This chapter goes beyond a descriptive view of crime hot spots to explore how hot spots and non-hot spots vary within and across communities. Using the characteristics we focused on in Chapter 2, we ask whether the extent to which hot spots and non-hot spots differ depends on the type of community they are nested within. We also examine to what extent hot spot streets have similar characteristics across the city, or whether hot spots look different depending on the community they are nested within. We find that hot spots differ on most characteristics from streets with little crime regardless of the type of community they are nested in (as indicated by levels of concentrated disadvantage). At the same time, community context does matter in terms of understanding characteristics such as structural measures of social disorganization and disorder. Even so, we find that hot spots of crime have similarly low levels of informal social control irrespective of the communities in which they are nested.”

This chapter directly examines whether social context influences crime on street segments by building statistical models that examine the relationship between social context and crime, while taking into account key elements of opportunities for crime at place. Our findings reinforce the importance of including social context and informal social control in understanding crime rates at micro geographic places, while also confirming that opportunities for crime are important underlying causes of crime at the micro geographic level.

Chapter 9 examines a negative case in Latin America, where far-right parties remain almost entirely politically and electorally irrelevant. Even after Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s (MORENA) victory in 2018, no far-right party emerged in response to Mexico’s turn to the left. This study argues that López Obrador’s “leftism without progressivism” failed to generate the incentives necessary for a conservative backlash or the successful rise of a far-right party. His government did not champion progressive policies – particularly on sociocultural issues such as gender equality, LGBT rights, or racial equality – that typically fuel grievances among far-right voters in Latin America and Europe. On the contrary, López Obrador often expressed conservative positions on matters including public morality, drug legalization, climate change, and immigration. As a result, the first left-wing government since Mexico’s democratic transition did not trigger significant far-right mobilization. Paradoxically, it even partially satisfied voters who might otherwise have been drawn to a populist radical right party. This study also finds that a segment of the Mexican electorate, based on programmatic preferences, could be receptive to such a party. In future electoral cycles, this latent demand could create an opening for far-right actors seeking to mobilize support for their policy agenda.

This chapter brings social context and social structure into the story of crime hot spots. We begin by examining why criminologists have, for the most part, ignored micro geographic study of crime until the late twentieth century. This was, in part, the result of not having data available at the micro geographic level, but also related to the overriding interests of sociologists in the study of spatial criminology with micro geographic units, such as neighborhoods and communities. We then turn to the importance of new theoretical innovations that focused interest on hot spots of crime, but led criminologists to largely ignore the social context of these places. Having placed the study of crime hot spots in historical perspective, we bring social context into the study of crime and place by examining variability of measures of social disadvantage and social disorganization across hot spots and non-hot spot streets in our study. We pay particular attention to informal social control as measured by collective efficacy in communities (Sampson et al., 1997). We also examine characteristics of hot spots that are often seen as tightly linked to crime, such as social and physical disorder and fear of crime.

The 2018 presidential election marked a watershed moment in Brazilian politics with the ascension of Jair Bolsonaro, who secured over 55% of the vote and became the primary catalyst for a novel far-right political alignment. This movement, termed Bolsonarismo, is characterized by a multidimensional political rhetoric that synthesizes reactionary stances on crime, corruption, and sociocultural issues—specifically regarding gender and LGBTQ+ rights—with militarist, economically liberal, and authoritarian inclinations. Bolsonaro’s ideological positioning oscillates between a radical, illiberal far-right and a more extreme, authoritarian posture, consistently commanding a resilient support base of approximately 20% of the electorate. This consolidation of the right-wing spectrum has effectively marginalized “third-way” alternatives, establishing him as the movement’s uncontested figurehead. Chapter 3 investigates the roots of Bolsonaro’s oratory, demonstrating that the core tenets of Bolsonarismo were embedded in his discourse before his presidency. Through a systematic analysis of his public statements and legislative rhetoric, the chapter shows how he championed positions aligned with the global far-right. Furthermore, the analysis examines his executive actions, focusing on his response to the COVID-19 pandemic and his disruption of conditional cash transfer programs as a form of policy rebranding.

This chapter first presents an ideal type of a hybrid regime. This account sees a hybrid regime as a regime that presents itself as a functioning democracy, but in which the incumbent has disproportionate control over the rules of the game. The chapter then identifies points of tension between a hybrid regime’s constitution and the constitution of a good state. It shows that three constitutional features tend to be found in a hybrid regime: rivaling constitutional ideologies of democracy and guardianship; a trifurcated dual state legal order; and two levels of constitutional battle. Along the way, the chapter suggests how these features might impact a constitutional court in a hybrid regime.

In this introductory chapter, we set the stage for what we learned from our study in later chapters. We begin with a discussion of the law of crime concentration. In some sense, it is the first law of study of crime and place, because it provides a logic for why it is important to examine hot spots of crime. We then turn to a brief history and description of the research site for our study – Baltimore City, Maryland. It is important to put Baltimore in historical context to be able to understand the specific research environment from which we draw our data. Following this, we detail our data collection. We describe the main features of our research program, which employed rigorous methods to identify places for study and collect data for analyses. Finally, we provide an overview of the directions we take in the book, introducing the chapters that follow.

Chapter 5 provides an in-depth analysis of the far right in Chile, focusing on José Antonio Kast and the Republican Party (PR). It begins by elucidating the ideological bedrock of authoritarianism, nativism, and neoliberalism that fuels the ascent of the far right. Central to this exploration is how these ideologies manifest in the politicization of punitive justice, traditional gender roles, and restrictive immigration policies – all within a framework marked by a staunch anti-communist stance. The chapter then seamlessly connects these political strategies to the tactics of otherization targeting indigenous communities, immigrants, and leftist elites. By doing so, it places these exclusionary practices within the broader context of identity politics, providing a comprehensive understanding of how these dynamics interact and reinforce each other in shaping the far right’s impact on Chile’s political landscape.

The chapter argues that courts in hybrid regimes face a legitimacy paradox: An activist court risks attracting backlash from the authoritarian, whereas a deferential court may undermine the trust of a democracy-supporting population. The chapter first lays out the conventional view of perceived legitimacy, including the mechanisms behind it and its utility. The conventional view is premised upon the political dynamics of a democracy; this requires modification in order to be applicable to a hybrid regime. It then takes on this task by introducing a relational angle. An audience-based framework is shown to help us identify the key audiences that are relevant to judicial legitimacy in different regime-types. The audience-based framework is then applied to a hybrid regime to set out the legitimacy paradox. The effects of the paradox are practical, as exemplified by the tensions between the expectations different political actors within a hybrid regime have of a constitutional court. It will be explained how these conflicting expectations create challenges for judicial maneuvering in a hybrid regime.

Chapter 8 explores two questions: Is there a far right in Colombia? To what extent are far-right ideas present in Colombian politics today, and what are their prospects going forward? Given the internal conflict, a militaristic and anti-guerrilla right has been historically strong and dominant, but it is different from the contemporary Latin American far right. Colombia lacks an organized far-right party, though this should not be taken to mean that far-right ideas are irrelevant to understanding political dynamics. The chapter evaluates the reach of contemporary far-right ideas among key figures in the Colombian political elite, relying on speeches, interviews, social media posts, and legislative output. It focuses on Álvaro Uribe and Rodolfo Hernández, arguing that neither should be understood as an exponent of the contemporary far right, though some far-right ideas can be identified in their discourse at different points, with varying degrees of coherence. The seeds of the contemporary far right are found elsewhere – in subnational politicians, emerging outsiders, and figures within existing parties, most strongly in Senator María Fernanda Cabal. The chapter explores the evolution of Cabal’s public discourse, identifying an inflection point in 2020, when she began emphasizing moral conservatism and became more involved in international far-right networks.