This article challenges two prominent explanations for military behavior: militaries, like other bureaucracies, will seek to maximize their budgets; and in the interest of maintaining professionalism, militaries will perform sovereignty missions—external defense and counterinsurgency—more intensively than policing functions. Running counter to these expectations, since 2000, Ecuador’s army has neglected its professional, lucrative mission of northern border defense, instead focusing on police work. The analysis applies organization theory to argue that the army’s minimal border defense efforts have been a way to maintain predictability for patrols on the ground, the part of the army that most directly performs the army’s core function of security. Specifically, the article traces how a contradiction has emerged in the army’s border mission. The contradiction has meant anything but predictability for the work of troops patrolling the border, compromising the mission.

How can policymakers reduce public fear of crime in Latin America? This study compares the effectiveness of “zero tolerance” and community-based policing strategies in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. At the micro level, it assesses the links between fear of crime and social identity characteristics, contextual factors, the media, community participation, and other insecurities. It finds that citizens' economic, political, and social insecurities are the main determinants of their fear of crime. At the macro level, the study compares levels of public insecurity and finds that cities that employ community-based strategies to fight crime register lower levels of public fear of crime.

For years, nongovernmental terrorism in Latin America was considered an epiphenomenon of the Cold War. The persistence of this type of political violence in the 1990s, however, not only belied many assumptions about its causes but also led scholars to reexamine the phenomenon. This article investigates the validity of a number of hypotheses by applying a pooled time-series cross-section regression analysis to data from 17 Latin American countries between 1980 and 1995. Findings indicate that nongovernmental terrorist acts in Latin America are more likely to occur in poorly institutionalized regimes characterized by varying degrees of political and electoral liberties, a deficient rule of law, and widespread human rights violations. The analysis also shows that nongovernmental terrorism in the region tends to surface in cyclical waves; but it finds no association between economic performance or structural economic conditions and the incidence of nongovernmental terrorism.

Institutional effectiveness varies widely across Chile's 346 municipalities. Whereas some local governments seem to work with impeccable precision, others struggle to deliver basic services and welfare benefits to the population. This article seeks to explain why such variation exists; it combines quantitative and qualitative evidence to show how mayors can play a crucial role in building institutional effectiveness. The study focuses on the administration of Chile's municipal job placement offices. It finds that municipalities where mayors have held office for three or more consecutive terms exhibit stronger institutional capacity than those localities where electoral turnover is the norm. The analysis, therefore, underscores an interesting finding: electoral competition has the potential both to improve and to undermine administrative capacity.

Virtually no one in the United States raised objections to the 1964 military takeover of the Brazilian civilian government. In the early 1970s, however, the Brazilian regime had become associated with torture and the arbitrary rule of law. By the end of that decade, compliance with human rights standards had developed into a yardstick for measuring U.S. foreign policy initiatives in Latin America. This paper argues that between 1969 and 1974, a small group of dedicated church activists, exiled Brazilians, and academics introduced the issue of human rights in Latin America into the U.S. national body politic. A network of concerned activists fashioned a systematic campaign to educate journalists, government officials, and the public about the abuses taking place under the generals' rule. Their activities helped isolate the military regime and laid the groundwork for a broader solidarity movement with Latin American popular struggles in the late 1970s and 1980s.

In the last 20 years, two broadly defined theories have sought to explain the relationship between economic inequality and redistribution. The well-known hypothesis set forth by Meltzer and Richard (1981) states that larger income differences between the median voter and the average income earner should increase redistributive pressures in democratic regimes. Power Resource Theory (PRT), by contrast, argues that income inequality breeds power inequality and should dampen redistribution. Critical to both theories is the translation of redistributive interest into policy signals. This article considers protests as signals that increase the salience of inequality among voters. Results provide evidence that protests facilitate more progressive cash transfers in highly unequal environments but have modest effects in more egalitarian ones.

This study of Uruguay's Frente Amplio explores four central questions for the analysis of the “new Latin American left.” How did a leftist alternative emerge and grow inside an institutionalized party system? How do the socioeconomic and political factors that enabled the rise of the left in Uruguay differ from those observed in other Latin American cases? How did Frente Amplio adapt itself to profit from the opportunities that arose during the 1990s? What are the implications of the previous factors for governmental action by the FA? In answering these questions, this study integrates an analysis of the sociological and political-institutional opportunity structures consolidated during the 1990s with one of strategic partisan adaptation processes. This perspective is useful for explaining how, by 2004, Frente Amplio had built a dual support base from its historical constituency and a socially heterogeneous group alienated from traditional parties due to economic and political discontent.

Why do armed groups fighting in civil wars establish different institutions in territories where they operate? This article tests the mechanisms of a theory that posits that different forms of wartime social order are the outcome of a process in which an aspiring ruler—an armed group—expands the scope of its rule as much as possible unless civilians push back. Instead of being always at the mercy of armed actors, civilians arguably have bargaining power if they can credibly threaten combatants with collective resistance. Such resistance, in turn, is a function of the quality of preexisting local institutions. Using a process-driven natural experiment in three villages in Central Colombia, this article traces the effects of institutional quality on wartime social order.

Democracy affords citizens the ability to influence policy through participation in elections and through direct political action. Though previous scholarship evaluates the impact each strategy has on outcomes, little if any work exists that examines how one strategy, direct action, affects success in the other, elections. This study analyzes the relationship between land occupations and the electoral success of the Workers' Party in Brazil between 1996 and 2006. It finds that the relationship varies in presidential and mayoral elections depending on income inequality and incumbency. Once the PT captures the presidential office in 2002, these effects disappear, suggesting that the effect of political protest also depends on who is in office.