The Alevist movement developed almost simultaneously in Turkey and among Turkish migrants, but it is structured and acts quite differently in these distinct, albeit related, political spaces. This comparative empirical study tries to explain the differences in the discourses and the success of Alevist movements in Turkey and Germany by relating them to the broader institutional and discursive contexts within which they are embedded. Alevist movements are incorporated differently in state policies directed to claim-makers and consequently possess different discursive and institutional resources. Spatially bounded institutional contexts and political agendas frame the discourse and strategies of Alevist claim-making, and result in divergent developments. It is thus necessary to disentangle the multiple levels of claim-and policy-making involved (local, national and supranational), and to analyze their relationships and possible articulations. ‘Transnational’ mobilization has often been understood as a mere continuation of mobilization at home or, oppositely, as its driving force. This paper questions the continuity between mobilizations at home and abroad, and argues that mobilization in migration entails specific dynamics, which may not be re-imported home.

In a democracy it is through the process of voting that people find an opportunity to register their likes and dislikes of domestic and foreign policy decisions most effectively. In Turkey, the recent national elections on 22 July 2007 provided an opportunity to observe the nexus between voters’ choices and foreign policy issues. Questions pertaining to problems facing the country and the campaign issues fail to give any clue as to whether people paid attention to foreign policy in making their choices among the political parties of the country. However, a closer examination of the factors determining the vote indicates that, although party identification and satisfaction with the performance of the economy and the expectations of the government in managing the economy played major roles, attitudes towards the European Union (EU), nationalism, and globalization closely followed in magnitude those two factors in determining the voters’ party preferences across the left-right spectrum. While AKP supporters had the most favorable attitude towards the EU, MHP supporters appeared highly nationalistic, and CHP voters seemed most influenced by positive orientations to openness to the world.

Over the past two decades, the debate over multiculturalism challenged the justice of neutral, “difference blind” rules in liberal democracies. Allegedly neutral institutions were shown to be implicitly biased toward the priorities, experiences, or interests of the dominant groups in the society. Criticism of difference-blind rules and claims for justice to minority groups defined the relationship between government and opposition in many contexts. Arguments for special rights to protect minorities, women, or ethnocultural groups gained legitimacy (Young 1990, Jones 1990, Phillips 1991, Taylor 1994, Kymlicka 1995, Kymlicka and Norman 2000).

The recent rise of Islamic Radicalism in the Middle East is generally associated with anti-Western sentiment and interpreted as a continuation of the traditional conflict between Christian and Islamic civilizations. It is thought to reflect a traditionalist opposition to the modernization process which originated in the West and then was introduced to the Islamic countries (for an example of this literature, see Youssef, 1985). But this view cannot explain the historical timing and specificity of the current Islamic political revival. In this paper I suggest that Islamic radicalism is not a traditionalist plea to return to a pre-modern era. Quite the contrary, it is a product of the contradictions of Third World modernization and represents a post-modern reaction to the specific form of modernization experienced by the Islamic Third World. In the Islamic countries, where modernization has been synonymous with westernization, the response to the contradictions of modernization has taken the form of a “politics of identity.”

Of the many European states that interacted with the Ottoman Empire in the early modern era, few did so as extensively as the Most Serene Republic of Venice, La Serenissima. The two empires shared a lengthy border and a common historical trajectory for almost 500 years, during which time the political and economic fortunes of both were intimately intertwined. While occasionally interrupted by brief periods of open hostility, for the most part this relationship was characterized by peaceful coexistence. Venetian historiography at present, however, is unable to explain this reality. Rather, in painting the picture of Venice’s relations with the Ottoman Empire, scholars have relied on broad strokes that depict a series of rather simple, binary relationships—East/West, Muslim/Christian, Venetian/Turk. This dichotomy is readily apparent in the titles of important monographs on the topic: Islam and the West, Europe and the Turk, Venezia e i turchi.

The “East Asian miracle”, involving the phenomenal growth experience of countries such as South Korea and Taiwan, has attracted enormous intellectual attention in recent years. What has been striking in the development experience of countries like South Korea and Taiwan is not only their ability to achieve extremely high rates of economic growth, an average of nine to percent per annum sustained over the course of three decades, but also their capacity to combine these high rates of economic growth with equally striking performances in relation to other major indicators of development. These, in turn, include a relatively egalitarian pattern of income distribution, eradication of absolute poverty on a broad scale, significant employment creation as well as the virtual absence of macroeconomic crises. The Turkish experience also constitutes an interesting case of late industrialization from a comparative perspective. It is clearly a case of moderate success judged by the East Asian standards of economic growth. Furthermore, Turkey has displayed patterns of income inequality and macroeconomic instability that are, in many ways, closer to “Latin American” standards. Yet, from a different perspective, when we exclude the East Asian superperformers from our sample, Turkey’s growth performance, an average of five to six percent per annum over time, compares favorably with other late industrializers. Indeed, what makes Turkey particularly interesting and somewhat unique from a comparative perspective is that these reasonably high rates of economic growth and the creation of a substantial industrial base over time have been accomplished within the framework of broadly democratic institutions during the post-war period.

This article analyzes the practice of suretyship (kefalet), surveillance and taxation in early nineteenth-century İstanbul. It deals with how the practice of suretyship functioned to achieve social control; it provided shelter for some but at the same time marginalized others with little or no social status. This article also analyzes the extent to which the state maintained order through suretyship. In this way, it intends to capture where and how state and society interacted through social and state control mechanisms. To this end, this article takes into consideration two particular events, the Greek uprising of 1821 and the abolition of the Janissary Corps in 1826, and demonstrates a growing tendency towards impersonal relations in terms of governmental practices of surveillance. Briefly, it illustrates how suretyship changed over time and how a gradual transition took place from personal to impersonal relations as well as within governmental practices. Furthermore, this article provides examples of similar practices by focusing on an institutional development that involved the government systematically accumulating knowledge about the population. Finally, it explores taxation practices by the government in order to. show how the pre-modern (contractual) and the modern (statutory) state were not substitutes for each other, but rather shaped each other.