This article aims at defining the concept of ‘semi‐presidential government’ and detailing the diversity of its practices. There are in fact three types of semi‐presidential regimes: the president can be a mere figurehead, or he may be all‐powerful or again he can share his power with parliament. Using four parameters ‐ the content of the constitution, tradition and circumstances, the composition of the parliamentary majority and the position of the president in relation to the majority ‐ the author seeks to explain why similar constitutions are applied in a radically different manner.

It has been argued that political parties are in decline. While they used to be responsible for connecting citizens to the state by translating their preferences into policies, they have increasingly become part of the state, acting as governors instead. While this perspective emphasises parties’ representative function, it is less clear what their role is in a more direct democratic context. Parties may gain support due to such context, but they may also be seen increasingly redundant in a situation where citizens can co‐decide directly. Focusing on party membership, this study tests these rival expectations on a panel of 16 West European democracies over the period 1980–2008 and finds that parties tend to have higher levels of party membership in a direct democratic context. The usage of referendums, however, does not contribute to this effect.

Power transitions among major states have shaped the course of cooperation in the history of the international system. We study this relationship from a public opinion angle by examining the effect of a potential power transition on attitudes towards bilateral trade liberalization. Power transitions can spur political and economic conflict because the rising power gains greater influence over the course of world politics, including trade rules, allowing it to assert its national interest and the interests of its citizens. This implies that citizens in the rising power are more supportive of bilateral economic cooperation than citizens in the declining power. Empirical findings from parallel, survey‐embedded experiments in China and the United States lend support to this conjecture. Great Power competition, therefore, interferes with current international economic affairs – an aspect that has received less attention in previous research on trade politics.

Preoperative prophylaxis efficacy depends on antibiotic infusion completion before incision. In our colorectal program, metronidazole often wasn’t completed on time, in contrast to cefazolin. A multidisciplinary effort standardized its administration timing, improving infusion completion rates. We evaluated the impact of this intervention on surgical site infections in colorectal surgery.

Systemic congruence between the whole legislature and the whole electorate (‘many‐to‐many’, or sociotropic congruence) should be the benchmark to evaluate a democratic system. Yet, most studies link shifts in democratic preferences to individual‐level representation (‘many‐to‐one’, or egocentric incongruence), since individual‐level representation failures should be more salient and visible for individual citizens. We argue that the sociotropic incongruence hypothesis has not been appropriately tested to date, because the measure does not vary at individual level in observational data. Using an experiment conducted in France, we manipulate various sociotropic (in)congruence scenarios at the individual level. In addition to the incongruence hypotheses, our original experiment tests whether offering expertise‐based justifications to incongruence attenuates the backlash against representatives. We find that, even when giving sociotropic incongruence a fair test, egocentric incongruence still consistently shapes democratic preferences, while the effect of sociotropic incongruence remains negligible. Furthermore, we find that narratives rooted in expertise claims do not attenuate the effect of representation failure on backlash against representative democracy: they exacerbate it.

In 2000, Japanese party politics continued to experience many changes. Although these changes may not have surprised attentive observers of Japanese politics, they were not necessarily expected in industrial democracies. They included the unexpected formation of the Mori cabinet following the fatal illness of Prime Minister Obuchi, the reshuffling of the governing coalition accompanied by the breakup of the Liberal Party, and revisions of the electoral systems of both houses of the Diet.

‘International commitments pay’ could be the mantra of the current literature on international organisations: tying their hands at the international level is a means for governments to push through politically costly, but ultimately welfare‐enhancing reforms. It is argued in this article that this logic has a limit, which can be empirically observed. Past a given point, further depth of integration increases odds of backsliding. This belief is tested in the context of accession to an institution whose rules have been heavily scrutinised: the World Trade Organization (WTO). Countries with low rule of law are imposed a risk premium in the form of demands for deeper concessions, making ‘over‐committing’ possible. This relationship is used to assess the extent to which deeper commitments lead to backsliding. Industry‐level analysis supports these beliefs: deep commitments lead to increased odds of backtracking through a range of legal and extra‐legal mechanisms. Ambitious international commitments can backfire.

The patterns by which ancestral species give rise to descendants offer critical insights into the processes governing evolutionary and ecological change through time. One such pattern, predicted by both theoretical models and empirical studies, is the persistence of long-lived ancestral species that give rise to multiple descendants. While models such as the birth–death process long employed by paleobiologists predict the occurrence of such “super-progenitors,” the extent to which they should appear in fossil clades remains unknown. To address this, I apply a birth–death-sampling model to four marine clades to evaluate the expected prevalence of super-progenitors and the distribution of sampled descendants. I also explore through analytical and simulation-based predictions how variation in preservation, turnover, and net diversification rate influences these expectations. The model predicts that super-progenitors should be common across nearly all of the clades examined, provided that sampling completeness exceeds approximately 50% at the taxon level. Although the threshold excludes some poorly sampled terrestrial groups, my findings suggest that super-progenitors should be expected across a broad array of clades. Continued integration of super-progenitors into phylogenetic inference and models of diversification may thus contribute to a more complete understanding of macroevolutionary pattern and process.

Recent political changes in established democracies have led to a new cleavage, often described as a juxtaposition of ‘winners’ and ‘losers of globalization’. Despite a growing interest in subjective group membership and identity, previous research has not studied whether individuals actually categorize themselves as globalization winners or losers and what effect this has. Based on survey data from Germany, we report evidence of a division between self‐categorized globalization winners and losers that is partially but not completely rooted in social structure and associated with attitudes towards globalization‐related issues and party choices. We thereby confirm many of the assumptions from prior research – such as that (self‐categorized) losers of globalization tend to hold lower levels of education and lean towards the radical right. At the same time, the self‐categorizations are not merely transmission belts of socio‐structural effects but seem to be politically consequential in their own right. We conclude that the categories of globalization winners and losers have the potential to form part of the identity component of the globalization cleavage and are important for understanding how political entrepreneurs appeal to voters on their side of the new divide.

Most accounts of electoral system change tend to consider it as being driven by purely partisan interests. Political parties are expected to change the electoral rules as a way to maximise gains or minimise losses. However, little work has been done on the question of why electoral reforms are so scarce in spite of these potential benefits. In this study, a wide range of both factors that may foster (‘catalysts’) and ones that may hinder (‘barriers’) the change of electoral institutions are investigated. A statistical analysis is performed of 16 West European countries from 1975 to 2005, covering 23 reforms of the proportionality of their electoral systems. It is found that procedural barriers are more effective for explaining the likelihood of electoral reforms than (most of) the catalysts. Additionally, there are indications that courts may play a more active role in triggering reform than previously thought.

Until recent years, two major trends in European politics ‐ the growth of State services and increased political participation ‐ have complemented the central role of parties. This paper argues that this complementarity may have started to come unstuck, and questions the future viability of the mass party as a result of a shift in the balance of perceived advantages of the mass party by both leaders and members. The paper discusses several potential costs and benefits of party membership for leaders and members. Using membership statistics and survey data the reasonableness of these arguments is explored.

The extinction of clades outside mass extinction events remains an understudied aspect of evolutionary dynamics. This study examines the Dactylioceratidae, an ammonite family that disappeared during the Early Jurassic, outside a recognized mass extinction event. By using high-resolution taxonomic (species-level) and temporal (subchronozone) data, we assess its evolutionary trajectory, from diversification to extinction. Our analysis reveals that Dactylioceratidae experienced an initial expansion in diversity and geographic range, followed by increased specialization. Morphological disparity and diversity peaked before a sharp decline, suggesting a possible link between ecological specialization and extinction risk. This pattern aligns with hypotheses proposing that overspecialization limits adaptability, leading to extinction under background conditions. In contrast to mass extinctions driven by sudden catastrophic events, background extinctions may be influenced by gradual ecological changes and evolutionary constraints. By comparing the case of Dactylioceratidae with broader ammonoid trends, this study provides insights into long-term extinction mechanisms. These findings are relevant for understanding both past and present biodiversity crises, shedding light on how species’ evolutionary strategies impact their survival over time.

Many contemporary researchers agree that group relative deprivation is a driver of political actions against outgroups. However, both relative deprivation and political actions are complex phenomena, making it important to further study this relationship in the context of other relevant variables. One such variable could be the specific outgroup. The purpose of our study was to evaluate differences in the contribution of group relative deprivation to the prediction of activist and radicalised intentions against two outgroups – Muslims and senior citizens. The multi‐group structural equation modelling was applied separately on nationally representative samples of youth from Germany (N = 1,056), Norway (N = 376) and the United Kingdom (UK) (N = 1053). Group relative deprivation exhibited a robust relationship with activist intentions after controlling for general aggression, social desirability bias, age and gender, except in the UK, where the relationship between activist intentions and relative deprivation was stronger with Muslims as the target outgroup. The relationship between relative deprivation and radicalised intentions depended on the target outgroup across countries – it was related to radicalised intentions only against Muslims. The meaning and implications of these results are briefly discussed.

Party system institutionalization (PSI) is regarded as a critical underpinning of democracies, but its role in non‐democratic systems has been understudied. In this paper, we evaluate whether the concept has meaningful and perhaps unique implications for the durability of competitive authoritarian regimes. We argue that a modified version of electoral volatility – the most common measure of PSI in democracies – conveys useful information about PSI in competitive authoritarian contexts by signalling the ability of the ruling party to manage the opposition. To this end, we construct an original data set that disaggregates electoral volatility into ruling party seat change and opposition party seat volatility and further divides opposition party volatility into Type‐A and Type‐B volatility. We find robust results that democratization becomes more likely when decreases in the ruling party's seat share coincide with an increase in opposition party Type‐B volatility. This paper demonstrates that the concept of PSI has utility for understanding regime dynamics in competitive authoritarian contexts.

In recent years, observers have raised concerns about threats to democracy posed by external support for authoritarianism coming from regional powers such as Russia, China and Venezuela. This article assesses the efficacy of autocracy promotion through a close examination of Russian efforts to shape regime outcomes in the former Soviet Union. It finds that while Russian actions have periodically promoted instability and secessionist conflict, there is little evidence that such intervention has made post‐Soviet countries less democratic than they would have been otherwise. First, the Russian government has been inconsistent in its support for autocracy – supporting opposition and greater pluralism in countries where anti‐Russian governments are in power, and incumbent autocrats in cases where pro‐Russian politicians dominate. At the same time, the Russian government's narrow concentration on its own economic and geopolitical interests has significantly limited the country's influence, fostering a strong counter‐reaction in countries with strong anti‐Russian national identities. Finally, Russia's impact on democracy in the region has been restricted by the fact that post‐Soviet countries already have weak democratic prerequisites. This analysis suggests that, despite increasingly aggressive foreign policies by autocratic regional powers, autocracy promotion does not present a particularly serious threat to democracy in the world today.

Political institutions and parties define the set of choices faced by voters, and structure the evolution of electoral preferences over the election cycle. While previous research examines the characteristics of institutions, here we consider the influence of political parties. We theorize ways in which they matter to the formation of electoral preferences over the election timeline, and also how these relate to institutional features. Our analysis simultaneously assesses the influence of different system‐ and party‐level variables on the dynamic structure of voters’ preferences in legislative elections using a dataset of 27,357 vote intention polls in 26 countries since 1942, covering 231 discrete electoral cycles and encompassing 208 political parties. The results indicate that electoral institutions and parties are both important, but the characteristics of parties matter most of all, and effectively mediate institutional influences. These results have implications for the effects of election campaigns, the prediction of election outcomes, and party behavior itself.