This study examines the impact of cooperation between radical right parties (RRPs) and non‐RRPs on the policy attitudes of non‐RRP supporters. As RRPs have gained prominence in recent years, particularly for their nativist and anti‐immigration positions, this research investigates whether non‐RRP partisans adopt similar views when their preferred parties collaborate with RRPs. Drawing on original survey data from Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom in 2019, the findings reveal a notable association: non‐RRP supporters are more likely to express stronger nativist attitudes when they perceive their parties as having cooperative relationship with RRPs. These results suggest the potential for ideological diffusion, where voters adjust their beliefs in response to perceived alignment with allied parties. Ultimately, this paper seeks to enhance our understanding of how party cooperation affects voter attitudes, suggesting that alliances with RRPs may normalize exclusionary policies and exacerbate societal divisions.

To hold their Members of Parliament individually accountable for their legislative behaviour, British voters would need to base their decision to vote for an MP at least partially on the extent to which the MP's legislative voting behaviour deviated from that of the MP's party leadership. Voters should evaluate this deviation contingent on their views of the party leadership. MP rebellion can signal that voter–MP congruence is greater than that of the voter and the MP's party leadership. In this article it is found that only constituents with negative attitudes toward the Labour government reward rebellious Labour MPs, albeit to a limited extent. A similar conditional association is not observed on a single issue: Iraq. The policy accountability of MPs is relatively weak and general rather than issue‐specific.

Legislators face a challenge when implementing long-termist policies that prioritise sustainability and the well-being of future generations: citizens prefer policies that pay off sooner rather than later. In this research note, I assess the hypothesis that the lifespan structures this temporal discounting effect. Do people show a particular preference for policies that pay off within, rather than beyond, their own lifetime? In a pre-registered conjoint analysis with age-group blocking (N = 2405), I find little evidence in support of this explanation. Although they significantly prefer nearer-term policy benefits, citizens show no sign of especially preferring policies whose benefits will materialise within their own lifetimes. This pattern holds across a range of personal, political and philosophical differences. The temporal discounting effect is also substantially smaller than other policy features, such as how large the payoff of that policy is expected to be. Additionally, people are clearly willing in principle to trade off the timing of benefits for the scale of benefits, preferring larger later payoffs to sooner smaller ones. Across and beyond the lifespan, the sooner a policy pays off, the better. But, whenever they materialise, the bigger the societal benefits of that policy, the better. These findings strongly suggest that temporal policy discounting is not driven by selfish concerns, while also reinforcing that any such effect does not overwhelm citizens’ evaluations of policy proposals in principle.

The ideological fit between party grassroots and leaderships has long been a concern for political science, with members in general, and young members in particular, thought to be more radical. However, we do not know, first, whether this is still the case and, if it is, what drives members in different ideological directions. To investigate, we propose a new typology of members as radicals, moderates and aligned, and develop a theoretical framework that accounts for how political socialization and party contexts drive congruence and incongruence. We test this using YOUMEM survey data from over 4,000 members of 12 youth wings in six countries. Our results show that while radicals are the largest group in most youth wings, they are more common on the centre‐left than the centre‐right. They tend to have been in the youth wing for longer than aligned members, but are under‐represented among politically ambitious members. Our findings thus shed light on opinion structures within political parties and provide a typology for future research on intra‐party cohesion.

Although left‐right scales are an inherent feature of much cross‐national research, they have necessarily been created on a somewhat ad hoc basis, since the empirical foundation for valid cross‐national scales rarely exists. This paper seeks to provide such a foundation by using judgements of party ideological position which are both explicit and non‐idiosyncratic across a wide range of countries. These judgements derive from a so‐called ‘expert’ survey of leading political scientists in Western Europe, the USA, and elsewhere. It is our hope that the scales which we derive in this way may prove useful in a wide variety of contexts of comparative research.

The study of European integration has traditionally focused on organisational growth: the deepening and widening of the European Union (EU). By contrast, this article analyses organisational differentiation, a process in which states refuse, or are being refused, full integration but find value in establishing in‐between grades of membership. It describes how the EU's system of graded membership has developed, and it explains the positioning of states in this system. The core countries of the EU set a standard of ‘good governance’. The closer European countries are to this standard, the closer their membership grade is to the core. Some countries fall short of this standard and are refused further integration by the core: their membership grade increases with better governance. Other countries refuse further integration because they outperform the standards of the core countries: their membership grade decreases as governance improves. These conjectures are corroborated in a panel analysis of European countries.

The systemic turn in deliberative democratic theory presents empirical researchers in this field with a problem. Deliberative systems are complex, porous and shifting in nature. These features cannot be adequately assessed by existing tools for measuring deliberative and democratic qualities. Such qualities only become apparent when set against practices in other systems. Meaningful analysis rests on comparison. However, in turning to the comparative politics literature for inspiration, we caution that the two dominant traditions in this subfield – rigidly systematic comparison or thickly descriptive area studies – are of only limited utility. On the one hand, rigid comparative analysis will map uncomfortably on the systemic account. On the other, there is a need to move beyond idiographic accounts produced in thick descriptions. Instead, this article emphasises the value of two alternative traditions in comparative political analysis. The first is through the use of ‘family resemblances’ in comparative research design. The second is through post hoc comparisons that draw together eclectic affinities between systems. Both approaches are sensitive to the contextual complexities of deliberative systems in practice. Both can tell us a great deal about why and how deliberative practices and institutions emerge, flourish or fail, and how they enable, enhance or undermine the democratic and deliberative qualities of the system overall. This article draws on promising examples of these two approaches to emphasise their value in understanding deliberative systems in practice.

This article examines the responses of ministers facing high levels of blame in the press after serious failures in the public exam system for school‐leavers in Scotland in 2000 and England in 2002. It develops a method for systematic analysis and comparison of the behaviour of officeholders facing blame, tests the hypothesis that ministers will accept personal culpability only after other ways of handling blame have been exhausted and uses time series intervention models to show how one can estimate the impact of strategies on the next day's blame level. The basic sequencing hypothesis is partially upheld by the observed behaviour in these cases, though many other kinds of blame responses do not display a clear sequence. The intervention analysis also raises questions about the claimed effectiveness of presentational strategies for managing blame.

Much recent research on coalitions and policy‐making in parliamentary democracies requires high‐quality data on the strength of legislative institutions. In this article, I introduce a new index of committee policing strength which improves on existing measures in important ways. I specify key index parameters using a binary rooted tree model and engage human coders to score formal rules. I obtain a novel time series of committee policing strength in 17 western and eastern European democracies since 1945. I validate the new estimates through convergent validation and discuss ways in which the new index contributes to future work.

This article investigates how China's economic cooperation affects authoritarian persistence elsewhere. For the period 1998–2008, the article assesses quantitatively whether the effects of economic cooperation from China vary, conditioned by the regime type of the recipient. The analysis finds that China's economic cooperation is associated with regime durability in party‐based regimes. In non‐party regimes, in contrast, it is associated with regime collapse.

Legislative debates are a thriving field in comparative politics. They make representation work by offering legislators the opportunity to take the floor and represent their constituents. In this paper, we review the key theoretical concepts and empirical findings in a maturing field. We begin by addressing what legislative debates are and why we should study them to learn about inter‐ and intra‐party politics. Next, we look at the contributions springing from Proksch and Slapin's ground‐breaking model. In so doing, our review suggests that recent work extends the original model to include further dimensions of legislative debates. Third, we examine the role of legislative debates as mechanisms of representation, focusing on gender. Four, we examine the challenges of the comparative analysis of legislative debates. Finally, we map the road ahead by discussing four avenues of future research and some key questions that remain unanswered.