This article is about national identity, political interest and the creation of international human rights regimes. Geographically, it is focused on Western Europe and the very recent process of establishing the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Both national identity and political interest are seen as important determinants of this process, defining its discourse and outcome. The relationship between the two is complex and recursive. They influence each other to an extent that warrants seeing them as mutually constitutive. On one hand, the social, political and economic projects elites engage in have to resonate positively with dearly held elements of national identity but have also the power to modify them. Being a psychological phenomenon, on the other hand, national identity is a dynamic concept that employs common historically defined memories, traditions and customs but is also subject to the influence of the political context within which it operates.

In March 2002 the United States and Uzbekistan signed a Declaration of Strategic Partnership. This document marked a qualitative break in the international relations of Uzbekistan and, to some degree, the United States' relations with Central Asia. Uzbekistan had sought closer relations with the United States since its independence in September 1991. But the course of U.S.-Uzbek relations was not smooth. Various obstacles hindered Tashkent's progress in making a positive impression on successive U.S. administrations in the last decade of the twentieth century. Tashkent's abysmal human rights record and the snail's pace of democratic reforms made the notion of closer ties with Uzbekistan unsavoury for U.S. policy makers. At the same time, Washington was more concerned with developments in Russia. Other former Soviet republics, especially the five Central Asian states, were relegated to the periphery of the U.S. strategic outlook. But the dramatic events of September 11 and the subsequent U.S.-led “war on terror” changed the geopolitical landscape of Central Asia. The consequent development of ties between Tashkent and Washington was beyond the wildest dreams of Uzbek foreign policy makers. Virtually overnight, Uzbek leaders found themselves in a position to pursue an ambitious foreign policy without being slowed by domestic considerations.

Slovenia's geographical position has exposed it to the underlying trends of European spiritual and cultural life from the Middle Ages to the present. The adoption of Christianity by the end of the first millennium, the incorporation of medieval political structures, and economic and cultural trends, were paralleled by Slovenes who adopted European culture. Ever since, Slovenia has been part of the broad framework of Central European spiritual and cultural life as it has unfolded and developed up to today.

The article intends to combine contemporary debates about nations and nationalism with a sociological perspective on collective emotions in its attempt to gain a better understanding of the process of constructing national identity. It will further present interdisciplinary evidence that collective emotions evoked in rituals instigate a number of group-related sociocognitive processes that reinforce enduring feelings of belonging and an emotional priming of collective representations. I will suggest that states of “collective effervescence” (Durkheim) do not only tie individuals to a community, but also provide a strong frame for the creation of symbols and the embodiment of shared meanings defining a community. The second part of the article analyzes examples taken from the football media coverage of the FIFA World Cups 2006 and 1974 (both were held in Germany) in order to provide a comparative case study exemplifying the proposed theoretical approach. The sample illuminates some interesting changes that invite further hypotheses about corresponding changes of national identity in a larger context.

In this paper we explore, through the narratives and perspectives of “old residents” in post-Soviet Bishkek, the dominant discourse which has emerged towards rural migrants arriving to the city from other areas of Kyrgyzstan from the late Soviet period onwards. We investigate the existence of a primarily “antagonistic” discourse in relation to the migrants and analyze this in detail to understand how it illuminates wider concerns amongst residents about what is occurring in their city, and about wider processes of social change in Kyrgyzstan. The paper provides a revealing insight into the processes of urban change in post-Soviet Central Asia, and demonstrates the ways in which confrontation with the everyday harsh realities of post-Soviet transformation can lead to the negative “othering” of one group of urban residents by another. We also demonstrate how the “old residents”’ perceptions of migrants reveal important insights into emerging notions and constructions of identity in the post-Soviet period, related in this case to understandings of “North” and “South'1 and related concepts of what is “urban” and what is “Kyrgyz”.

In December 1918, Hungary ceded 21,000 square kilometers to what was soon to become the Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian Monarchy. According to 1910 census data, of the total 577,000 ethnic Hungarian population on the ceded territory, one-fifth came under the jurisdiction of Croatia, approximately one-twentieth came under the jurisdiction of Slovenia, and the rest became citizens of Serbia in the region that was to become the autonomous province of Vojvodina. According to 1991 census data, the Hungarian-speaking minority decreased by 200,000 (over one-third), and its proportion of the population also changed: currently, only 6 percent live in independent Croatia and 2 percent in independent Slovenia. The population of Hungarians in Croatia decreased by four-fifths, and that of Slovenia decreased by two-thirds. Already between 1980 and 1990, the decrease in the Hungarian minority population exceeded 10 percent in both republics. Despite the differences in the condition of the Hungarian community in Croatia and Slovenia, their total assimilation can be averted only if serious measures are taken. An analysis of the political, economic, demographic, cultural and other factors contributing to the population decline since the post-world war peace treaties is beyond the scope of this article. I would merely like to point out the general demographic trends and indicate that, according to estimates, the Hungarian population is 1.5 times larger (22,400 in Croatia and 8,500 in Slovenia) than the figure revealed by census data.

Bulgarian majority and Turkish minority relations have remained peaceful in the post Communist era despite a significant potential for civil strife. These antagonisms were a product of Bulgaria's historical political development. The most recent episode of forced assimilation policies under the Communist regime was a critical grievance contributing to the democratic transition in 1989. Unlike in neighboring Yugoslavia, communal ethnic conflict did not escalate to violence with political liberalization and the emergence of democratic political competition. A critical factor in the political formula for maintaining interethnic peace in Bulgaria has been Turkey's comparatively constrained behavior as a “motherland state” with regard to the Turkish Diaspora in Bulgaria.