The chapter completes my discussion of the inception of periodical publishing in asylums, by examining the histories of two of the first asylum periodicals published in America and Britain and their patient-founders: Barber Badger’s Retreat Gazette (Hartford Retreat in Connecticut, 1837) and John Reid Adam’s Chronicles of the Monastery (Glasgow Royal Asylum, 1842). It shows that the histories of early asylum periodicals were tightly intertwined with their founders’ fates, which was the major reason for the publications’ comparatively short runs. Furthermore, these founders were all patients with printing skills or, in the case of Adam, literary aspirations and willingness to learn, and the opportunity to print in the asylum played an important role in their lives and professional careers: for Badger, it was a way to continue providing for his family, while for Adam, institutionalisation constituted an apprenticeship that eventually enabled them to pursue a career in publishing beyond their discharge. Asylum periodicals allowed patients to apply their existing skills or gain new ones in the pursuit of their own aspirations and personal interests.

Chapter 1 introduces the key concepts of the book, lays out the main argument, and discusses the empirical approach and data used in later chapters. It emphasizes that variation in governance outcomes cannot be understood without examining the incentives and interactions of politicians, bureaucrats, and voters. Ultimately, I argue that politicians in developing democracies have incentives to hire competent bureaucrats but will simultaneously retain tools to influence their career progression. Using tools of career control – interference in bureaucrats’ promotions, work locations, and day-to-day work tasks – politicians can extract bureaucratic loyalty. The introduction also situates the book within existing scholarship. The empirical strategy combines qualitative interviews, survey experiments, and observational data, largely drawn from Ghana but supplemented with comparative insights. Ultimately, the chapter frames the book as an inquiry into how the competing incentives of politicians and bureaucrats shape governance.

Chapter 6 shifts from procurement to the spatial allocation of local public goods, examining how partisan considerations shape the placement of infrastructure in communities. It begins by outlining the formal planning processes, in which bureaucrats are expected to design allocations based on community needs. However, interviews and prior research reveal frequent deviations from these plans, often driven by political pressure. Using data from Ghana’s Central Region, the chapter shows a strong correlation between the ruling party’s prior vote share and the number of projects a community receives. At the same time, the analysis highlights the role of need: poorer communities are more likely to secure projects than wealthier ones. These patterns suggest a dual influence – politicians seek to reward co-partisan communities, while bureaucrats attempt to prioritize developmental considerations. To probe this further, the chapter employs a survey experiment across eighty local governments. Results confirm that bureaucrats perceive both partisanship and need as influential, but partisan alignment often outweighs need in determining outcomes. The evidence thus reveals a tug-of-war between politicians and bureaucrats, with distributive outcomes shaped by the balance of partisan incentives and bureaucratic resistance. This politicization of allocation ultimately undermines equitable and efficient public service delivery.

Chapter 4 examines how politicians’ ability to influence bureaucrats’ careers creates opportunities for corruption in public procurement. Drawing on surveys and interviews with bureaucrats across local governments in Ghana, it finds that nearly half of bureaucrats believe procurement contracts are awarded uncompetitively, often in exchange for party financing. These perceptions highlight the vulnerability of procurement processes to partisan manipulation. A key mechanism through which politicians secure bureaucratic compliance is career control, particularly the threat of geographic transfers. Bureaucrats who resist corrupt demands risk reassignment to less desirable locations, a sanction that can disrupt both professional advancement and personal lives. Evidence from a survey experiment underscores this fear: bureaucrats anticipate that opposing corruption would trigger punitive transfers. By focusing on career management as a channel of influence, the chapter contributes to broader debates on bureaucratic autonomy and political interference. It also demonstrates that corruption is not merely the result of bureaucrats’ individual incentives but of institutionalized practices that bind bureaucrats’ careers to politicians’ partisan strategies.

Kumud's story begins in a small village in Maharashtra, where life was defined by poverty and struggle. She does not remember her exact age, but piecing together timelines—like her arrival at G. B. Road in 1980 and the assassination of Indira Gandhi—suggests she is about 59 now. The pivotal events of her life are often marked by phrases like ‘When Indira1 died …’, a moment she uses to anchor her memories.

Kumud grew up in a family of nine children—five boys and four girls— where the burden of survival left little room for dreams. Her formal education ended in the 3rd grade. Her life took a dramatic turn when a woman from her village approached her father with an offer. ‘With so many daughters, why not entrust the youngest to me? I will take care of her,’ the woman suggested. And so, Kumud's journey to Delhi began.

At just 13, Kumud found herself living in the brothels under the care of this woman, whom she called Didi. Didi ran a brothel, and although Kumud initially played the role of a brothel caretaker/helper—running errands, accompanying sex workers to the hospital, and managing daily operations—she eventually expressed her desire to work on G. B. Road. ‘I have lived in every kotha,’ she says with a mixture of pride and resignation. ‘I followed my Didi everywhere.’

Her stories are a patchwork of raids, arrests, beatings, debts, and moments of laughter. One particular incident in 2015 stands out starkly.

This chapter introduces Governance by Emulation, a framework analyzing how public law models, particularly administrative and constitutional mechanisms like individual rights adjudication, are reproduced in private and regulatory governance. Focusing on corporate-controlled content moderation, it examines the European Union’s out-of-court dispute settlement bodies (ODSs) under the Digital Services Act and Meta’s Oversight Board–conceptualized as Emulated Guardians. These institutions borrow the legitimacy of courts to regulate novel, bureaucratic private power structures while addressing public demands for accountability. Grounded in law, sociology, and political science, the chapter outlines the book’s methodology and contributions. It delves into four inquiries: the actors involved, their tasks, the power they seek to discipline, and how public law principles are adapted for private governance. These dynamics highlight emulation’s duality: it promises innovation yet risks performative legitimacy devoid of substantive reform. By situating Emulated Guardians within broader global governance challenges, this chapter frames content moderation as a microcosm of future issues in sectors like AI, biotechnology, and space exploration. It concludes that while governance by emulation addresses urgent accountability demands, its efficacy depends on public engagement and institutional evolution, offering a critical lens to assess emerging accountability structures beyond state control.