Différentes études suggèrent que le ne de négation se perd de plus en plus en français parlé (cf. Ashby, 2001 ; Armstrong et Smith, 2002 ; Hansen et Malderez, 2004). Notre travail pose la question de savoir si un tel développement peut également être observé dans l’oral mis en scène. Nous analysons pour ce faire le changement du langage mis en scène au fil du temps ainsi que le changement médial entre le drame écrit et son adaptation. Notre corpus se compose du drame Marius (1929) de Marcel Pagnol, du film Marius (1931) d’Alexander Korda et du remake Marius de Daniel Auteuil (2013). Nous avons analysé ce corpus selon l’approche classique de la sociolinguistique, en considérant le ne de négation comme variable sociolinguistique (cf. Labov, 1972). Nos résultats montrent que l’oral mis en scène dans le drame se distingue nettement de la façon dont parlent les personnages dans les films, puisque le ne y figure bien plus souvent. Par ailleurs, le nombre bien plus élevé de ne dans le remake de 2013 que dans la version de 1931 pourrait être une stratégie mise en place pour représenter de l’oral ancien.

The year 2020 proved to be a clarion call for global society. There is no longer doubt that increasingly we are experiencing unpredictable events, known as ‘black swans’, ranging from pandemics to financial meltdowns. One of the ’climate black swans’ against which experts have cautioned is the financial crisis caused by climate change. In this context, the Australian case of McVeigh v. Retail Employees Superannuation Trust for the first time tested climate risk and the fiduciary duties of retail pension funds. Settled in November 2020, the case has already raised the bar for climate risk practice in pension funds. In particular, McVeigh suggests that courts, as well as out-of-court settlements, may articulate a duty, rather than grant permission, for pension funds to consider climate-related financial risk in their investment decisions.

The article builds on McVeigh to ask two questions. Firstly, what is the role of climate change litigation in promoting climate regulation by pension funds? Secondly, what is the relative importance of pension funds for the risk management of climate-related financial risk via due diligence compared with risk assessment via disclosure? Fundamentally, the article explains climate-related financial risk as a cultural phenomenon and argues that a discussion on pension fund fiduciary duties must consider disclosure in addition to due diligence. It argues that McVeigh articulated the need for a normative approach to pension fund disclosure duties and an extension of the field of climate-related risk disclosure to embrace climate-related risk due diligence.

La mise en scène du langage parlé est un élément central de la bande dessinée: les discours directs des protagonistes sont non seulement visuellement représentés par des bulles, mais leur langage se caractérise souvent aussi par les marques phonologiques et morpho-syntaxiques typiques de l’oral afin d’évoquer l’immédiat communicatif. Cet article se propose ainsi d’étudier, sur le plan phonologique, des phénomènes tels que les élisions, les aphérèses et même certaines marques prosodiques ainsi que, sur le plan morphosyntaxique, entre autres l’omission du ne de négation, les dislocations et l’absence du il impersonnel. On s’interrogera notamment sur les convergences entre l’oralité fictive des bandes dessinées et les résultats des études de l’oralité basées sur des corpus authentiques. L’analyse s’appuie sur un corpus de deux bandes dessinées francophones, comprenant un tome respectivement des séries Astérix et Titeuf. L’étude est basée sur une grille inspirée, entre autres, par la catégorisation des phénomènes de l’immédiat communicatif par Koch et Oesterreicher (2011) et complétée de manière inductive (corpus-driven). L’article montre que les deux sous-corpus révèlent des stratégies d’oralisation divergentes: alors que dans Astérix, on trouve un grand nombre de phénomènes phonologiques suprasegmentaux représentés, notamment au niveau de la typographie, Titeuf privilégie l’utilisation de marques morphosyntaxiques ainsi que de certains phénomènes phonologiques segmentaux.

While access to civil-law institutions has been a traditional area of socio-legal research, access to administrative justice still constitutes an underresearched field. In the field of administrative law, public ombuds institutions represent an important pathway to resolve disputes without invoking a court. To date, we have little knowledge about who uses these ombuds institutions and which factors facilitate access to the ombuds. In this paper, on the basis of our survey among users of the Austrian Ombudsman Board (n = 8,274), we explore the effects of institutional design on the user population. The findings suggest that the two outreach measures – regular consultation days and a weekly TV broadcast – contribute to reducing existing inequalities with regard to users’ sociodemographic characteristics.

Over the course of the first two decades of the twenty-first century, within the occupied Palestinian territories, photographic technologies and image-oriented politics would grow increasingly central as activist and human-rights tools of bearing witness to Israeli state and settler violence. This essay investigates the Israeli right-wing and international Zionist response to these Palestinian visual archives and their perceived threat. In particular, it tracks the rise and normalization of a repudiation script that impugned the veracity of these images, arguing that they were fraudulent or manipulated to produce a damning portrait of Israel. Drawing on post-colonial and settler-colonial studies, as placed into dialogue with digital media studies, the essay focuses on three cases studies of repudiation (2000, 2008, 2014, respectively) to consider how the long colonial history of repudiation in the Israeli context would be progressively updated by right-wing Israelis and their international supporters to meet the challenges posed by the smartphone age. By the second decade of the twenty-first century, the script had become an increasingly standard Zionist response to viral images of Palestinian death or injury at Israeli state or settler hands. Repudiation was thus marshaled as a solution to the viral visibility of Israeli state violence by bringing the otherwise damning images back into line with dominant Israeli ideology, a process of shifting the narrative from Palestinian injury to Israeli victimhood. The story of the “false” image of Palestinian injury endeavors strips the visual field of its Israeli perpetrators and Palestinian victims, thereby exonerating the state. Or such is the nature of this digital fantasy in the Israeli colonial present.

Just three weeks after the World Health Organization (WHO) recognized COVID-19 as a global pandemic, novelist Arundhati Roy wrote: ‘Historically, pandemics have forced humans to break with the past and imagine their world anew. This one is no different. It is a portal, a gateway between one world and the next.’1

Since the 2012 sanctions that dis-embedded the Iranian economy from global markets, contraband commerce has become an explosive issue in Iran. Increasingly Iranians came to regard sanctions as enforced by both international powers and their own state officials, who criminalized certain kinds of cross-border trade, but not others. Although Iranian state actors distinguish between the trader—praised for contributing to the economy—and the traitor—denounced for undermining its integrity—what both unites and blurs the line between them is their shared struggle with a devaluing currency that some Iranians call nuclear. This article examines the “nuclear rial” by extending insights from anthropological scholarship on money to the study of sanctions to advance a dynamic understanding of currency. Studying Iranian trade in gold proves productive for understanding how people negotiate the effects of sanctions in an unevenly financialized world. At stake in the negotiations is a conditional articulation of monetary value that relies on contingent conversions between commodities and currencies and among currencies.

Human dignity, effective human rights protection and the rule of law are the backbones of the legal system of the European Union (EU).1 The EU and its member states have been front-runners in human rights protection not only on its own territory, but also beyond in their relationship with third countries. They have been the principal standard-setters in the field of business and human rights (BHR). The majority of the EU member states (15 out of 27) have so far adopted National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights.2 As far as legislative action goes, the EU has in recent years adopted two binding legal acts in the BHR field, namely, a Directive requiring obligatory non-financial reporting for large corporations3 and a Regulation concerning mandatory due diligence for the EU-based importers of minerals and metals from conflict-ridden areas.4 More recently, the European Parliament and the European Commission have been working towards adoption of a general directive for obligatory human rights and environmental due diligence for large corporations.5

Institutions can be strong or weak. But what does this mean? Equilibrium theories equate institutions with behavioural regularities. In contrast, rule theories explicate them in terms of a standard that people are supposed to meet. I propose that, when an institution is weak, a discrepancy exists between the regularity and the standard or rule. To capture this discrepancy, I present a hybrid theory, the Rules-and-Equilibria Theory. According to this theory, institutions are rule-governed behavioural regularities. The Rules-and-Equilibria Theory provides the basis for two measures of institutional strength. First, institutions that pertain to coordination games solve problems of information. Their strength is primarily a matter of the expected degree of compliance. Second, institutions that concern mixed-motive games solve problems of motivation. Their strength can be measured in terms of the weight people attribute to its rule.

This article examines the Turkish State’s recent practice of removing pro-Kurdish mayors and appointing trustees in their place without holding new elections. By comparing previous cases of removals of pro-Kurdish mayors to post-2016 practices, it argues that the discursive shift in legitimizing recent anti-democratic governmental practices should be read in relation to authoritarian neoliberalism in Turkey. To this end, it analyzes a Twitter account dedicated to promoting public services of trustee-ran municipalities (oluyor.net) and 89 YouTube videos that feature the trustees themselves. By demonstrating the ways in which the trustees themselves promote their work in Kurdish-populated cities, it underlines the dangers of authoritarian neoliberalism in subordinating democratic mechanisms to economic development and providing better public services. However, by studying the results of the following 2019 local elections in these 89 trustee-appointed municipalities, this article shows that the local people mostly continue supporting democratic mechanisms by electing pro-Kurdish candidates even in unfair electoral conditions.

This article explains how the Turkish nation’s composition has changed under Justice and Development Party rule. Turkish nationalism and Turkish national identity have dramatically changed since 2010, when the Kurdish Opening process was started by former prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The Syrian refugee crisis and the influx of Syrian refugees into Turkey created another change in Turkish national identity. Increasing religiosity in Turkey and the use of Islam by the Justice and Development Party created a flexible nation, where all Sunni Muslims can be considered members even though they are not ethnically Turkish. The author uses primary sources, such as President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s speeches since 2010, to show how his discourse became more embracing of non-Turkish Muslim groups and created a dynastic understanding of nationalism based on religion rather than the idea of an ethnically homogenous, secular Turkish nation.

From the dawn of the 1978–79 Iranian Revolution until the consolidation of Hizbullah in the late 1980s, a network of Iranian, Lebanese, and Palestinian clerics played a crucial role in spreading the revolution to Lebanon and laying the groundwork for Hizbullah. Whereas the historiography of the post-1979 Iran–Lebanon relationship is overwhelmingly focused on Hizbullah, the present study, by drawing on oral history interviews with these clerics and archival materials, contends that the Iranian Revolution came to Lebanon primarily through these Shi‘i and Sunni clerics, who joined ranks and established the Association of Muslim ‘Ulama’ in Lebanon in the wake of the 1982 Israeli invasion. This study argues that these clerics modeled their struggle on the ‘ulama’-led and mosque-based example of the 1978–79 revolution, which this paper describes as the Khomeinist script, to transcend sect to seed a revolution in Lebanon and mass mobilize against the invasion. This article concludes that the ecumenical script was highly appealing to non-Shi‘i Islamists, a key factor in the success of exporting the revolution and the rise of Hizbullah in Lebanon.

In 1862, al-Ḥājj ʿUmar Fūtī Tall (d. 1864) conquered a prominent Muslim polity of the Middle Niger valley, the Caliphate of Ḥamdallāhi. Several months earlier, he had penned a long polemical work, Bayān mā waqaʿa, where he outlined his conflict with Ḥamdallāhi's ruler, Aḥmad III (d. 1862), and presented a legal justification for his eventual conquest. Al-Ḥājj ʿUmar was one of several West African Muslim intellectuals who articulated a new vision of power in the region. These intellectuals linked legitimate political rule with mastery over Islamic knowledge that they claimed only they had. Yet these linkages between religious authority and political power remain understudied. Al-Ḥājj ʿUmar's Bayān offers one example of political theology in nineteenth-century West Africa. In this article, I trace his arguments and explain how he constructs his authority and claims to sovereignty in this work. In the process, I conceptualize two theoretical frameworks — the ‘political geography of belief’ and the ‘political theology of knowledge’ — to demonstrate how a careful engagement with Arabic sources can help develop new approaches to the study of Muslim communities in African history and beyond.

The marginal case of the decolonisation of Comoros has gained little attention from historians of Africa. By tracing the evolution of the Mouvement de libération nationale des Comores (MOLINACO) around East Africa's Indian Ocean basin, this article explores the possibilities and constraints of anticolonial organisation among a diaspora population whose own existence was threatened by the more exclusive political order that emerged from the process of decolonisation. In Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Kenya, and Madagascar, MOLINACO's activities were shaped and limited by contested issues of racial identity, island genealogy, partisan alignment, and international priorities among both the Comorian diaspora and their ‘host’ governments. Through a transterritorial approach, this article examines the difficulties for minority communities in navigating the transition from empire to nation-state, while also illustrating the challenges MOLINACO faced in its ultimately unsuccessful attempt to impose that same normative model onto the archipelago.

This article revisits Japan's empire-building in Northeast China through the construction of and reactions to the Daidō hiroba 大同広場 (Plaza of Great Unity) in Shinkyō, showing how Chinese and Japanese challenged the top-down attempt for building a totalitarian empire. These re-interpretations and definitions of Hiroba unveiled the diversity, dynamics, and complexity of Manchukuo society that cannot be fully grasped in a nation-state framework. Moreover, their voices challenged the previous depiction of such imperial monumental space as the physical materialization of imperial governmentality but a contested site where individuals challenged the official vision of Manchukuo. This article examines documents ranging from governmental documents to works of literature in both Chinese and Japanese. Compared to Japanese planners' vision of the Hiroba as a site of governmentality, visitors and local residents held differing interpretations of this space: some Japanese disapproved the attempt to reframe the urban space by a totalitarian regime, and many Chinese redefined the meaning of this “utopian” urban space to accord with their own tradition and everyday life.