Chapter 2 develops the theoretical framework that underpins the book. It argues that politicians in developing democracies face a dual incentive: they need competent bureaucrats who can implement programs effectively, yet they also desire control over those bureaucrats to secure loyalty and political advantage. As a result, politicians often recruit based on merit but retain formal or informal levers of influence, such as control over promotions or geographic transfers. The chapter distinguishes between programmatic and non-programmatic distribution, emphasizing that politicians often require bureaucratic loyalty to engage in non-programmatic distribution. Further, politicians have greater incentives to engage in non-programmatic distribution when local elections are highly competitive. Accordingly, I expect that intense local electoral competition will result in worse governance outcomes, including higher levels of corruption and partisan allocation of public goods. This framework provides the theoretical lens to interpret the empirical evidence presented in subsequent chapters and situates the book’s contribution within broader debates on state capacity, bureaucratic autonomy, clientelism, and democratic accountability.

There is a story we like to tell about rescue—a story of triumph, of justice served, of victims transformed into citizens, their suffering redeemed by the promise of freedom. It is an uplifting narrative, a denouement that reassures us: the world, though flawed, can be set right. Yet, as the dust settles and the headlines fade, the lives behind these stories continue, marked not by closure but by uncertainty, loss, and the slow, grinding weight of reality— the reality of social structures that constrict individuals’ choices, creating conditions that limit their options and make them work in exploitative conditions in the first place. The moral landscape of these stories also tends to oversimplify the roles of various actors involved. Stories of emancipation rarely delve into the lives of traffickers, some of whom may themselves be impoverished workers, or victims-turned-traffickers, or young people willingly migrating into arduous forms of labour.

Kumud's arrest in 2015 was supposed to be a turning point. In the eyes of the world—non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the media, even myself—it was a victory: a trafficker brought to justice, a symbol of progress. But what did freedom mean for Kumud? Ten years on, the answer is written in debts that never shrink, in the deaths of her daughters who could not be saved, and in a life reduced to selling alcohol on the margins of a city that no longer has a place for her. She waits, not for freedom, but for the end of a legal process that has exiled her from the only home she knew. ‘I am wishing for the case to get over, so I can come back to G. B. Road. I don't have anywhere else to go.’

Chapter 9 examines a negative case in Latin America, where far-right parties remain almost entirely politically and electorally irrelevant. Even after Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s (MORENA) victory in 2018, no far-right party emerged in response to Mexico’s turn to the left. This study argues that López Obrador’s “leftism without progressivism” failed to generate the incentives necessary for a conservative backlash or the successful rise of a far-right party. His government did not champion progressive policies – particularly on sociocultural issues such as gender equality, LGBT rights, or racial equality – that typically fuel grievances among far-right voters in Latin America and Europe. On the contrary, López Obrador often expressed conservative positions on matters including public morality, drug legalization, climate change, and immigration. As a result, the first left-wing government since Mexico’s democratic transition did not trigger significant far-right mobilization. Paradoxically, it even partially satisfied voters who might otherwise have been drawn to a populist radical right party. This study also finds that a segment of the Mexican electorate, based on programmatic preferences, could be receptive to such a party. In future electoral cycles, this latent demand could create an opening for far-right actors seeking to mobilize support for their policy agenda.

The 2018 presidential election marked a watershed moment in Brazilian politics with the ascension of Jair Bolsonaro, who secured over 55% of the vote and became the primary catalyst for a novel far-right political alignment. This movement, termed Bolsonarismo, is characterized by a multidimensional political rhetoric that synthesizes reactionary stances on crime, corruption, and sociocultural issues—specifically regarding gender and LGBTQ+ rights—with militarist, economically liberal, and authoritarian inclinations. Bolsonaro’s ideological positioning oscillates between a radical, illiberal far-right and a more extreme, authoritarian posture, consistently commanding a resilient support base of approximately 20% of the electorate. This consolidation of the right-wing spectrum has effectively marginalized “third-way” alternatives, establishing him as the movement’s uncontested figurehead. Chapter 3 investigates the roots of Bolsonaro’s oratory, demonstrating that the core tenets of Bolsonarismo were embedded in his discourse before his presidency. Through a systematic analysis of his public statements and legislative rhetoric, the chapter shows how he championed positions aligned with the global far-right. Furthermore, the analysis examines his executive actions, focusing on his response to the COVID-19 pandemic and his disruption of conditional cash transfer programs as a form of policy rebranding.

This chapter first presents an ideal type of a hybrid regime. This account sees a hybrid regime as a regime that presents itself as a functioning democracy, but in which the incumbent has disproportionate control over the rules of the game. The chapter then identifies points of tension between a hybrid regime’s constitution and the constitution of a good state. It shows that three constitutional features tend to be found in a hybrid regime: rivaling constitutional ideologies of democracy and guardianship; a trifurcated dual state legal order; and two levels of constitutional battle. Along the way, the chapter suggests how these features might impact a constitutional court in a hybrid regime.

Chapter 5 provides an in-depth analysis of the far right in Chile, focusing on José Antonio Kast and the Republican Party (PR). It begins by elucidating the ideological bedrock of authoritarianism, nativism, and neoliberalism that fuels the ascent of the far right. Central to this exploration is how these ideologies manifest in the politicization of punitive justice, traditional gender roles, and restrictive immigration policies – all within a framework marked by a staunch anti-communist stance. The chapter then seamlessly connects these political strategies to the tactics of otherization targeting indigenous communities, immigrants, and leftist elites. By doing so, it places these exclusionary practices within the broader context of identity politics, providing a comprehensive understanding of how these dynamics interact and reinforce each other in shaping the far right’s impact on Chile’s political landscape.