After reviewing progress in Latin America's economic stabilization and international competitiveness in the last two decades, this essay discusses the current post–Washington Consensus “social democratic convergence” agenda, which aims to sharpen market efficiency, improve the quality of democratic governance, and advance equity goals by attacking the social deficit. Two illustrative examples, at opposite ends of the development spectrum, are Nicaragua's pro-CAFTA agenda and Chile's Chile Compete program. More generally, pluralistic democracy can hamper progress by giving veto powers to recalcitrant vested interests; but enlightened political leadership can make gains by combining carefully crafted coalitions, international support, popular pressures, and an attractive ideological message.

Since the early 1990s, World Bank officials in many countries have pressed their government borrowers to include nongovernmental organizations as development partners. What impact has this new partnership norm had in the bank's borrower countries, and why? This article investigates these questions through longitudinal analysis of three cases: Guatemala, Ecuador, and the Gambia. In their first iteration in the 1990s, these bank-sponsored efforts generally failed to take root; yet by the 2000s, NGOs and state actors were engaged in multiple partnerships. This article suggests that over time, bank officials' repeated efforts to embed these new ideas fostered a social learning process that led NGOs to adopt more strategic partnership practices and government officials to see NGO partners as useful. Several factors may affect this learning process: levels of professionalism and the growth of professional networks, the presence of effective “bridge builders,” and the level of historical conflicts.

Between 1996 and 2009, a process of struggle for and (after 2002) partial achievement of the second incorporation of the popular sectors took place in Argentina. This process involved a combination of routine and contentious political dynamics that reformulated state-society relations in the postcorporatist period. As a continuation of the first incorporation (1943–55), the second incorporation displayed some similar features; other attributes were specific to this second process, mainly that it was not corporatist but territorial and that the central agents of transformation were not trade unions but the disincorporated popular sectors, which were territorially organized into a “reincorporation movement.” This article conceptualizes these dynamics and analyzes the role played by the main political actor related to this historical process, the piquetero (picketer) movement.

There is no other country where the division between the old and young electorate is as striking as in Chile. For older voters, turnout exceeded, on average, 90 percent in 2009; for those aged less than 30, it fell below 30 percent. Using individual survey data from 2006, 2008, and 2010, this article studies the current socioeconomic composition of the Chilean young electorate. First, it shows that the young electorate is class-biased. Income is highly correlated with both registration and turnout even after controlling for education. Second, it presents evidence that class bias for the whole electorate has been increasing over time, due to generational replacement. The results are not promising for Chile’s democracy in the years to come, since equal participation is worsening over time.

This article analyzes the relationship between ideas, interests, and institutions in the 1996 reform of the civil service in Uruguay. Beneath the appearance of a process led by technocratic principles, the reform's agenda and content were shaped by legitimating principles, strongly institutionalized interests, and the political legacy of earlier failed reform attempts. Reformers sought a strategy of a reform “without losers,” which, instead of gathering support for adoption and implementation, sought to minimize opposition. This deliberately low-profile strategy left people unaware of the reform's achievements and thereby reinforced a political culture that has made resistance to change both a political virtue and an inescapable condition.