Seminal models in political economy imply that rising economic inequality should lead to growing public demand for redistribution. Yet, existing empirical evidence on this link is both limited and inconclusive – and scholars regularly doubt it exists at all. In this research note, we turn to data from the International Social Survey Programme's (ISSP) Social Inequality surveys, now spanning the period from 1987 to 2019, to reassess the effect of rising inequality on support for redistribution. Covering a longer time series than previous studies, we obtain robust evidence that when income inequality rises in a country, public support for income redistribution tends to go up. Examining the reaction across income groups to adjudicate between different models of how rising inequality matters in a second step, we find that rising inequality increases support for redistribution within all income groups, with a marginally stronger effect among the well‐off. Our results imply that insufficient policy responses to rising inequality may be less about absent demand and more about a failure to turn demand into policy, and that scholars should devote more attention to the latter.

Since the outbreak of the eurozone's sovereign debt crisis, a range of fiscal policy measures have been adopted at the European Union (EU) and national levels that have given rise to claims of a significant reinforcement of fiscal policy constraint. Given the prominence and reinvigorated political appeal of fiscal rules in the EU and beyond, it is disconcerting how little we actually know about the link between fiscal rules, budgetary outcomes and market behaviour. In this research note, the aim is to take stock of the existing literature and challenge its contribution to the current policy debate on the merits of fiscal rules. Specifically it will focus on problems linked to endogeneity, measurements and contextuality.

Studies interested in the cross‐national levels of corruption have concluded that specific institutional characteristics drive the aggregate variation. In countries with high institutional clarity and plurality electoral systems, corruption tends to be lower since increased voter monitoring and clarity of responsibility incentivise politicians to deliver virtuous policies. However, the underlying accountability mechanism has never been tested at the individual level. It is still unclear whether (1) voters do place voting weights on corruption, and (2) whether these weights vary in response to aggregate institutional characteristics. In this article, survey data from 23 democracies is used to put the accountability micro‐mechanism to this test. While there is some evidence that voters do vote on the basis of corruption, the moderating effect of institutional characteristics is not as strong as previously thought.

Does economic inequality dampen support for the political system? This question has been answered in the affirmative in prior work studying the relationship between economic inequality and various manifestations of political system support across countries or US states. However, recent work challenges the premise underlying such analyses by showing that citizens are generally ignorant about national-level inequality. Relatedly, work on contextual effects finds that economic and social phenomena are particularly consequential for political attitudes when they reflect palpable everyday experiences. Combining these insights, we suggest that a more theoretically and methodologically appropriate test of the proposition that economic inequality reduces political system support should focus on local, neighbourhood-level economic inequality, which citizens encounter on a daily basis. By linking multiple geo-referenced surveys – both cross-sectional and longitudinal – with Danish registry data, we create micro-contextual measures of local economic inequality and relate them to a range of indicators of political system support. We find no evidence indicating that local inequality reduces political system support.

This study examines citizens’ support for state surveillance, contingent upon factors related to policy design and the context of implementation. While most people want to live in a secure environment, we argue in this study that the support of policies to reach this goal depends on their necessity, extensiveness and reliability. Results from survey experiments in four European countries show that citizens are ready to approve the introduction of far‐reaching state surveillance that includes measures of facial recognition and motion detection. Public support is further enhanced if these measures are to be targeted at potential criminals, rather than at all citizens (i.e., policy extensiveness), as well as if a safety threat is salient (i.e., policy necessity). Concerns about data security reduce support (i.e., policy reliability). While these conditions matter for the support of specific policies, they do not influence how trustworthy citizens consider government and other political authorities to be.

The 2008/2009 economic crisis has been identified as an important element contributing to declining trust in institutions in Europe and worldwide. However, it is unclear whether this decline in trust is distributed homogenously among citizens or whether there are differences across social strata. This article applies multilevel models to six waves of European Social Survey (ESS) data to analyse changes in trust in the European Parliament (EP) from 2002 to 2012 in 20 European Union countries. Moreover, it investigates whether individuals with different socioeconomic backgrounds experienced different reductions in trust. The results indicate that trust in the EP declined the most in the peripheral European countries hit hardest by the economic crisis: Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Cyprus, Greece and Spain. Furthermore, the results suggest that the decline in trust was more pronounced among subjects with lower social status. The tightening of the link between social and political inequalities is especially preoccupying considering the importance of trust in institutions for citizens to actively participate in society, voice their needs and demand their place at the table. Hence, the worsening economic conditions, combined with declining levels of trust, are not only troublesome for the functioning of democracies as a whole, but they are also problematic at the individual level as they are likely to perpetuate the divide among subjects at different ends of the social ladder.

In 1999, Japanese politics appeared to move toward more stability after the ups and downs of party politics since 1993. First, the LDP and its new coalition partners, the Liberal Party (LP) and the Komeito (CGP), won a stable majority, which the LDP coalition government had lacked since 1996. Second, with the new coalition partners, the LDP-centered government passed many laws. Despite these apparent signs of stable rule, there was much potential for change. The governing coalition, which had managed to achieve a policy agreement at the beginning, continued to disagree over specific policies to be proposed and passed in the Diet. These conflicts, alternatively, exacerbated different views and strategies of coalition formation inside the LDP and increased the cleavages between intraparty groups that were more fragmented than the existing factions. However, despite declining popular support, the three party coalition continued to rule primarily because of the ineffective opposition coalition in which a major opposition party, the Democratic Party (DP), was centered.

Following Duverger, low district magnitude (low number of seats per electoral district) produces a mechanical effect, the underrepresentation of small parties, and a psychological effect, discouraging voters from voting for small parties. The two effects usually occur together and cannot be tested separately. However, in Venezuela an experimental ‘control’ is provided by the requirement that voters simultaneously cast a vote for the same party in each of three legislative tiers (Senate, Chamber of Deputies, and State Assembly), each with a different district magnitude. Hence the psychological effect can exert itself on only one tier. In the other tiers exceptionally high or low deviations from proportional representation are observed. The separate effects of district magnitude are analysed by their consequences on the number of electoral parties and the deviation from proportional representation.

Coalition governments are said to make voters of coalition parties feel more warmly towards supporters of their coalition partners and, hence, reduce affective polarization. However, even countries frequently governed by coalitions commonly experience high levels of affective polarization. We argue that for coalitions to reduce affective polarization, they must be perceived as successful. In coalitions that are perceived as unsuccessful, voters will not develop an overarching coalition identity. Such coalitions fail to change whom voters consider as their in‐group, therefore not mitigating affective polarization. We test this argument using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data. We find that the positive effects of coalition membership reported in previous work are exclusively driven by voters who are satisfied with the coalition's performance. Coalitions have no depolarizing effect among voters dissatisfied with their governing performance. These results question whether democratic institutions themselves can mitigate affective polarization and instead demonstrate the responsibility of elites to make inter‐party cooperation work.

The argument for proportional representation (PR) rests on the assumption that the legislature should accurately reflect the opinions of the voters as a whole. An alternative, and more compelling, argument is that the government (executive) should faithfully reflect the voters’ opinions. When we apply this proportional tenure (PT) criterion to 87 political parties in 18 countries from 1945 to 1980, we find that neither PR nor plurality-majority systems have performed very well. In PR systems, small centrist parties tend to be favoured, and large parties, especially those that are ideologically ‘extreme’, are discriminated against. Three types of constitutional-electoral arrangements may be introduced in order to make government tenure more proportional: PT in each government that is formed: PT by consecutive governments; and majoritarian PT in which the largest party forms the government for a period proportional to the size of its share of the popular vote.

Throughout the year 2000 the party finance scandal involving the CDU in general and former chancellor Helmut Kohl in particular continued to dominate national politics. It involved money laundering, illegal donations to the party and secret bank accounts abroad (see also previous issue). During the early months of the year the Christian Democrats found themselves in the worst crisis of their entire history. In January it emerged that Helmut Kohl’s successor Wolfgang Schäuble, chairman of the CDU and the joint parliamentary party of CDU and CSU in the Bundestag, had also accepted cash from a dubious arms trader. In mid-February, he resigned after agonising weeks and after he had to admit that he had lied to the Bundestag. At the same time, however, he implied that he had fallen victim to a plot orchestrated by his predecessor and former mentor Helmut Kohl. He was succeeded by Friedrich Merz as parliamentary leader and by Angela Merkel as party chair (elected in April). Angela Merkel became the first female, Protestant and East German chair of the CDU which is traditionally dominated by Catholics, reaping the benefit of being the first senior Christian Democrat to openly criticise Helmut Kohl in late 1999.

Academics and practitioners are increasingly interested in deliberative minipublics and whether these can address widespread dissatisfaction with contemporary politics. While optimism seems to prevail, there is also talk that the use of minipublics may backfire. When the government disregards a minipublic's recommendations, this could lead to more dissatisfaction than not asking for its advice in the first place. Using an online survey experiment in Belgium (n = 3,102), we find that, compared to a representative decision-making process, a minipublic tends to bring about higher political support when its recommendations are fully adopted by the government, whereas it generates lower political support when its recommendations are not adopted. This study presents novel insights into whether and when the use of minipublics may alleviate or aggravate political dissatisfaction among the public at large.

Does radical right political violence favour or hinder public support for right-wing stances? Numerous existing studies have demonstrated that Islamic terrorism provokes a conservative shift, increases nationalism and induces negative sentiments towards immigration. However, little is known about the consequences of far-right terrorism, despite its incidence in Western societies. We leverage four waves of the British Election Study (BES) and use a quasi-experimental design to analyse individual political orientations shortly before and after terrorist attacks. We find that respondents distance themselves from the ideology associated with the perpetrator and shift away from ideological positions at the right end of the political spectrum. Furthermore, respondents are less likely to report nationalistic attitudes and immigration skepticism, core tenets of extremist right-wing political ideologies. Our findings suggest that the characteristics of the perpetrators and their driving goals are crucial factors shaping the impact of terrorism on public sentiments.