by combining the literature on economic voting with social movement research and by presenting the first integrated, large‐scale empirical analysis of protest mobilisation and electoral outcomes in Europe. The economic voting literature offers important insights on how and under what conditions economic crises play out in the short‐run. However, it tends to ignore the closely connected dynamics of opposition in the two arenas and the role of protests in politicising economic grievances. More specifically, it is argued that economic protests act as a ‘signalling mechanism’ by attributing blame to decision makers and by highlighting the political dimension of deteriorating economic conditions. Ultimately, massive protest mobilisation should, thus, amplify the impact of economic hardship on the electoral losses of incumbents and mainstream parties more generally. The empirical analysis to study this relationship relies on an original semi‐automated protest event dataset combined with an updated dataset of electoral outcomes in 30 European countries from 2000 to 2015. The results indicate that the dynamics of economic protests and electoral punishment are closely related and point to a destabilisation of European party systems during the Great Recession.

Networks famously epitomize the shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ as governing structures for exercising control and coordination besides hierarchies and markets. Their distinctive features are their horizontality, the interdependence among member actors and an interactive decision‐making style. Networks are expected to increase the problem‐solving capacity of political systems in a context of growing social complexity, where political authority is increasingly fragmented across territorial and functional levels. However, very little attention has been given so far to another crucial implication of network governance – that is, the effects of networks on their members. To explore this important question, this article examines the effects of membership in European regulatory networks on two crucial attributes of member agencies, which are in charge of regulating finance, energy, telecommunications and competition: organisational growth and their regulatory powers. Panel analysis applied to data on 118 agencies during a ten‐year period and semi‐structured interviews provide mixed support regarding the expectation of organisational growth while strongly confirming the positive effect of networks on the increase of the regulatory powers attributed to member agencies.

Most quantitative analyses of policy convergence treat transnational communication in international organisations and domestic economic problems as additive factors. By contrast, this article argues that domestic economic problems motivate governments to search for successful policies, while international organisations offer channels for policy learning. Thus, both factors interact, magnifying each other's effects. The argument is corroborated by a quantitative analysis of the privatisation of telecommunications providers in the Western OECD world. A dyadic logit model shows that joint membership in international organisations increases the likelihood of policy convergence if governments face budget deficits. The argument of the article builds a bridge between theories of international organisations and domestic theories of policy making. Theories of the former gain an important scope condition specifying the conditions under which transnational communication works, while exploring the latter gains a theory specifying where new policy ideas come from.

Stigmatising stereotypes about welfare recipients play a crucial role in building public support for welfare retrenchment. Existing literature finds that the highly educated are more sympathetic towards welfare recipients. This is surprising given the economic advantage associated with educational attainment. Furthermore, educational attainment has increased even as sympathy for welfare recipients has declined. I address these puzzles using three decades of British survey data and find that it is the socially liberal attitudes rather than the economic advantage associated with higher education that explains why this group is sympathetic towards welfare recipients. These findings reveal an educational cleavage in stereotypes about welfare recipients, which is based on non-economic concerns, and has implications for support for welfare retrenchment and policies such as increased conditionality. This cleavage is weaker in more highly educated regions, implying that there are diminishing returns from increasing educational attainment in terms of sympathetic attitudes towards welfare recipients.

Studies have repeatedly documented the cost of ruling: governing parties generally suffer electoral defeats. We approach this empirical law of political science from the perspective of another empirical law: the incumbency bonus, the fact that incumbents get more media attention than the opposition. Our claim is that the bonus constitutes an electoral liability because it reflects the critical approach of media to government power. News featuring incumbents is therefore associated with a more negative tone than news featuring the opposition. This incumbency burden in turn affects government support negatively. Empirically, we draw on an extensive news corpus covering four European countries over two decades, combined with monthly poll data. Analyses show that the incumbency burden in political news is an empirical reality, and that variations in the burden contribute substantially to predictions of government support. Finally, the negative burden effect is stronger for single‐party cabinets, but stable throughout government tenure.

This article addresses an issue previously neglected in the research on support for populist parties: How do perceptions of the local quality of government (QoG) and local service delivery affect voters’ propensity to vote for a populist party? It argues that personal experience with poor QoG makes voters more likely to support populist parties. The argument highlights the interplay between supply and demand factors in explaining populist support and discusses why populist parties have been particularly successful in certain regions in Europe. A unique dataset from the Quality of Government Institute that surveys citizens’ perception of QoG in their area is used to estimate both individual- and regional-level models of the link between perceived local QoG and populist support in Europe. The empirical results show a strong and robust association between within-country variation in QoG and support for populist parties.

During the COVID‐19 pandemic, public opinion regarding restrictions and lockdowns was quickly characterized by significant disagreement. In a societal crisis such as COVID‐19, it is important to understand the drivers behind citizens’ attitudes and behaviours. Political disagreement related to COVID‐19 restrictions and lockdowns has often been interpreted as an ideological or partisan divide along the left‐right dimension of political opinion. Here, we argue that there is more to unpack. There is increasing awareness that public opinion is structured by both left‐right orientation and trust in the system. In this paper, we examine the divide in COVID‐19 attitudes and behaviours and compare the influence of ideology and system trust as drivers across countries and across time during the pandemic. Based on monthly surveys from eight countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, France and Italy) from September 2020 to July 2021 (total sample of 49,414 respondents), we show that citizens with right‐wing ideologies and those who do not trust ‘the system’ perceived a lower threat from the coronavirus, were less supportive of government measures against the virus, report having changed their behaviour less and report lower intentions to vaccinate against COVID‐19 compared to citizens with left‐wing ideologies and those with high system trust. These results are stable across time and across countries. We also find that behavioural differences are larger between those who support the system and those who do not than between those with right‐ and left‐wing ideological outlooks, respectively. This implies that system trust is at least as important as ideology in terms of shaping cleavages in COVID‐19 attitudes and behaviours. The results suggest that in order to increase public support for societal responses during a crisis, it is not only important to appeal to both sides of the ideological spectrum, but also to appeal to those who do not trust ‘the system’.

How can democracies satisfy citizens' demands for legitimate decision making? This article reports findings from a randomised field experiment designed to mimic decision making in large‐scale democracies. Natural collectives of individuals with a shared history and future (high school classes) were studied. They were asked to make a decision about how to spend a sum of money under arrangements imposed by the researchers and distributed randomly across classes. Within this setting, empirical support for three ideas about legitimacy enhancing decision‐making arrangements is tested: participatory constitution‐making; personal involvement in the decision‐making process; and fairness in the implementation of arrangements. Throughout the analyses it was found that personal involvement is the main factor generating legitimacy beliefs.

Market economies inevitably generate social inequalities, of which the new democracies of Central and East European (CEE) societies have seen dramatic – though widely diverging – levels of growth. Do CEE citizens believe that inequality is excessive and, if so, why? And what is the connection between perceptions of social inequality and citizens' views of new markets and democracy? These questions are addressed using new data from mass surveys conducted in 2007 in 12 post‐communist CEE states. Surprisingly weak links are found between social inequality perceptions and national‐level measures of inequality as well economic, social and political conditions. Perceptions of social inequality are mainly driven by individual‐level assessments of market and democratic performance, but not by market or democratic ideals.

Although the welfare state is a core theme in most national elections in Western democracies, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the causes of welfare state pledge‐breaking. This article presents an argument that explains when governments do not do what they promised and tests it using an innovative research design with data covering four decades and 18 countries. The argument is able to account for several important but, until now, undescribed phenomena. First, nowadays, governments, on average, deliver less welfare than they promised, whereas in the 1970s they used to deliver more than promised. Second, the pledge‐breaking of governments has become highly dependent on the parliamentary opposition's position on the welfare issue. When the opposition favours fiscal and economic responsibility, governments’ tendency to deliver less welfare than promised is amplified. In contrast, when the opposition emphasises the positive benefits of generous welfare, such as equality and social justice, governments become more prone to keep their promises. Third, this conditional effect of the opposition is a recent occurrence that only emerged after the number of potential swing voters increased as class‐based voting gradually declined from the 1970s onwards.

This paper examines why some ethnic minorities in Europe have successful ethnic parties while others pursue their political interests through mainstream parties. To study differential success of ethnic minorities in establishing successful ethnic parties, I adapt threats‐vs‐resources approach, comparing relative importance of ethnic threats (acting as motivator for collective political activism) and ethnic resources (providing different opportunities facilitating ethnic mobilization). Empirically, I focus on the post‐Cold War period, including ethnic minorities in Western and Eastern Europe. I find that both ethnic threats and ethnic resources matter for success of ethnic parties. I show that increased salience of issues tied to ethnicity, either through promotion of majority ethnonationalism, or through advancement of minority ethnic rights, can foster successful ethnic parties. I also show that the logic behind successful minority political mobilization differs between Western and Eastern Europe.

How does public opinion affect political discourse on issues that parties struggle to deal with? Although scholars tend to analyse party–voter linkages in terms of policy positions, parties can respond to public opinion by changing both the positions and the salience of their policy agenda. Based on original time‐series data of party discourse and voter preferences in France, Italy and the United Kingdom (1992–2016), this paper analyses how mainstream parties have changed their political discourse on European integration in response to an increasingly Eurosceptic public. Results show that mainstream parties have adapted their positions to changes in public opinion and have at the same time deemphasized European Union issues in their discourse as the public grew Eurosceptic. Parties did not talk more about Europe even when they followed the tides of public opinion. These findings challenge our current understanding of party responsiveness, have implications for theories of party competition, and contribute to debates on the legitimacy of the European project.

This paper seeks to deepen our understanding of financial industry lobbying efforts that result in specific regulatory rules being dropped from the regulatory agenda, or what we call ‘rule omission’. Critically, existing research either ignores rule omission or characterizes it as the pinnacle of lobbying success. We argue that only in carefully mapping out industry preferences and tracking what happens to rules following their omission can we say something about the extent to which finance wins or loses in its effort to shape regulation. Our analysis is based on two in‐depth case studies from the European Union: (1) solvency rules in the Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision Directive (IORPP II), where rule omission does reflect a strong case of industry influence; and (2) short selling rules in the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD), a case of rule omission resulting in more stringent rules over industry activities.

A close connection between public opinion and policy is considered a vital element of democracy. However, legislators cannot be responsive to all voters at all times with regard to the policies the latter favour. We argue that legislators use their speaking time in parliament to offer compensatory speech to their constituents who might oppose how they voted on a policy, in order to re‐establish themselves as responsive to the public's wishes. Leveraging the case of Brexit, we show that legislators pay more attention to constituents who might be dissatisfied with how they voted. Furthermore, their use of rhetorical responsiveness is contingent on the magnitude of the representational deficit they face vis‐à‐vis their constituency. Our findings attest to the central role of parliamentary speech in maintaining responsiveness. They also demonstrate that communicative responsiveness can substitute for policy responsiveness.